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 This dissertation argues that between 1830 and 1914, with increasing intensity 
over time, French Catholic missionaries sowed divisions among the European population 
of French Algeria. The French government initially welcomed missionaries to cater to 
religiously devout Spanish, Italian, and Maltese settlers in Algeria and to foster their 
loyalty to the colonial state. Missionaries, however, incited the professional jealousy and 
personal animosity of the territory’s generally less devout French population, who saw 
Catholicism and missionaries as little different from Islam and the “fanatical” Muslim 
population. Throughout this period, missionaries thus occupied a liminal space in the 
racialized hierarchy of colonial rule. As such, their presence disrupted colonial 
taxonomies that positioned a “civilized” European population as superior to an 
“uncivilized” indigenous one. 
 For their part, missionaries saw Algeria as a blank slate in which to create a 
Catholic society they perceived as increasingly foreclosed in a secularizing Europe. At 
the same time, in the extralegal space of Algeria, missionaries relied on seemingly “pre-
modern” networks of privilege and patronage to win support. The stress caused by 
navigating these dense patronage networks in an increasingly hostile environment created 
discord among missionaries. On the most localized level of power, missionaries 
competed with each other to carve out their own niches of authority. Male missionaries 
 v 
competed to administer sacraments to female missionaries, while the latter sought to 
assert their own autonomy by procuring friendly spiritual advisors or secular authorities 
who would allow them the most individual latitude. In the end, these political ploys only 
undermined their efforts to spread the Catholic faith and to portray themselves as useful 
to government officials. 
 Ultimately, this dissertation reveals that colonial officials of all types framed the 
need to govern the settler population as a crucial component of the larger goal of ruling 
over the conquered indigenous population. As such, it re-conceptualizes France’s well-
known civilizing mission as directed as much towards this settler population as towards 
the indigenous one. At the same time, in showing that colonial officials utterly failed in 
their attempt to mold a unified settler community, this dissertation further reveals the 
fragility of the bonds that supposedly held the colonial settlers together and the tenuous 
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 1 
Introduction: Missionaries, Settlers, and the Colonial State 
 
 Between 1830 and 1914, with increasing intensity over time, French Catholic 
missionaries sowed divisions among the European population of French Algeria and 
preoccupied the French colonial government. Although fully European in birth and 
nationality – that is, in no way a métis population in the traditional sense of the word – 
missionaries occupied a liminal space between European rulers and North African 
subjects that further disrupts the notion that a clear racial divide separated colonizer from 
colonized.1 Never fully subject to the rule of law, but neither entirely servants to the 
arbitrary regime of exception that ruled native Algerians, missionaries floated uneasily in 
a contested and ever-changing colonial space, appearing variously as nodes of 
communication that either transmitted or subverted expressions of power between the 
imperial regime and its diverse subjects, citizens, and functionaries.2  
 Missionary work in Algeria did not fail to garner publicity. An array of actors, 
including the colonial press, the military and civilian governments, lay settlers, and 
indigenous subjects, all offered their opinions on the benefits and liabilities of welcoming 
missionaries to the territory. The multiple and varied discourses that surrounded and 
enveloped these missionaries did little to clarify their potential to facilitate or undermine 
                                                
1 Recent historiography has portrayed the mixed-race populations in the colonies as the group that most 
disrupted imperial taxonomies and hierarchies. See Ann Laura Stoler, Carnal Knowledge and Imperial 
Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), Owen 
White, Children of the French Empire: Miscegenation and Colonial Society in French West Africa, 1895-
1960 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), Emmanuelle Saada, Les enfants de la colonie: les métis 
de l’Empire français entre sujétion et citoyenneté (Paris: La Découverte, 2007), Philippa Levine, 
Prostitution, Race & Politics: Policing Venereal Disease in the British Empire (New York: Routledge, 
2003), Julia Clancy-Smith and Frances Gouda, eds., Domesticating the Empire: Race, Gender, and Family 
Life in French and Dutch Colonialism (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1998). 
2 The arbitrary regime of exception was embodied, after 1881, in the law code known as the indigénat. See 
Isabelle Merle, “Retour sur le régime de l’Indigénat: Genèse et contradictions des principes répressifs dans 
l’empire français,” French Politics, Culture, Society 20:2 (2002): 77-97, and Gregory Mann, “What was the 
Indigénat? The ‘Empire of Law’ in French West Africa,” The Journal of African History 50/03 (November 
2009): 331-353. 
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colonial rule. Throughout the period from 1830 to 1914, the nature of the relationships 
between and among missionaries and settlers, as well as the political dangers these 
relationships posed to the state, remained remarkably confused; and this confusion and 
the anxiety it engendered stemmed directly from the weakness, instability, and 
incoherence of the colonial state. 
 Beginning in the 1830s, the French military government welcomed Catholic 
missionaries from France and from the Vatican as part of its effort to encourage European 
settlement in Algeria. Officials encouraged missionaries to provide religious services for 
Catholic settlers in Algeria in order to tie them and their families to the colony. If settlers 
could find sufficient religious resources in their adopted homeland, officials reasoned, 
they would have less of an incentive to return to France or elsewhere in Europe. From the 
very beginning, though, reality never corresponded to expectations. Unlike in France, the 
French population in Algeria constituted a minority of the overall Catholic European 
population.3 French colonial officials were thus faced with the dilemma of having to 
choose whether to use missionaries to “assimilate” these foreigners (and the minority of 
French Catholics) by spreading their universalist ideal of French culture and language or 
to allow missionaries to provide for these settlers’ particular needs by fostering their own 
religious customs and preaching and ministering to them in their own native languages – 
typically Spanish, Italian, and Maltese.4 
 To complicate matters, French rule throughout much of the nineteenth century 
resembled a system of dual power, in which after 1848 civilian officials theoretically 
                                                
3 For foreign Catholics in France, see Gérard Cholvy, “La religiosité populaire dans la France méridionale: 
jalons pour une sociologie historique,” L’Année sociologique, Troisieme série 28 (1988): 169-192. 
4 Julia Clancy-Smith analyzes in depth the multi-ethnic population of North Africa, especially Tunisia, in 
Clancy-Smith, Mediterraneans: North Africa and Europe in an Age of Migration, 1800-1900 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2010). 
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administered areas occupied primarily by Europeans while military officials governed 
lands where native Algerians constituted a majority.5 Until at least 1880, the military and 
civilian regimes remained divided over whether to pursue a policy of assimilation or 
association in their attempts to tie settlers to the colonial state. Generally speaking, the 
military regime hoped to treat foreign settlers and their religion much like they purported 
to treat conquered Algerians and their religion – by allowing them to retain their religious 
and linguistic heritage in return for pledging their political loyalty to the state. The 
civilian regime too sought to govern the foreigners as it claimed to rule the indigènes, but 
it pursued the goal of assimilating outsiders to a universalist conception of French 
belonging rooted in the tradition of the Revolution of 1789, while leaving them to their 
own devices to fulfill their particular religious needs in the privacy of their own homes 
and chapels.6 Either way, officials from each camp applied their respective ideologies 
much more consistently and wholeheartedly to the settler population than to the 
indigenous one.7  
                                                
5 See Claude Collot, Les institutions de l’Algérie durant la période coloniale (Paris: CNRS, 1987) and John 
Ruedy, Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 
1992), 72-76. 
6 For policies of assimilation and association towards native Algerians see Osama W. Abi-Mershed, 
Apostles of Modernity: Saint-Simonians and the Civilizing Mission in Algeria (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2010). For policies of association and assimilation in the French empire more generally, 
see Raymond Betts, Assimilation and Association in French Colonial Theory, 1890-1914 (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1961). For the universalist expression and legacy of the French Revolution, 
specifically of Jacobinism, see Patrice Higonnet, Goodness Beyond Virtue: Jacobins during the French 
Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998) and Sudhir Hazareesingh, The Jacobin 
Legacy in Modern France: Essays in Honour of Vincent Wright (London: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
For the limits of French universalism from the Revolution to the present, see Joan Scott Only Paradoxes to 
Offer: French Feminists and the Rights of Man (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997) and Joan 
Landes, Women and the Public Sphere in the Age of the French Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1988). 
7 David Scott, channeling Michel Foucault, speaks of the emergence in the 1830s of a “colonial 
governmentality,” by which colonial rule (specifically in British controlled Ceylon) transitioned from the 
administration of territory to the administration of a population; or from the repressive power of territorial 
rule to the productive power of forging colonial subjects by producing new forms of individual conduct and 
subjectivities. If we apply certain insights of Frederick Cooper concerning the limited and uneven reach of 
the imperial state, however, we could argue that such desire to produce colonial subjects often had a very 
 4 
 Regardless of the policy pursued at any given moment, the extralegal effort to 
control missionaries reveals the limits of the supposed juridical assimilation between 
France and Algeria, while the arc traced by a history of missionary work correlates little 
with the major political and social upheavals that shaped the historical trajectory of 
metropolitan France. That arc took shape, rather, according to the unexpected difficulties 
the colonial regime encountered in its attempt to govern the diverse European population 
of Algeria. Despite the supposed transition to civilian rule in 1848, and the full 
assimilation of Algeria to France in 1870-71, the military would continually flout the rule 
of law and come to the aid of foreign settlers when civilian officials threatened to 
separate them from the religious services the missionaries provided. Only after the 
application of the Ferry laws to Algeria in 1883 did the policy of association begin to 
give way to the civilian ideal of assimilation.8 Paradoxically, however, the hallmark of 
this policy – the law that naturalized foreigners en masse in 1889 – granted actual 
political rights to these freshly-naturalized settlers (néo-français) and thus at times 
allowed them to enforce their religious will on the ethnically French population (français 
                                                                                                                                            
fitful application. Rather, the colonial state harnessed the productive (labor) power of certain colonial 
subjects while largely ignoring others (except in the realm of tax collection). Drawing from both these 
insights, I would argue that Scott’s conception of colonial governmentality permeated the European settler 
community much more than the mass of Algerian colonial subjects. In this effort, the colonial state had an 
urgent need to actually invest itself in shaping European settler-citizens who in their sensibilities and 
conduct differentiated themselves from Algerian colonial subjects. See David Scott, “Colonial 
Governmentality,” in Anthropologies of Modernity: Foucault, Governmentality, and Life Politics, edited by 
Jonathon Xavier Inda (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 23-49. See also Frederick Cooper, Africa in 
the World: Capitalism, Empire, Nation-State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014). 
8 The Ferry laws of 1880-82 were the creation of Prime Minister Jules Ferry. They mandated that primary 
education be free, secular, and obligatory, though families could still opt to send their children to religious 
schools. To be sure, the laws’ application to Algeria only pertained to European children, as colonial 
officials feared the political repercussions of forcing native Algerians to send their children, especially their 
daughters, to French schools. See Antoine Prost and François Mayeur, Histoire générale de l'enseignement 
et de l'éducation en France, t. III, 1789-1930 (Paris: Perrin, 2004). See also Peter McPhee, A Social History 
of France, 1789-1914, Second edition (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), 252-255. For the 
application of the laws to Algeria see Fanny Colonna, Instituteurs Algériens, 1883-1939 (Alger: Presses de 
Science Po, 1975). 
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d’origine).9 What was supposed to constitute the pinnacle of colonial assimilation in fact 
divided the settler community more than ever before. 
 The efforts to cultivate the religious sensibilities of the settler population, to 
classify their outward manifestations and locate their potential for political subversion, 
call to mind Ann Laura Stoler’s observation that imperial rule did not only rely on the 
reign of reason, on gifting Enlightenment principles to the irrational peoples of the world; 
it also entailed the careful cultivation of affect and sentiment among the supposedly 
rational European population.10 Whereas officials in the Dutch East Indies fretted 
especially over the affective ties that bound together, or threatened to tear apart, the 
mixed-race families that disrupted and confused the imperial hierarchy, officials in 
French Algeria sought to monitor the religious sentiments of the Catholic settler 
population, all the more so as this group consisted primarily of European foreigners. In 
Algeria, religious belief already connoted political subversion in and of itself, as from the 
beginning the French classified all conquered Algerians simply according to their 
confessional identity as “Muslims.”11 The combination of such religious and political 
                                                
9 The term néo-français henceforth applied to foreigners who gained French citizenship through the law of 
1889. See also Charles Robert Ageron, Les algériens musulmans et la France, 1871-1919, Volume 1 
(Paris: PUF, 1968), 577-79. For the law of 1889, see Patrick Weil, How to Be French: Nationality in the 
Making Since 1789, translated by Catherine Porter (Raleigh: Duke University Press, 2008), 210-215. For a 
detailed discussion of the paradoxes of indigenous citizenship in Algeria see Laure Blévis, “Les avatars de 
la citoyenneté en Algérie coloniale ou les paradoxes d’une catégorisation,” Droit et société 48/2 (2001): 
557-581. 
10 Ann Laura Stoler, Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009). 
11 Indeed, after 1865 Algerians who hoped to gain French citizenship first had to renounce their personal 
status as Muslims and reject their right to Islamic courts of law. See, among many other works, Ruedy, 
Modern Algeria, 75-76. The exception to the categorization of all native Algerians as “Muslims” came in 
the form of Algeria’s substantial Jewish population (30,000 at the time of the conquest). Although many 
Frenchmen in France and Algeria characterized indigenous Jews and Muslims as equally uncivilized, a 
large number of Frenchmen, notably Jewish elites in the metropole, actively worked to assimilate Algerian 
Jews to French society and culture. This undertaking ultimately led to the Crémieux Decree of 24 October 
1870, which extended French citizenship to all Algerian Jews. To be sure, from its inception this law 
heightened anti-Semitism among Algeria’s European population, culminating in the anti-Semitic riots of 
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anxieties led the colonial state to see faith and religious belief as “especially dense 
transfer point[s] for relations of power.”12 Over time, however, officials increasingly 
divided over exactly what sentiments they ought to cultivate: whereas the military regime 
saw Catholicism as a bulwark of French civilization in the fight against Islamic 
“fanaticism,” the civilian regime increasingly identified Catholic with Islamic fanaticism 
and saw both as equally subversive. In a society that defined the political enemy 
primarily by the religion he professed, any religious sensibility whatsoever threatened to 
blur the line between ruler and ruled.  
 The government initially hoped to use religion to tie settlers to the regime, but 
research on missionaries reveals the pluripotency of faith and the unreliability of 
harnessing faith for political ends. Although officials hoped missionaries would bolster 
imperial rule by fostering unity among a diverse settler population, they more often 
sowed divisions. Not only did they divide the military from the civilian regime and 
Catholic from anticlerical settlers, but they also engendered discord within the 
community of the Catholic clergy itself. Like other European immigrants to Algeria, 
missionaries and clergymen saw the territory as a blank slate in which they could inscribe 
their own niches of professional and personal authority that remained closed off in the 
more rigid confines of the metropole. Because of their precarious financial, legal, and 
political positions, however, missionaries had to compete with each other to secure 
valuable patrons who could supply moral and financial support, typically Catholic 
                                                                                                                                            
1898. See Valérie Assan, Les consistoires israélites d’Algérie au XIXe siècle: ‘L’alliance de la civilisation 
et de la religion’ (Paris: Armand Colin, 2012); Claude Martin, Les israélites algériens de 1830 à 1902 
(Paris: Editions Herakles, 1936); and Michel Abitbol, “La citoyenneté imposée du décret Crémieux à la 
guerre d’Algérie,” in Histoire politique des juifs en France: Entre universalisme et particularisme, P. 
Birnbaum, ed. (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1990): 196-217. 
12 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol. I: An Introduction, translated by Robert Hurley (New 
York: Random House, 1978), 103. Foucault here is referring to sexuality. 
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bishops, military governors general, or civilian prefects. The strain engendered by the 
cultivation of these dense networks of patronage only caused secular clergymen and 
missionaries to encroach on one another’s terrain and to denounce one another to 
ecclesiastical and secular authorities. In many ways, their story is one of ambition, often 
thwarted, and it mirrors that of the settler population writ large.  
 Finally, although missionaries relied on these seemingly pre-modern patronage 
networks to carve out their own realms of autonomy and authority, they still saw Algeria 
as a place to forge what they saw as a religious modernity.13 Rather than seeing the 
territory as a “laboratory of modernity” whose findings could be transplanted back to the 
metropole, missionaries saw the empty space of empire as affording them the opportunity 
to forge and implant a religious present increasingly foreclosed in a secularizing France.14 
To be sure, their version of modernity looked very much backwards toward a (perhaps 
mythical) medieval past. As such, their ideal of modern Christianity correlated closely 
with that of metropolitan Catholics described by historians Raymond Jonas and Ruth 
Harris. Both historians have shown how nineteenth-century Catholics combined modern 
techniques of mass fundraising drives and organized pilgrimages with medieval imagery, 
most notably that of the Sacré-Coeur of Jesus Christ, to mobilize support for a Catholic 
revival – whether in the construction of the Sacré-Coeur cathedral on Montmartre or the 
                                                
13 Although I am aware of the critiques, offered most forcefully by Frederick Cooper, of the various uses of 
the all-encompassing term “modernity,” I avoid the potential pitfalls Cooper describes by refraining from 
attaching any agency to modernity itself. I instead use the term to depict the society that these actors hoped 
to create, a society that they described themselves as modern, even if it often took inspiration from the past. 
For the critiques of the historical uses of the term “modernity” see Cooper, Colonialism in Question: 
Theory, Knowledge, History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 133-152. 
14 For the laboratories of modernity thesis, see for example, Paul Rabinow, French Modern: Norms and 
Forms of the Social Environment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), Ann Laura Stoler, Race 
and the Education of Desire: Foucault’s History of Sexuality and the Colonial Order of Things (Raleigh: 
Duke University Press, 1995). 
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popularization of the miraculous fountain at Lourdes.15 More recently, literary scholar 
Michelle Warren has turned to the colonial world to analyze a phenomenon she terms 
“creole medievalism,” or an emerging belief among French colonists in La Réunion that 
they occupied a privileged position through which to restore France to its medieval 
glory.16 This dissertation repeatedly invokes Warren’s terminology in its contention that 
missionaries in Algeria – due both to their distance from metropolitan organs of control 
and their proximity to a large European population – saw themselves as uniquely placed 
to combat the secular society that they feared threatened to overtake metropolitan France. 
 Unfortunately for missionaries, not only did they compete with each other to 
direct the implementation of a Catholic Algeria, but they also increasingly competed with 
French anticlericals who themselves saw Algeria as a place to enact their own version of 
a secular modernity that they could not yet achieve in the metropole. Although Algeria 
constituted a French territory, it remained far enough from the relatively moderate 
policies of Paris to allow more extremist positions on both sides to prevail; and both sides 
used the colonists’ tenuous position amidst an overwhelming and menacing Muslim 
majority to radicalize their respective visions. Over time, these conflicting versions of 
modernity, both secular and religious, past- and future-oriented, would come into direct 
                                                
15 For the image of the Sacré-Coeur see Raymond Jonas, France and the Cult of the Sacred Heart: An Epic 
Tale for Modern Times (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000). For the construction of the shrine 
at Lourdes see Ruth Harris, Lourdes: Body and Spirit in the Secular Age (London: Allen Lane, 1999). 
16 This desire to implement a mythical medieval past recurs throughout this dissertation. Here I draw from 
the recent work of French literary scholar Michelle Warren, Creole Medievalism: Colonial France and 
Joseph Bédier’s Middle Ages (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011). Warren defines 
“creoles” strictly as fully white, ethnically French settlers on the island of La Réunion. Used this way, the 
term aptly applies to the nostalgic vision of missionaries in Algeria. To be sure, Warren focuses more on 
the French of Réunion who chose to study medieval French literature as a way to revive the gloriousness of 
France’s past in the present. These scholars though also saw the Crusades as an early form of French 
colonialism. Although they were not members of the Catholic clergy and they largely supported the Third 
Republic, they also continued to claim the Christian identity of Réunion’s elite landowners and they saw 
medieval France and its incarnation in Réunion as superior to modern metropolitan France. Warren, xxviii. 
139, 164-193.  
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and explosive combat with one another. Despite this combat, the goal of constructing a 
religious modernity in Algeria remained a distinct possibility until very late in the 
nineteenth century.  
 
Historiography 
This dissertation bridges two distinct bodies of literature that French historians have only 
recently brought into conversation with one another: those on imperialism and 
Catholicism. For the former, it builds on the pioneering work of Ann Stoler and Frederick 
Cooper that sees European empires as sites of contestation, instability, and anxiety – sites 
where the division between ruler and ruled was never as clear as European discourses, 
and indeed later historians, portrayed.17 For the latter, this dissertation owes much to the 
work of Claude Langlois, Sarah Curtis, and Caroline Ford, all of whom definitively 
overturned the depiction of nineteenth-century France as entirely secular and of the 
Catholic church as existing merely at the margins of society.18 All of these scholars have 
called into question previously accepted historiographical suppositions and brought to the 
fore the importance of concepts such as negotiation, unreason, and liminality. 
 In the last decade, the interventions led by these historians have sparked a 
renewed interest in Catholic missionaries in the French empire. Whereas an older 
                                                
17 Stoler and Cooper, Tensions of Empire; Stoler, Along the Archival Grain; and Stoler, Carnal Knowledge 
and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule (Berkeley, University of California Press, 
2002). 
18 Langlois was the first to show that thousands of young women joined religious congregations throughout 
France in the nineteenth century, as these congregations provided them with professional opportunities 
unavailable in secular life. Sarah Curtis built on this work to show that in the field of education especially 
religious teaching congregations educated more children than did secular schools throughout almost all of 
the nineteenth century. Caroline Ford too built on Langlois’ work by illustrating how the Catholic faith 
often tore families apart, as women tended to become more religious and men less religious. Claude 
Langlois, Le catholicisme au féminin. Les congrégations françaises à supérieure générale au XIX siècle 
(Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1984), Sarah Curtis, Educating the Faithful: Religion, Schooling, and Society in 
Nineteenth-Century France (Chicago: Northern Illinois University Press, 2000), and Caroline Ford, 
Divided Houses: Religion and Gender in Modern France (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005). 
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generation of historians tended to view missionaries as simple and obvious extensions of 
the oppressive colonial state, historians like J.P. Daughton, Sarah Curtis, and Elizabeth 
Foster have complicated the role of missionaries abroad.19 Daughton was perhaps the first 
to show that, in the very midst of the wave of anticlericalism that overtook the Third 
Republic after 1880, French missionaries spread throughout the world in unprecedented 
numbers. Although they often won the support of French colonial authorities if they 
agreed to spread French culture in the French language, they could also incite the ire of 
the same authorities if they adopted the language and customs (if not the religion) of 
France’s indigenous subjects.20 Curtis has shown that the empire especially allowed 
female missionaries an escape from the rigid gender hierarchy of bourgeois France.21  
Foster, meanwhile, has portrayed the empire as a space where competing religious and 
secular “power brokers” sought to assert their own realms of authority and autonomy far 
away from overbearing metropolitan superiors.22 Although this dissertation owes much to 
Foster’s concept of missionaries as power brokers, it complicates this term by portraying 
                                                
19 For the historiography that portrays missionaries and colonial powers as working completely in tandem, 
see Y.A. Yansané, “The Impact of France on Education in West Africa,” in Double Impact: France and 
Africa in the Age of Imperialism, edited by G. Wesley Johnson (London: Greenwood, 1985) and Stephen 
Neill, Colonialism and Christian Missions (New York: McGraw Hill, 1966). Philipe Joutard has also 
argued that Catholic and secular education throughout the French empire were “more complementary than 
competitive and their similarities outweigh their differences.” Joutard, “Preface” to Une France en 
Méditerranée: écoles, langue, et culture françaises. Le XIXe -XXe siècles, edited by Patrick Cabanel (Paris: 
Creaphis, 2006), iv. Cabanel’s book as a whole sees Catholic missionaries and the French state as working 
in tandem abroad. 
20 J.P. Daughton, An Empire Divided: Religion, Republicanism, and the Making of French Colonialism, 
1880-1914 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). See also Daughton and Owen White, eds., In 
God’s Empire: French Missionaries and the Modern World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 
and Owen White, “The Decivilizing Mission: Auguste Dupuis-Yakouba and French Timbuktu,” French 
Historical Studies 27/3 (Summer 2004): 541-468.  
21 Sarah Curtis, Civilizing Habits: Women Missionaries and the Revival of French Empire (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010). 
22 Elizabeth Foster, Faith in Empire: Religion, Politics, and Colonial Rule in French Senegal, 1880-1940 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013). 
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missionaries and other members of the Catholic clergy as in competition more than 
collusion with one another. 
 In studying nineteenth-century colonial Algeria in particular, a handful of 
historians have examined the disturbances caused by Catholic missionaries. Other than 
Sarah Curtis, all of these scholars have dealt with a single missionary congregation, the 
Missionnaires de Notre Dame d’Afrique, better known as the Pères Blancs, due to their 
distinctive white robes. As François Renault has recounted, this congregation was 
founded in 1870 by the archbishop of Algeria, Charles Lavigerie, who hoped to use the 
congregation to convert Muslims to Christianity and then to train an indigenous clergy to 
convert the rest of Africa.23 Karima Dirèche-Slimani and Betrand Taithe have both 
examined particular attempts by these missionaries in the 1870s and beyond to establish 
“Arab-Christian villages” consisting of native Algerian orphans.24 These attempts 
typically met with failure, as the orphans ran away or declined to convert. On rare 
occasions the orphans did convert, only to meet with a double marginalization from both 
Muslim and European societies. Sarah Curtis has examined the fortunes of another 
missionary congregation in Algeria in the 1840s, the Sisters of St Joseph of the 
Apparition, led by the intrepid Emilie de Vialar, but Vialar quickly fled Algeria for 
Tunisia after her disagreements with the bishop of Algiers. To be sure, these 
                                                
23 Renault, himself a Père Blanc, hoped to write the definitive biography on Lavigerie, which provides a 
very sympathetic reading of his life. François Renault, Cardinal Lavigerie: Churchman, Prophet, and 
Missionary, trans. John O’Donohue (London: the Athlone Press, 1994). 
24 Karima Dirèche-Slimani, Chrétiens de Kabylie (1873-1954). Une action missionnaire dans l’Algérie 
coloniale (Paris: Editions Bouchène, 2004). Bertrand Taithe, “Algerian Orphans and Colonial Christianity 
in Algeria, 1866-1939,” French History 20/3 (2006): 240-259. For another example of Catholic missionary 
work with the indigenous population of North Africa see Julia Clancy-Smith, “L’éducation des jeunes filles 
musulmanes en Tunisie: missionnaires religieux et laïques,” in Le pouvoir du genre, Laïcités et religions, 
1905-2005, edited by Florence Rochefort (Paris: Presses Universitaires du Mirail, 2007). 
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disagreements represent some of the only documented incidences of infighting among the 
Catholic clergy abroad, and this dissertation will expand on such conflict in great depth.25 
 Because of their relative rarity and their failure to impart any significant historical 
consequences, direct interactions between missionaries and Algerian Muslims figure 
rarely in my analysis. The works described above have dealt adequately with such 
interactions. Further, in the very framing of their questions these works perpetuate the 
historiographical dichotomy that posits a clear divide between colonized and colonizer.  
This dissertation will complicate such a dichotomous historical picture by building on a 
methodological framework recently called for by historian Mary Lewis – one which 
“transcends neat oppositions between colonizers and colonized, without denying uneven 
distributions in power.”26 Indeed, none of the works described above examine missionary 
interaction with a largely forgotten colonial population that nevertheless constituted the 
primary object of missionary labor in Algeria: the settlers themselves. Although the 
settler community as a collective admittedly held more power than did the colonized 
indigènes, vast discrepancies in power existed within the settler community as well; and 
the religious beliefs of missionaries and their followers often cast them to the marginal 
outskirts of colonial society, or to conceptual and literal spaces that closely bordered 
those inhabited by native Algerians. 
 The settler population in general remains underexplored in the history of French 
Algeria, particularly in the nineteenth century. When historians have broached the topic, 
two questions have tended to predominate: When did civilian settlers unite to overthrow 
                                                
25 For another example of Catholic missionary infighting in colonial Louisiana, see Michael Pasquier, 
“When Catholic Worlds Collide,” in In God’s Empire, edited by Daughton and White. 
26 Mary Lewis, Divided Rule: Sovereignty and Empire in French Tunisia, 1881-1938 (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 2014), 6. 
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the military regime, and when did the settler community achieve an identity as such, an 
identity known colloquially as pied-noir? This dissertation will contribute to both debates 
and in doing so it will help to change the periodization of the history of French Algeria. 
This periodization owed little, especially in the initial decades, to major political turning 
points in the metropole; rather, it depended more on the specific exigencies of imperial 
rule, the uneven application of metropolitan legislation, and the individual whims of 
ecclesiastical and secular leaders. Despite the division of Algeria into three official 
departments of the metropole in 1848, and the supposed institution of full civilian rule in 
1871, the military continued to wield ultimate power well into the 1880s due to the 
political disenfranchisement of not only the entire indigenous population but also the 
mass of the settler population that did not possess French citizenship until 1889.  
 Historians have posited various dates for the emergence of a relatively unified 
settler community in Algeria. Perhaps the most famous thesis comes from Annie Rey-
Goldzeiguer, who argued that by the late 1860s a powerful civilian population had come 
together to stymie Napoleon III’s attempt to use the army – and the detested Arab 
bureaus – to create an “Arab Kingdom” that protected native Algerians from civilian 
rapaciousness. Goldzeiguer locates this success in the colonists’ ability to ensure that the 
senatus-consultes of 1863 and 1865 remained essentially dead letters in the colony.27 
Conversely, historians Pierre Nora, David Prochaska, and Charles Robert Ageron have 
argued that the law of 1889, which granted automatic citizenship to all the foreign 
Europeans born in Algeria, served as, in Ageron’s words, “the birth certificate of the 
                                                
27 Annie Rey-Goldzeiguer, Le Royaume arabe: la politique algérienne de Napoléon III, 1861-1870 (Paris: 
PUF, 1977). The senatus-consulte of 1863 aimed to designate and protect tribal lands from colonial 
speculators. The senatus-consulte of 1865 aimed to facilitate the conversion of Algerian subjects into 
French citizens. Both were essentially failures because of the resistance of both settler and subject 
populations. 
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European people of Algeria.”28 These arguments are all belied by a study of missionaries 
in Algeria, as up to the eve of the First World War the settler community remained 
wracked by divisions that stemmed above all from ethnically-tinged religious differences 




This dissertation combines research in the French national archives in Paris, the French 
overseas archives in Aix-en-Provence, and a number of missionary archives in Paris, 
Lyon, and Rome. Research in the national archives provided material for the basic legal 
and political arc of the argument. Specifically, in the national archives, series F19 on 
religious congregations and F17 on public instruction proved invaluable for delineating 
how the minister of war (and later interior), the governor general, and the various prefects 
employed legal and extra-legal means to attempt to control missionary work in the 
territory. In the French overseas archives (Centre d’Archives Nationales d’Outre-Mer), a 
subset of series F80 on the establishment of parish churches in Algeria and series 1U 
containing correspondence between Algerian bishops and the governor general and 
prefects allowed me to gain a better understanding of the relationship between secular 
and ecclesiastical officials in the colony. 
 This information, however, has with some exceptions only provided the 
institutional framework of the overall dissertation. For its primary argument and its 
attempt to depict the social and spiritual landscape of missionary life and work, this 
dissertation relies primarily on missionary archives. Materials in each of the eight 
                                                
28 See Charles Robert Ageron, Les algériens musulmans et la France, 1871-1919, Volume 2 (Paris: PUF, 
1968), 118. Pierre Nora, Les Français d’Algérie (Paris: René Julliard, 1961), David Prochaska, Making 
Algeria French: Colonialism in Bône 1870-1920 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
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missionary archives I visited illuminated crucial insights regarding the relationship both 
between secular and religious authorities and amongst missionaries and clergymen 
themselves. In many of these archives, no historian had previously looked at the papers 
pertaining specifically to Algeria. Their organization varied tremendously, with some 
periods well documented and others inexplicably absent from the historical record. 
Similarly, the emotional richness of these documents varied from archive to archive and 
often changed over time. Whereas the documents in some archives may have provided an 
extraordinary level of detail for the decades of the 1830s and 40s only to tail off into 
more bureaucratic language after 1850, others only began to prove useful after 1850. As a 
general though not uniform trend, however, the richness of the missionary archives 
declines after about 1880, and this decline can be traced directly to the centralization of 
religious authority under the archbishop of Algiers and with the slow but steady 
application of metropolitan law to the territory of Algeria. Both of these events 
contributed to circumscribing the realm of the possible in the missionary imagination, 
and the narrowing of this imagination is reflected in the increasingly formulaic nature of 
missionaries’ letters. 
 A final word is in order regarding the structure of the missions in Algeria and how 
it shaped the archives left behind. Upon arrival in the colony, each congregation 
established one or more houses depending on the number of missionaries it staffed. 
Typically referred to as a residence, each of these houses had its own superior. This 
superior would report to the superior of the entire “province” of Algeria, who took the 
title of “visiting superior.” In theory, the visiting superior alone corresponded with the 
superior of the congregation who resided in the motherhouse in France or Rome. In 
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reality, however, various sub-superiors of the different houses often wrote directly to the 
superior in the metropole. On rare occasions, typically in times of personal duress, 
individual missionaries who did not possess any position of authority also wrote to either 
the visiting superior or the superior of the congregation. Once or twice a year – though 
sometimes less frequently – a “visiting inspector,” often also the superior of the entire 
congregation, toured all the houses of Algeria and penned a report on his or her findings. 
The report would comment on the general conduct, morality, efficacy, and morale of each 
of the houses – and often each of the missionaries – followed by suggestions for 
improvement, or even outright admonitions.  
 The frequency of all of this correspondence – at least what remains of it today – 
varied widely from congregation to congregation; and the level of detail in the 
correspondence depended entirely on the individual personality of the author. Other than 
the annual reports penned by the visiting superiors, the archival documents consist 
entirely of letters written from missionaries in Algeria to their superiors in the metropole. 
That is to say, the archives do not contain the equally frequent letters written from the 
superior in the metropole to the visiting superior in Algeria. We can only hear the 
distorted voices of these metropolitan superiors in their echoed sentiments found in the 
responses penned by missionaries abroad, for instance when these latter responded 
directly to questions, reprimands, or advice offered by the former. Presumably these 
documents remained in Algeria, where the relatively chaotic state of the missionary 
establishments and the paucity of personnel did not allow for the systematized collection 
and filing of letters received from Europe. 
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 For the purposes of this dissertation, the most valuable information by far came 
from the archives of the Congregation of the Mission of St Vincent de Paul, hereafter 
referred to as the Lazarists, and the neighboring archives of their sister congregation, the 
Filles de la Charité, both located in Paris. From 1845 to 1905 the Lazarists directed the 
senior seminary at Kouba and, for most of that time, the nearby junior seminary as well. 
They also served as parish priests in a number of communes in the territory. Further, the 
Lazarist priests served as the spiritual advisors – generally as administrators of 
sacraments – to the Filles de la Charité. From 1845 onward, these sisters directed schools 
and orphanages and worked as nurses in military (and sometimes civilian) hospitals 
throughout the territory, though primarily in the department of Algiers. From their arrival 
in the 1840s, these two congregations enjoyed more support from both the secular and 
ecclesiastical hierarchy than any other congregation. This support stemmed from their 
history of serving the French government at home and abroad and from the paternalist 
relationship between the Lazarists and the Filles de la Charité.  
 The documents these two congregations left behind remain relevant for two 
reasons: first, the Lazarist superiors, more than those of any other congregation, enjoyed 
the patronage of successive bishops of Algiers; accordingly, the correspondence between 
superiors of various houses in Algeria with the motherhouse in Paris reveals the criteria 
required for success in Algeria. Second, due to their special and entirely paternal 
relationship with the Filles de la Charité, correspondence among and between these two 
congregations reveals the gendered dimension of the missionary hierarchy and helps us 
understand how female missionaries worked to carve out their own niches of autonomy 
within a society and religion structured entirely on patriarchal principles. As such, these 
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documents also reveal the limits of both governmental and ecclesiastical control, and how 
missionary women capitalized on the particular structures of always-unequal 
relationships to creatively manipulate different levers of male authority to their own ends. 
 Of almost equal importance, especially for the period between 1845 and 1870, are 
the archives of the Jesuits, located in Rome. More than any other congregation in Algeria, 
the Jesuits spoke specifically and in depth about issues of power and politics. At the same 
time, as legally suppressed in France for a large portion of the nineteenth century, the 
Jesuits encountered numerous obstacles with the civil and military authorities (though 
much more so with the former than the latter). As notorious adherents of ultramontanism 
– or loyalty to the pope over the French government – they also sparked the repeated 
suspicions of more Gallican bishops and secular clergy of Algiers, who owed their 
positions and salaries entirely to the French government.29 Thus, if the documents left 
behind by the Lazarists reveal the criteria for success in Algeria, the documents crafted 
by the Jesuits shed light on the reasons for failure and, equally importantly, how this 
failure took its toll on the personalities, relationships, and piety of the missionaries in 
question. 
 The remaining missionary archives proved useful for specific and circumscribed 
purposes. Those of the Soeurs Trinitaires – the most disorganized of all the archives I 
                                                
29 Gallicanism is the profession of loyalty towards the French government over the pope. Ultramontanism, 
literally “beyond the mountains” (as in the Alps), connotes loyalty to the pope over the French government. 
These issues came to a head several times previously in French history, notably in 1713 when the papal bull 
Unigenitus condemned the Jansenists and later in the 1760s and 70s when Jansenists began to adopt an 
explicitly Gallican outlook. Finally, the Civil Constitution of the Clergy in 1790 forced all clergymen in 
France to swear an oath of loyalty to the nation rather than the pope. For the Jansenist controversy see Dale 
van Kley, The Jansenists and the Expulsion of the Jesuits from France (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1975) and The Religious Origins of the French Revolution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996). For 
the dechristianization campaign during the French Revolution, see Claude Langlois et al., Atlas de la 
Révolution française. Religion, 1770-1820, tome 9 (Paris: Editions de l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes en 
Sciences, 1996). For the popular response to this campaign, see Suzanne Desan, Reclaiming the Sacred: 
Lay Religion and Popular Politics in Revolutionary France (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990). 
 19 
visited – first brought to my attention the idea that the church in Algeria did not constitute 
a monolithic entity, a conclusion that would have been impossible to draw from the 
national archives alone. The Soeurs Trinitaires worked in Algeria, specifically in the 
department of Oran, from 1840 until the end of the period covered in this dissertation, 
and indeed beyond. The documents exchanged between the headstrong visiting superior 
and the superior of the motherhouse in Lyon, France, illuminate how, in the 1840s and 
50s, the bishop of Algiers sought to replace the sisters with more docile female 
missionaries. The bishop failed in this attempt, however, because the sisters possessed a 
powerful patron in the form of the governor general of Algeria. The governor general and 
the visiting superior formed a tight emotional bond which resembled that of a father and 
daughter and which protected the congregation from the designs of the bishop. 
 The archives of two other male missionary congregations proved useful for very 
specific insights. The Frères des Ecoles Chrétiennes, who worked only as primary school 
teachers and were not actually priests, arrived in Algeria in 1853 and stayed until the First 
World War. Located in Rome, their documents helped illuminate how the transition from 
the Second Empire to the Third Republic affected Catholic school teachers of Algeria in 
what I will refer to as the “long decade” from 1867 to 1883. In Lyon, the Centre de Jean 
Bosco, technically a library rather than an archive, provided crucial background 
information on the Salésiens de Don Bosco in Algeria. Further, an internal unpublished 
history from 1941 discovered by the librarian during my trip allowed me to flesh out the 
details of the story that unfolded during their time in the territory from 1891 to 1914. The 
Salésiens, however, left behind a greater presence in the national archives than in their 
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own library due to the constant state of suspicion they evoked in the eyes of the 
government, which resulted directly from their supposed foreign origin.  
 Finally, this dissertation draws from the archives of two organizations that did not 
constitute missionary congregations as such – the Propaganda Fide and the Propagation 
de la Foi. Based in Rome, the Propaganda Fide (today known as the Congregation for the 
Evangelization of Peoples) was founded by Pope Gregory XV in 1622 and had as its 
stated goal to spread Catholicism to the non-Catholic regions of the world. The 
Propaganda Fide was staffed by cardinals of the pope’s inner circle and run by a cardinal 
prefect, appointed by the pope. Correspondence sent from missionaries in Algeria to the 
cardinal prefect helps illuminate the conflicting visions that the Holy See and the French 
state held for the religious fate of colonial Algeria; it also reveals the contempt that most 
missionaries from the Vatican had for French appointed clergymen.30 This 
correspondence especially sheds light on the decade of the 1830s, when the future of the 
faith in Algeria remained completely open ended.   
 The Propagation de la Foi, meanwhile, collected donations from the faithful in 
France in order to channel funds to French Catholic missionaries throughout the world, 
especially in their efforts to convert non-Catholics to the Catholic fold.31 Based in Lyon, 
the archives of the Propagation de la Foi shed light on the goals of early missionary 
establishments and especially the financial hardships they suffered and the difficulty they 
had in converting Muslims to Catholicism. The richness of this archive lies essentially in 
                                                
30 In its diplomatic relations with other nations, the Vatican referred to itself as the Holy See. This 
dissertation will use the term Holy See when discussing geopolitical or diplomatic relations between the 
pope or the Vatican and other nations. 
31 J.P. Daughton’s, An Empire Divided was the first monograph to formulate its entire argument from 
documents found in this archive and to alert historians to the wealth of information other missionary 
archives might contain. 
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the period before 1848, when missionaries still held out hope of converting Muslims and 
before the successive bishops of Algiers attempted to bring them entirely under their 
authority. After this period the correspondence consists almost entirely of letters from the 
bishops of Algeria requesting money for their own ends. By 1870 the Propagation had 
largely ceased to provide funds for Catholic works in Algeria for three reasons: the 
territory’s nominal incorporation to the metropole; the fact that the metropolitan 
government already provided salaries for Algeria’s bishops and parish priests; and the 




This dissertation includes four substantive chapters that build upon one another and 
proceed chronologically. Chapter One spans the period from the conquest of Algeria in 
1830 to the arrival of the second bishop of Algiers in 1846. Between 1830 and the 
establishment of the bishopric in 1838 the confused state of the Catholic church in 
Algeria stemmed directly from a wider state of confusion over the exact purpose of the 
newly-conquered territory. With a settler population numbering fewer than 4,000, 
Catholic missionaries saw the conquest primarily as offering a chance to convert the one 
million Muslims who inhabited the former Ottoman regency and to resurrect the ancient 
splendor of the early church in North Africa. At the same time, missionaries sent by the 
Vatican competed with ambitious military chaplains appointed by the governor general to 
oversee the establishment of the church on a more permanent basis. From the very 
beginning they all relied on the patronage of highly placed military leaders to ascend the 
ranks of the clergy in Algeria. 
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 By the end of the 1830s, the rapid influx of colonists from throughout the 
Mediterranean world combined with the religious resistance of the conquered Algerians 
to shift the focus of Catholic missionaries away from Muslims and towards (often lapsed) 
Catholics. The military regime supported this transition because it quickly began to see 
the political dangers in threatening the religious sensibilities of the conquered North 
African population. Further, officials feared that what they saw as the notorious 
immorality of the early settler population might undermine the supposed racial 
superiority of the conquerors. The government thus hoped to use missionaries to moralize 
a settler population whose depravity threatened from a very early stage to invert the 
colonial racial hierarchy. In order to better control missionaries in Algeria, the French 
government established Algiers as an official bishopric in 1838, which under the terms of 
the Concordat of 1801 allowed the French government, rather than the Vatican, to 
appoint its chosen bishop from among the French clergy.32 This first bishop, however, 
proved a great disappointment to metropolitan officials, both for allowing himself to be 
manipulated by Jesuits and for bringing the church to the brink of financial ruin. In 1846, 
the government replaced him with a much more Gallican and administratively competent 
bishop. 
 Chapter Two spans the tenure of this second bishop, who held his position from 
1846 until his death in 1866. This period was marked by the rapid migration to the colony 
of both settlers and missionaries. The military government continued to see Catholic 
missionaries as a cheap means of providing for the religious and educational needs of 
                                                
32 Napoleon Bonaparte signed the Concordat with the Vatican in order to end the religious discord that 
wracked France following the Civil Constitution of the Clergy in 1790. It proclaimed Catholicism “the 
religion of the great majority of the French,” but not the national religion of France. It also allowed the 
French government to nominate bishops in metropolitan France and to provide all the clergy in France with 
state salaries. See McPhee, A Social History of France, 1789-1914, 79-80. 
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settlers, and it was at this time that it really began to formulate its policy of using 
missionaries to help tie these settlers to the regime. This change stemmed from the 
recognition of the permanence of the French occupation of Algeria and the need to create 
a unified settler community as a bulwark of support against indigenous uprisings. At the 
same time, the Revolution of 1848 had two important repercussions for Algeria: it 
nominally assimilated the European areas to the metropole as three departments of France 
with full political rights and, following the June Days and Louis Napoleon’s coup, it led 
to the exile to Algeria of more than 6,000 political radicals. This new system of dual 
power between conservative military generals and at times radical civilian leaders 
continued until the 1880s. Nevertheless, the fact that French missionaries remained in a 
state of legal limbo and that they could repeatedly rely on the extralegal support of 
military generals belies the notion that even for the settler population – to say nothing of 
the native Algerians – 1848 led to the establishment of the metropolitan rule of law in the 
territory. 
 Secondly, this chapter examines in detail the criteria for missionary success and 
failure in Algeria. It uses case studies of the Lazarists and Jesuits to show the importance 
of patronage and the power that missionaries could accrue from gaining the support of the 
bishop of Algiers or the governor general. It also uses case studies of the Soeurs 
Trinitaires and the Filles de la Charité to show the gendered dimension of missionary 
work and patronage in Algeria. The bishop of Algiers hoped to replace the Soeurs 
Trinitaires with the Filles de la Charité in order to better exert his authority over the 
sisters. Whereas the former congregation had a headstrong female superior, the latter had 
a Lazarist priest as superior, and the bishop hoped to bestow patronage on the Lazarists in 
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order to use them to exert his authority over the Filles de la Charité. In both of these 
plans, however, he encountered unexpected difficulties. The superiors of the Soeurs 
Trinitaires and the Filles de la Charité both found powerful patrons in the form of 
military generals, and the latter congregation even used this patronage to overturn the 
gendered hierarchy so that their Lazarist superiors relied on the sisters for their monthly 
salaries and their very existence.  
 Chapter Three begins in 1867, with the arrival of the first archbishop of Algeria, 
the imposing Charles Lavigerie, and spans what I will term the “long-decade” of 1867 to 
1883, when the metropolitan government applied the republican educational legislation 
known as the Ferry laws to Algeria. Lavigerie both built on past precedents and vastly 
expanded the authority of his office. He succeeded where his predecessors had failed and 
brought missionaries and their work almost entirely under his control and oversight. He 
did so by creating his own missionary society, the Missionnaires de Notre Dame 
d’Afrique, known as the Pères Blancs, and designating himself as superior. From this 
point forward, Lavigerie began to dismantle the complex patronage system erected by 
past missionaries and ecclesiastics and funnel all state and charitable resources to his 
congregation alone. Despite his renown as the most important Catholic clergyman in 
nineteenth-century Africa, Lavigerie’s arrival definitively weakened missionaries’ 
autonomy in Algeria and thus changed their fortunes for the worse.33 
 The second set of actors that profoundly changed the status of missionaries in 
Algeria consisted of municipal councils – especially that of Algiers – which even before 
the proclamation of the Third Republic began a concerted effort to remove missionaries 
                                                
33 For the exploits of Lavigerie in Africa, see especially François Renault, Cardinal Lavigerie. 
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from all public teaching roles. This effort to secularize the schools began before any 
similar concerted effort in France, and had two causes specific to Algeria. First, many 
political exiles of 1848 and 1852 lay low in Algeria during the ensuing decade, only to 
gain renewed confidence by the mid 1860s due to their very distance from metropolitan 
organs of repression. Algeria in effect provided them an opportunity to enact their 
secularizing visions that remained closed off in France. They seized this opportunity in 
1867, when the governor general implemented a program to create mixed schools (écoles 
mixtes) that provided a universal secular education with time set aside for particular 
religious instruction for children of different faiths. The municipal council of Algiers 
willfully misinterpreted this circular to remove any religious vestige from their public 
schools whatsoever, specifically the Catholic missionary teachers. In doing so, however, 
they provoked the protests and petitions (with signatures numbering almost 10,000) of 
the city’s Catholic, largely foreign, families. 
 The battle over the schools would span the entire decade of the 1870s and envelop 
nearly all of the municipal councils of Algeria until finally coming to an end with the 
application of the Ferry laws in 1883.34 The conflict remains important for three reasons. 
First, it shows that despite the official institution of civilian rule in 1870-1, the “civil” 
governor general continued to overrule legally elected municipal councils in order to 
appease the disenfranchised foreign population of the territory. The colonial government 
continued to rule the European population as colonial subjects as much as citizens, as the 
political and juridical status of the territory remained mired in confusion. Second, it 
shows that the settler population had after forty years of imperial rule in no way taken on 
                                                
34 Yvonne Turin has a brief account of the struggle over the schools in the period 1870-72. See Turin, “La 
commune d’Alger et ses écoles en 1871. Un problème de laïcité coloniale,” Révue d’Histoire et de 
civilisation du Maghreb 8 (Publ. Fac. Lettres, Alger, 1970): 83-95. 
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a unified consciousness, as conflicts over religion intertwined with those of ethnicity 
continued to divide them more than any other issue. While Catholics and anticlerical 
officials both saw Algeria as a place to carve out an alternative modernity, they both 
continued to have diametrically opposed visions of what that modernity entailed and how 
to go about constructing it. 
 The fourth and final substantive chapter covers the decades surrounding the law 
of 1889, which granted automatic French citizenship to all foreigners born in Algeria 
upon reaching adulthood. In the years leading up to the law the practice of Catholicism, 
more so than Islam, continued to preoccupy and divide colonial officials and the settler 
community.35 In this period, the association of “foreigners” with the religious fanaticism 
of the Muslim population only intensified. Officials hoped that the law of 1889 would 
stand as the pinnacle of civilian rule and the triumph of the policy of assimilation over 
association, but even it did not signal the definitive creation of a cohesive European 
community. Rather, by transforming previously disenfranchised foreigners into citizens 
newly endowed with political rights the law only increased the insecurities of the 
ethnically French colonists. This chapter looks at the department of Oran in particular, 
where foreigners, now known as neo-French, continued to outnumber their French 
counterparts. These latter no longer necessarily held the numerical majority in the 
electorate or the municipal councils, and many commentators worried that Catholics of 
Spanish or Italian descent would assert their religious will on more anti-clerical French 
                                                
35 This argument goes against that of the only extant research on the subject, by Oissila Saaïdia, who argues 
that the colonial regime and the settler population were almost entirely supportive of the Catholic clergy as 
a bulwark against Islam in Algeria. Oissila Saaïdia, “L'anticléricalisme article d'exportation? Le cas de 
l'Algérie avant la première guerre mondiale,” Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'histoire, No. 87, Numéro spécial: 
Laïcité, séparation, sécularisation 1905-2005 (Jul. - Sep., 2005): 101-112. 
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settlers. In the years leading up to the First World War, these fears of a “foreign peril” 
only intensified. 
 Such fears coalesced around a newly installed missionary congregation, the 
Salésiens de Don Bosco, which not only had an Italian founder, but also staffed its ranks 
with a number of Spanish and Italian missionary priests. The Salésiens thus acted as a 
touchstone for larger debates around the danger of foreigners, and their arrival only 
intensified the association of foreigners with the Catholic faith. In the period between 
1901 and 1905, when the government sought to apply the laws of laïcization to Algeria, 
colonial officials persecuted the Salésiens to a much greater extent than any of the other 
missionary congregations in Algeria. At the same time, while Algeria increasingly did 
constitute a true extension of the metropole (at least for the European settlers), the failure 
to fully enforce the secularization laws revealed that this transformation remained 
incomplete. After their legal dissolution, a number of Salésiens continued to work with 
the youth of colonial Oran due to the support they had from the families of Spanish and 
Italian descent. This support continued to preoccupy the colonial regime and divide the 








Algeria: A Land of Opportunity, 1830-1846 
 
 
“I fear an apostolic vicar chosen from outside a congregation would be animated by a 
spirit of personal ambition and self-interest, inclined maybe only to see his mission as a 
temporary task or as a means of advancement. Experience has shown that priests who 
want to leave their diocese for a far off mission are typically not the most respectable 
people.”1  




“What will become of our women and our children without this priest? Do not leave us 
unfortunate colonists without spiritual and temporal aid.”2 




 This chapter analyzes the shifting and competing logics that led to the official 
establishment of the Catholic Church in Algeria. In the 1830s, both the French 
government and the Vatican saw Algeria as an empty space in which to inscribe their 
authority.  Although the two states disagreed on the purpose of religion they both saw it 
as a crucial component of political authority more generally.3 The French government’s 
plans for establishing the Catholic Church on a permanent basis in Algeria changed over 
time according to contemporary debates over the wider juridical and political relationship 
                                                
1 Archives of the Congrégation de la Mission de St Vincent de Paul, known as the Lazarists, 108a Algiers. 
Copy of letter from the archives of Foreign Affairs of a note on the arrangement made with the Holy See 
for the organization of the Catholic religion in Algiers, 31 December 1835. Unless otherwise noted, all 
translations are my own. 
2 Archivio Storico della Congregazione ‘de Propaganda Fide’: Scritture Riferite nei Congressi – Barbary 
[Henceforth: ASC, SC – Barbary] 14/200. Algiers. “To their majesties. Petition of colonists in support of 
Abbé Muller,” undated [1834]. 
3 Again, many other actors, including Saint-Simonians, saw Algeria saw as a “blank slate” in which to 
enact ambitious schemes or create new utopias. See Abi-Mershed, Apostles of Modernity. For colonies as 
“laboratories of modernity” see Rabinow, French Modern; Stoler and Cooper, eds., Tensions of Empire. 
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between France and Algeria. In the early years of French rule the exact purpose of the 
colony remained unclear. Ultimately, it was the rather unexpected emergence of a 
permanent (and generally far from pious) settler community that led to the establishment 
of the diocese of Algiers in 1838 under a French appointed bishop.  
 At the same time, various plans imposed from above by the government and the 
Vatican ran up against the unexpected idiosyncrasies and messy realities of individual 
missionaries and settlers from below. While the government hoped a religious influence 
would help moralize and civilize a renegade settler community, missionaries sent by the 
Vatican just as often competed with military chaplains paid by the French state to carve 
out their own niches of professional and spiritual authority as “power brokers” in the 
former Ottoman regency.4 At the most localized level of power, missionaries even 
denounced one another in order to displace their rivals and extend their influence 
throughout the city of Algiers and later into the rest of the nascent colony. Finally, 
despite numerous royal ordinances from France and papal decrees from the Holy See, 
successful missionaries relied just as much on private patronage of highly placed military 
and ecclesiastic officials in Algeria to secure their livelihoods. 
 
The Period of the Apostolic Vicariate, 1830-1833   
Prior to the French conquest of Algiers in 1830, a handful of Catholic priests from 
congregations such as the Pères de la Merci and the Pères de la Congrégation de la 
Mission de St. Vincent de Paul (better known as Lazarists) lived in the city of Algiers and 
served the chapels of foreign consuls. They also won occasional permission from the dey 
                                                
4 I borrow the term power brokers from Elizabeth Foster, Faith in Empire. This chapter complicates 
Foster’s portrayal by showing that secular clergy, different congregations, and individual missionaries 
could also serve as competing, rather than complementary, power brokers in the imperial world. 
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of Algiers to administer sacraments to Europeans held in prison or sold into slavery.5 The 
Lazarists especially had a long history of collecting donations in Europe to fund the 
repurchase of “Christian” slaves captured and sold into captivity by Muslim corsairs.6 As 
early as 1632, the Vatican had designated the “Barbary Coast” as an apostolic prefecture 
and named a Lazarist priest as apostolic prefect with express orders to repurchase 
captured European slaves.7 This situation continued more or less unabated up to the 
French invasion of 1830.8 
 Following the French capture of Algiers on 5 July 1830, colonial rule in Algeria 
fell under the authority of a military governor general, who received his powers from and 
reported to the minister of war in Paris. Over time, the position of the governor general 
would emerge as the single most important source of support for Catholic missionaries in 
the colony. The governor general held enormous influence over policymaking and could 
rule unilaterally by emergency decree. He also controlled a bureaucracy staffed by 
subordinate generals who oversaw finances, justice, commerce, police and, notably, 
religious affairs, in Algeria.9 During the expeditionary campaign the governor general 
had already drafted 17 military chaplains into the army to administer sacraments and 
preach mass to French soldiers. Many soldiers experienced extreme homesickness for 
                                                
5 The dey ruled as “governor” of the Regency of Ottoman Algiers and enjoyed a large degree of 
independence from the Ottoman sultan. Jennifer Sessions, By Sword and by Plow: France and the 
Conquest of Algeria (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011), 25. 
6 For more on piracy and slavery in the early modern Mediterranean world, see Gillian Weiss, Captives 
and Corsairs: France and Slavery in the Early Modern Mediterranean (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2011). 
7 An apostolic prefect is a priest who oversees an apostolic prefecture, or a missionary area where the 
Catholic Church is not yet sufficiently developed to create a diocese. The prefect has authority from the 
Vatican to administer all sacraments in the missionary area. 
8 For this summary, see Bartholomew Randolph, “Congregation of Priests of the Mission,” Catholic 
Encyclopedia, Volume 10 (1913). 
http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Catholic_Encyclopedia_(1913)/Congregation_of_Priests_of_the_Mission 
9 Benjamin Brower, A Desert Named Peace, The Violence of France’s Empire in the Algerian Sahara, 
1844-1902 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 31. 
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their native villages, and military chaplains typically came from the same regions as the 
soldiers who composed the regiments.10 On the same day as the fall of Algiers one such 
chaplain held the first religious ceremony in the newly acquired territory when he led a 
Te Deum in the medieval neighborhood of the Casbah. Although a royal ordinance of 10 
November 1830 suppressed these chaplains in their official functions, the governor 
general allowed those chaplains who opted not to return to France to continue to travel 
with the army in an unofficial capacity or to remain in the city of Algiers to administer 
sacraments to local Europeans and give last rites to dying soldiers in the increasingly 
crowded military hospitals.11 These priests often continued to receive salaries directly 
from the funds of the governor general according to their perceived level of public utility. 
 Immediately after the conquest military and metropolitan authorities remained 
divided over the future of their newly acquired territory.12 This situation owed much to 
the revolution that unfolded in Paris directly following the fall of Algiers. Although the 
Bourbon King Charles X had used the invasion to distract from his unpopularity at home, 
his overthrow on 30 July 1830 did not signal an immediate withdrawal from North Africa 
(though to be sure a large minority of commentators supported such a measure). The 
establishment of the July Monarchy and the ascension of the Orléanist Louis Philippe to 
the throne as “King of the French” actually led to an increased focus on Algeria as the 
king and his sons saw the new colony as a place to prove their worthiness as “citizen 
                                                
10 For the number of military chaplains, see Fernand Combaluzier, “L’organisation du culte catholic à Alger 
(1830-1838),” Revue d’Histoire des Missions 7/2 (June 1930), 164. For homesickness among French troops 
see Thomas Dodman, “Un pays pour la colonie: mourir de nostalgie en Algérie française, 1830-1880,” 
Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales 66:3 (July 2011): 743-784. 
11 Combaluzier, 165. In 1833, 2,512 French soldiers died in military hospitals in Algeria, compared to just 
64 in combat. See Brower, 48. 
12 Charles-André Julien referred to the years 1830 to 1834 as “the period of uncertainty” in French Algeria. 
See Julien, Histoire de l’Algérie Contemporaine: La Conquête et les Débuts de la Colonisation, 1827-1871 
(Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1964), 64. 
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soldiers” and leaders of the new regime.13  Two of the king’s sons, the Duc d’Aumale and 
the Duc d’Orléans, would serve as governors general of Algeria (and the latter would 
even die there). Thus, with longer-term – if not permanent – occupation appearing 
increasingly likely the ministry of the king opened negotiations with Pope Gregory XVI 
and the Vatican’s official missionary organ, the Propaganda Fide (also known as the 
Sacred Congregation), to establish the Catholic Church on a solid and more permanent 
foundation in the new territory. 
 Between 1830 and 1838 these efforts repeatedly foundered in the face of 
continued disagreements between the Vatican, the French government, and the 
missionaries chosen for this task. In this respect, religious policy in these early years 
differed little from policy over the conquered North African population. Historians agree 
that the 1830s generally constituted “a period of disorder” regarding France’s relations 
with its conquered subjects.14 Religious policy was no different, and the general state of 
confusion pertained not only to France’s new colonial subjects, but also to its new 
colonial citizens. Three primary sources of tension arose over the establishment of the 
church in Algeria: whether to constitute Algeria as an apostolic vicariate or a bishopric; 
whether the French government or the Vatican would have the right to appoint the 
spiritual leader over this jurisdiction; and whether the necessary priests should come from 
the secular clergy or from missionary congregations.15 The answers to these questions 
changed over time and depended largely on conflicting visions of the wider purpose of 
                                                
13 Sessions, By Sword and by Plow, 83-96. 
14 Brower, A Desert Named Peace, 12. 
15 The term “secular clergy” denotes Catholic clergy salaried by the state and who, unlike missionaries, did 
not belong to religious orders, or congrégations. 
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the territory of Algeria, its broader juridical relationship to France, and the population to 
be targeted by the Catholic Church. 
 The Vatican preferred to designate Algeria as an apostolic vicariate because this 
legal status would allow the pope, rather than the king, to appoint his chosen apostolic 
vicar. By definition an apostolic vicar worked in the midst of “infidels,” not in a land 
composed predominantly of Catholics, with the goal of achieving enough conversions 
that the vicariate could eventually give way to a diocese under the jurisdiction of a 
bishop. Further, an apostolic vicariate constituted by definition a missionary land, and 
priests appointed there worked in the official capacity as missionaries, not as members of 
the secular clergy.16 In sum, by designating Algeria as an apostolic vicariate the Vatican 
and the French state would tacitly recognize that the role of the Church in Algeria was to 
convert Muslims to Catholicism. Recognition of an apostolic vicariate thus attached less 
importance to the existing European settler community – which numbered about 3,000 in 
1831 – than to the much larger and seemingly more permanent Arab and Berber 
populations.17 
 In the weeks and months following the conquest, however, confusion continued to 
reign over the purpose of an expedition that “lacked an ideology.”18 The Holy See’s 
hopes of converting Muslims threatened to undermine the peace treaty of 5 July 1830, 
which stipulated that “the exercise of the Mohammedan religion will remain free.”19 At 
the same time, many of the leading generals in the Armée d’Afrique were themselves 
                                                
16 For a full explanation of an apostolic vicariate see William Fanning, "Vicar Apostolic," The Catholic 
Encyclopedia, Vol. 15 (New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1912). 
<http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/15401b.htm>. 
17 For the population of Algiers, see Sessions, By Sword and By Plow, 217. 
18 Brower, A Desert Named Peace, 10. See also John Ruedy, Modern Algeria: The Origins and 
Development of a Nation (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992), 51-55. 
19 Quoted in Brower, 11. 
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devout Catholics and envisioned spreading the faith throughout Africa on the heels of the 
French army. In August 1830, the Comte Albert de Retz, officer of the army’s thirty-
seventh regiment, wrote to the French ambassador to the Holy See that “our conquests 
are almost finished, the Crescent is humiliated and will soon cede the throne to the 
Cross.”20 By 1831 de Retz had developed his views further and wrote, “I see the 
colonization and civilization of this country by conversion to the Catholic religion as a 
very beneficial act and it should be French policy to send missionaries here.”21 In the end, 
the French government reneged on the treaty’s promise of religious toleration, just as it 
did regarding the agreement to respect indigenous property and persons. On 19 December 
1830 a royal ordinance established Algeria as an apostolic vicariate with an apostolic 
vicar appointed by the Holy See after nomination by the French government.22  
 From the beginning, the holder of this position relied for his authority on private 
patronage; and de Retz had months previously begun to maneuver to secure the 
appointment of his personally chosen nominee. In August 1830 de Retz asked France’s 
ambassador to the Holy See (who also happened to be his brother) to use his influence 
with the pope to win the appointment of one Father Collin. This priest, a native of 
Brittany and likely in his 50s, had served as military chaplain in de Retz’s regiment, and 
de Retz saw him as the ideal man to oversee the spread of Catholicism to Algeria’s 
conquered subjects. Collin’s “zeal and education” gave him “the ability to work for the 
                                                
20 ASC, SC – Barbary 13/. Letter from Comte Albert de Retz to the French ambassador to Rome, 12 August 
1830. 
21 ASC, SC – Barbary 13/223. Excerpt from a letter from the Compte Albert de Retz, officer of the thirty-
seventh regiment to his brother, ambassador to Rome, 13 April 1831. 
22 CM Lazarists, 106b, Algiers. Anonymous author, “Chronique du Vieil d’Alger,” published in either 
L’Echo d’Alger or La Dépêche Algérienne, 5 January 1929. 
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conversion of peoples, a conversion which remains extremely difficult.”23 De Retz 
succeeded in his aims and the same royal ordinance that established Algeria as an 
apostolic vicariate also named Father Collin as the first apostolic vicar of Algiers.  
 This appointment set a precedent that continued throughout the nineteenth 
century, as private patronage from highly placed military officials served as the primary 
determinant of the success or failure of individual missionaries. In this and many other 
aspects the daily lives and “little tactics of the habitat” employed by missionaries in 
Algeria differed little from those of their secular colon counterparts.24 In addition to 
revealing missionary reliance on private patronage and ad hoc policy, then, viewing early 
colonization through the lens of religion helps uncover the habits, motivations, and fears 
that animated the larger settler community in the 1830s – a community whose experience 
“remains the least known aspect of the decades of the conquest.”25 In the early and 
tumultuous years of French rule in Algeria, policy toward European missionaries and 
settlers differed little from policy toward the conquered North African population. As 
Benjamin Brower has written in regard to the latter policy:  
 The new regime did not plan to rule based upon affirmation and consent, law and 
 legitimacy, institutions thought to be typical of the modern state. Instead, it 
 prepared a specific set of institutions for colonial rule inspired by the most 
 unsophisticated forms of power.26 
 
                                                
23 ASC, SC – Barbary 13/169. Letter from Comte Albert de Retz to the French ambassador to the Holy See, 
12 August 1830. 
24 The phrase the “little tactics of the habitat” was coined by Steven Kotkin to explain how Soviet citizens 
navigated their daily lives under Stalin’s so-called totalitarian regime. Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain: 
Stalinism as a Civilization (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995). 
25 See Jennifer Sessions, “Les colons avant la IIIe République: peupler et mettre en valeur l’Algérie,” in 
Histoire de l’Algérie à la Période Coloniale, edited by Abderrahmane Bouchène et al. (Paris & Algiers: 
Editions La Découverte, 2012), 69. 
26 Brower, A Desert Named Peace, 16. 
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This “unsophisticated” policy toward missionaries and the wider settler community 
continued until the 1880s even if, to be sure, it remained conquered colonial subjects who 
felt its effects in their most oppressive and violent manifestations.27 
 Unbridled ambition quickly emerged as one of the primary traits of missionaries 
in early French Algeria. The new apostolic vicar, Father Collin, saw the territory largely 
as a “blank slate” on which he could inscribe a degree of personal authority deprived him 
in Europe. In doing so, he set another precedent that would continue to hamper the 
religious policy of France and the Vatican in Algeria throughout the nineteenth century. 
Collin’s ambitions repeatedly destabilized the sanctity that authorities felt his position 
must entail. Further, Collin incited the ire and jealousy of other missionaries who aspired 
to his position and who engaged in constant intrigue to disgrace him in the eyes of the 
Vatican and the French government alike. Throughout the nineteenth century, these 
repeated religious scandals only undermined the moral authority of the Church in the 
eyes of the settler community as well as, authorities feared, the gaze of an indigenous 
population which, as one historian has written, “whether invisible or visible, [was] 
always present.”28  
 Word of Collin’s impiety began to spread almost immediately upon his 
appointment. In March 1832, the Propaganda Fide dispatched two French missionaries 
from the Missions Etrangères de Paris – Fathers Banvoy and Cayens – to take stock of 
the situation and report back to the congregation. Immediately upon his arrival, Cayens 
                                                
27 Writing on a later period, between 1880 and 1940, Elizabeth Foster has argued that political policy 
towards missionaries in colonial Senegal also resembled “Old Regime” or “pre-modern” forms of power. 
Foster, Faith in Empire. 
28 Oissilia Saaïdia and Pierre Soumille, “Algérie et Tunisie: le repli en terre d'islam?,” in Le grand exil des 
congrégations religieuses françaises, 1901–1914, edited by Patrick Cabanel and Jean-Dominique Durand 
(Paris: Le Cerf, 2005), 333. 
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wrote to the prefect of the Propaganda Fide, Cardinal Pedicini, to complain that, while 
the French authorities had shown them goodwill, “unfortunately we cannot say the same 
for our [apostolic] prefect; M. Collin is rarely at the chapel and always about town.” The 
two missionaries further complained that Collin refused them lodging so that they had to 
take refuge with a military chaplain in a tent at the nearby garrison. They accused Collin 
of failing to perform marriages, baptisms, communions, or burials and of “only [doing] 
things that can bring him some immediate gain.”29 The following month Cayens wrote 
that “If [Collin] is not replaced disorder will reign throughout Algeria…He exceeds his 
authority and he believes himself soon to be pope.”30 
 A rift soon arose between Collin and Cayens, as both appeared to covet the 
position of apostolic vicar. In August 1832 Collin himself wrote to the Propaganda Fide 
to complain of Cayens’ insubordination. He demanded that the congregation “increase 
my authority to rule over the ecclesiastics in this country” and he accused Cayens and 
Banvoy of acting against his orders “in many grave circumstances.”31 In response to 
Collin’s rebukes, the missionaries told him that “they brought from Rome powers above 
my own and that these powers place them outside of my surveillance and my orders.”32 
Despite Vatican and French hopes of using the apostolic vicariate to bring order to the 
newly acquired French territory, the missionaries specifically designated for this task 
only sowed further disorder. 
                                                
29 ASC, SC – Barbary 13/286. Abbé Cayens to Cardinal Pedicini, Prefect of the Propaganda Fide, 25 March 
1832. 
30 ASC, SC – Barbary 13/294. Abbé Cayens to Cardinal Pedicini, Prefect of the Propaganda Fide, 12 April 
1832. 




 Unsure of whose story to believe, the Vatican responded by sending yet another 
priest, Father Muller, to ascertain the reality of the situation. To ensure that Collin 
received Muller better than he did the previous two missionaries, the pope himself sent 
Muller in the official capacity of apostolic missionary with powers equal to those of 
Collin (including the ability to engage on his own with secular authorities). Upon arriving 
in Algeria, however, Muller followed the precedent set by the other three missionaries 
and immediately worked to carve out his own niche of authority by displacing both 
Collin and Cayens. In January 1833, Muller wrote to Cardinal Pedicini that “religion still 
goes very poorly and it is all because of the poor ecclesiastics that we have here.” Muller 
worked to cultivate his relationship with the governor general, Anne Jean Marie René 
Savary, the Duc de Rovigo, who “is well disposed towards us” and allowed Muller to 
convert “the most beautiful mosque in the city” into the Church of Saint Philippe.33 This 
relationship reached the point that, in the words of another general, the governor general 
“calls [Muller] often to his home and promises him his protection.”34 Muller hoped to 
cultivate this relationship to claim the position of apostolic vicar as his own.  
 Muller’s arrival also coincided with a decisive shift in French religious policy in 
Algeria. In January 1833 he informed the Propaganda Fide that the governor general had 
asked him “as soon as possible to replace the ecclesiastics here…to put an end to the 
scandals and the lack of faith that there is among the Europeans” [emphasis added].35 
Indeed, despite the designation of Algeria as an apostolic vicariate, changing political 
                                                
33 ASC, SC – Barbary 14/1.  Abbé Muller to Cardinal Pedicini, Prefect of the Propaganda Fide, 1 January 
1833. The name of the church is given in Julien, La Conquête, 160. 
34 ASC, SC – Barbary 14/154. Letter from Count Audras to the Queen of France in defense of Abbé Muller, 
26 July 1833. 
35 ASC, SC – Barbary 14/1.  Abbé Muller to Cardinal Pedicini, Prefect of the Propaganda Fide, 1 January 
1833. 
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policy and a total lack of interest among the Muslim population had led Algeria’s clergy 
to reluctantly shift their focus to the European community. This shift also reflected the 
growing fear among colonial authorities that a failure to extend proper moral guidance to 
the European settler population would render Algeria a lawless land populated by 
vagabonds and criminals. 
 Unsure over the future and ultimate purpose of the vicariate, the Vatican began to 
consider that the patronage Muller enjoyed from the governor general necessitated that in 
the short term Muller replace Collin as apostolic vicar. Rather than appease Father 
Cayens, who also despised Collin, this move prompted his passionate protest. It seems 
professional aspirations motivated Cayens at least as much as any pious ones. Cayens 
coveted the position for himself and wrote to Rome that with Muller as vicar “all our 
difficulties will remain the same.”36 He asked if he must remain “entirely under his 
authority, [and if he] can do nothing without his orders?” Cayens alleged that Muller’s 
youth, inexperience, superficial personality, and weak theology had left people “stunned 
that you have confided such a responsibility to such a feeble character.”37 Unlike Muller, 
however, Cayens lacked a powerful patron in the colony. As a result, the Propaganda 
Fide had him recalled to Paris, from where he wrote numerous letters seeking permission 
to return to the colony. After multiple rejections, Cayens sought a new adventure in 
Brazil. 
 In Algeria, the constant disagreements between missionaries soon became an 
object of embarrassment for both the colonial regime and the Vatican. On 3 June 1833, a 
                                                




royal ordinance removed Collin from his position and abolished the apostolic vicariate.38 
At this point tension arose between the French government and the Vatican over the 
future of the faith in Algeria. Misunderstanding the full extent of the royal ordinance, the 
Vatican simply replaced Collin with Father Muller as pro-apostolic vicar. The French 
government, however, had grown distrustful of the entire set up and saw little difference 
between Collin and Muller. Further, the minister of war had recalled the Duc de Rovigo 
to Paris upon hearing news that Rovigo had murdered several tribal leaders after luring 
them into supposedly peaceful negotiations and had undertaken the virtual extermination 
of the Al'Ouffia tribe earlier in 1833.39  
 Without a patron, Muller began to suffer persecution from less friendly 
authorities. The civil intendant, Genty de Bussy, complained to the minister of war of 
Muller’s constant visits to the military hospital and his harassing of sick and wounded 
soldiers. Further, the French ambassador to the Holy See expressed his fear that “acting 
as he has done, M. Muller has perhaps been guided by the hope of getting himself named 
in place of M. Collin; this conjecture seems at least justified by the little intrigues he has 
made against Collin.”40 By October 1833, the minister of war wrote to the governor 
general that Muller must cease all religious functions in the colony and that he could no 
longer receive any salary from the state. Indeed, rather than accept a new vicar, the 
ambassador informed the Holy See that France would review the question “at a more 
                                                
38 CM Lazarists, 106b/Algérie. Anonymous author, “Chronique du Vieil d’Alger,” published in either 
L’Echo d’Alger or La Dépêche Algérienne, 5 January 1929. 
39 Brower, A Desert Named Peace, 17. For more on Rovigo’s tenure in Algeria see Julien, La Conquête, 89-
92. 
40 ASC, SC – Barbary 14/113. M. Bellocq, French Ambassador to Rome, to Cardinal Pedicini, Prefect of 
Propaganda Fide, 24 May 1833. 
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opportune time when a system of administrative organization for Algiers will have been 
definitively adopted.”41  
 In addition to creating a rift with the Holy See, this failure to define a coherent 
religious policy led to the beginning of a conflict between state-appointed secular clergy 
and members of missionary orders that would span the rest of the century. In late 1833, 
the colonial regime simply returned to the practice of employing military chaplains to 
serve the military and civilian communities in the new territory. At the same time, a 
number of missionaries sent by the Propaganda Fide continued to work independently in 
Algiers. Immediately upon his removal, Father Muller complained to the Propaganda 
Fide that the colonial regime had replaced him with an army chaplain, Father Spitz, 
whom Muller accused of orchestrating his downfall. Muller claimed that the government 
called Spitz “to create the new church of the French” but that “by his conduct he has 
revealed himself as the secret enemy of all ministers of the Catholic religion who have 
come to Algiers. He has always worked to divide them and unfortunately he has always 
succeeded.”42 
 Finally, Muller found a base of support that would continue to sustain 
beleaguered missionaries throughout the nineteenth century: the colony’s devout and 
largely non-French settler population (examined in greater depth in Chapter Two). To be 
sure, the settlers who actively practiced their religion constituted a distinct minority of the 
overall population; they did, however, make their wishes known. In a petition to the king 
and queen of France, a group of settlers wrote, “for 18 months we had asked Rome for a 
                                                
41 Ibid. 
42 ASC, SC – Barbary 14/214. Abbé Muller to Cardinal Pedicini, Prefect of Propaganda Fide, against Spitz, 
7 September 1833. 
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French priest who spoke the Italian and German languages.”43 Father Muller had fulfilled 
these duties admirably and without him “the Italians and Germans…would be the most 
miserable colonists.” The petitioners further asked, “What will become of our women and 
our children without this priest?,” pleading with the royal couple “not to leave us 
unfortunate colonists without spiritual and temporal aid.”44 In a nearly identical petition 
to the pope the settlers added only that the French government’s “blindness and weakness 
for the indigènes has sought to destroy our holy religion rather than protect it.”45 In both 
petitions the writers divided their signatures into columns labeled French, Italian, 
Spanish, German, and Maltese, reflecting the diverse makeup of the early settler 
population and presaging the identity politics that would so divide the settler community 
later on in the nineteenth century.  
 These petitions also mark the emergence of a new voice into this cacophony of 
competing interests in the nascent colony: the settlers themselves. The decades of the 
1830s and 40s saw the significance the colonial regime attached to this population 
transform from a virtual afterthought with little-to-no importance into the primary 
purpose of the entire colonial venture. I argue in subsequent chapters that the government 
applied the ideologies of both assimilation and association to this settler population more 
zealously than it applied them to the indigenous population.46 The heterogeneous nature 
of this colon community would especially preoccupy policy makers in metropole and 
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44 Ibid. 
45 ASC, SC – Barbary 14/344. “Petition to the Holy Father by the inhabitants of Algiers in favor of Muller, 
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colony alike. At this moment in the history of the colonization of Algeria, however, such 
petitions remained relatively rare, and the fact that they apparently did not receive a 
response from the governor general or metropolitan officials reveals the continued lack of 
importance attached to the settler population and the confusion that still reigned over the 
ultimate purpose of the colony. Only in 1834 did the initial phase of the conquest give 
way to a period of so-called “occupation restreinte,” or restricted occupation. Not until 
22 July 1834 did a royal ordinance even give the colony an official name: Les 
Possessions françaises du Nord de l’Afrique.47 And it would take a new round of warfare 
that led the army deeper into the interior of Algeria, away from the coastal cities, for a 
period of full conquest and occupation to “add momentum to plans for a settler colony.”48 
Only then would the colonial regime truly recognize the need to establish the Catholic 
Church on a definitive foothold in Algeria via the establishment of a bishopric and the 
employment of secular clergy to cater specifically to the settler community. 
 But the petitions by the colonists are revealing for a second reason. The 
accusation that the French government possessed “weakness for the indigènes” indicates 
the shift in religious policy that occurred shortly after the conquest in 1830. Despite the 
initial desires of some Catholic-minded generals, the colonial regime decided it was poor 
policy to meddle with the religious sensibilities of what it saw as a fanatically devout 
Muslim population. As the minister of war wrote to the governor general as early as 27 
November 1832: 
 While totally desiring that dissemination of the principles of Christianity 
 accompany our efforts for the progress of civilization, I cannot warn you 
 strongly enough against the dangers of propaganda that is spread and supported 
 publicly by the government. It could only alienate us from the Muslim 
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 populations, which are too attached already to their beliefs for us to bother with 
 establishing a foreign religion in their midst.49 
 
This about-face in the logic that informed religious policy also explains the ministry of 
war’s decision to abolish the apostolic vicariate and to replace Vatican-appointed 
missionaries with its own, more trusted, military chaplains. As we have seen, by its 
definition the apostolic vicariate aimed to convert non-Catholics. Once this policy began 
to conflict with the exigencies of colonial rule its abolition proved inevitable. From this 
point forward, the state would work to ensure that Catholic clergymen focused their 
efforts on the European settler community. To do so, the colonial regime sought to better 
control the number, character, and activity of Catholic clergymen (and female 
missionaries) in their burgeoning settler colony. To be sure, the regime would still 
undertake a number of failed efforts before it succeeded in establishing the Church on 
any firm foundation, and a number of competing power brokers still hoped to insert 
themselves into the political equation while colonial religious policy remained mired in 
confusion in the minds of metropolitan and colonial officials. 
 
A Lazarist Vicariate? 
In 1834, the French government again set about to establish the Catholic Church in 
Algeria on a definitive foundation. The apostolic vicariate had presented a host of 
difficulties. Not only did the appointment of apostolic vicar come from the Vatican rather 
than the French state, but this nomination also did not provide for any unity of action 
among the clergy as a whole. The incessant conflict between missionaries Collin, Muller, 
Cayens, and Spitz led the French government to consider alternative solutions. To 
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promote clerical unity, the government could either confide religious authority to secular 
clergy, as in France, or it could call on a single missionary congregation, as it would later 
do, for instance, in colonial Senegal.50 Secondly, it still had to decide if the new clergy 
should administer Algeria as an apostolic vicariate or as a bishopric akin to those in the 
metropole. The answer to this question would determine the church’s official purpose in 
Algeria and it hinged upon the wider relationship between Algeria and France. Whereas a 
bishopric constituted a tacit recognition of the permanence of the settler community, not 
to mention France’s very presence in Algeria, an apostolic vicariate indicated a more 
transient settler community in what remained above all a missionary land (pays de 
mission). In a bishopric the clergy served the faithful; they did not convert infidels. 
Ultimately, these decisions would help determine the larger juridical future of Algeria as 
a land of European settlement fully assimilated with the metropole or as an official 
colony of exploitation in which the military continued to rule over a conquered North 
African population, if it ruled at all.51  
 At this point, a consensus remained illusory among church and government 
officials alike. Writing to the Propaganda Fide in August 1833, one Father Sabatier 
observed: 
 Obviously [the mission in Algiers] differs from ordinary missions since there 
 exists already in this city a Christian and Catholic population coming from the 
 French garrison and from the numerous colonies belonging to different nations 
 and from commercial speculators who are called here.52 
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This large “Christian” population led Sabatier to reluctantly recommend that the 
Propaganda Fide relinquish the spiritual needs of Algiers to French secular clergy under 
the authority of a bishop. The French government showed itself no less uncertain in this 
regard. Despite the obvious benefits to France of a bishopric, the minister of war 
expressed his concern in September 1833 that “we are not yet established enough in 
Algiers to send a bishop there.”53 He recommended maintaining the apostolic vicariate 
but staffing it with secular clergy the French government felt it could better control, 
rather than with more unpredictable members of missionary congregations. The foreign 
affairs ministry, however, feared that an apostolic vicar chosen from among the secular 
clergy “would be animated by a spirit of personal ambition and self-interest, inclined 
maybe only to see his mission as a temporary task or as a means of advancement.” He 
further observed that priests who willfully left their dioceses in favor of a far off mission 
“are typically not the most respectable people.”54 
 A final option consisted of constituting Algeria as an apostolic vicariate but 
staffing it with members of a single missionary congregation that had its motherhouse in 
France and employed priests trained exclusively in French seminaries. To be sure, this 
option too presented difficulties. Coming so soon on the heels of the French Revolution 
and the Bourbon Restoration all congregations, even French ones, remained suspect in 
the eyes of many government officials and much of the larger public. Revolutionaries had 
shuttered most congregations in the 1790s, and well into the nineteenth century many 
feared that congrégationistes harbored ultramontane sentiments and provided places of 
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refuge for the dreaded Jesuits, who had been expelled from France in 1764, reestablished 
in 1814, and then partially expelled again in 1828 (only to be again reinstalled in 1850 
and expelled again in 1880).55 As the foreign affairs ministry noted in 1835, “it would not 
be without problems to place this administration in the hands of a congregation, when the 
congregations of men have been generally suppressed in France.”56 In the waning months 
of Charles X’s reign, the liberal opposition reanimated this sentiment by depicting the 
king as led by “priestly” and “Jesuitical” ministers and the new King Louis-Philippe 
doubtlessly hoped to avoid similar accusations himself.57 
 The various French ministries arrived at a potential solution in the form of the 
Lazarists. In 1835, the minister of war announced a plan to reconstitute Algeria as an 
apostolic vicariate and to confide all clerical positions to Lazarist priests. The Lazarists 
possessed many attributes that rendered them particularly suitable to the mission in 
Algeria. Unlike nearly all other French Catholic congregations, the Lazarists had 
survived the Revolution intact. They won official authorization by a Napoleonic decree 
of 7 Prairial XII (27 May 1804) and again by royal ordinance of 3 February 1816. They 
also had a long history of loyalty to the French state. As the minister of foreign affairs 
remarked, “the Lazarists have not shown in their conduct or opinions the spirit of 
ultramontanism that the Jesuits have shown.”58 Despite the government’s decision to 
maintain an apostolic vicariate, it still believed the Lazarists would place loyalty to 
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France over loyalty to the pope. Further, the Lazarists’ history of working in the Levant 
rendered them “especially suitable…due to their knowledge of the morals and the 
languages of Turks and Arabs.”59 Again, the very fact that the ministry desired that 
priests possess a knowledge of these languages reveals its continued uncertainty over 
exactly which community constituted the ultimate object of religious aid and the purpose 
of the Catholic religion in general. For despite approving of their knowledge of native 
languages, the minister of war wrote in the same letter that the Lazarists, “by their 
irreproachable morality, their enlightened tolerance, their submission to established 
authorities, and their very old relationship with the French government, give us 
guarantees that it would be difficult to find with other congregations.”60 Not least of these 
guarantees would be their agreement not to undertake outright and overt proselytism 
towards unwieldy and potentially rebellious Muslims. 
 The Lazarists’ very history of loyalty to the French government, however, also 
threatened to create difficulties with the Vatican. Informed of this plan by the minister of 
war, the French ambassador to the Holy See worried that “the Congregation of the 
Propaganda [Fide] does not always seem satisfied in its relations with the Lazarists.”61 As 
it happened, the chaotic state of the faith in Algeria worked in favor of the Lazarists and 
encouraged the Vatican to consider this proposition. Pope Gregory XVI expressed 
particular worries over the fact that many priests in Algeria had begun to perform 
sacraments, notably marriages, without officially recognized authority as curés, thus 
rendering these marriages null and void in the eyes of the church and establishing any 
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resulting children as conceived out of wedlock. According to the minister of foreign 
affairs, “the Holy Father attaches the highest importance to end this affair as soon as 
possible [so that] spiritual aid be set up in a permanent and suitable manner for the 
numerous Catholics who live or temporarily reside in Algiers and its surroundings.”62 On 
3 July 1835, the French ambassador to the Holy See wrote that the two states had reached 
a tentative agreement to send the Lazarists to Algiers and to appoint a Lazarist superior as 
apostolic vicar.63 
 This tentative agreement, however, encountered unexpected difficulties when the 
Lazarists set about drafting a constitution for their new establishment in Algiers. First, the 
Propaganda Fide took offense at stipulations that allowed the French government to 
determine the number of missionaries to work in the colony at any given time and to 
retain ultimate authority over the appointment and removal of these missionaries in 
consultation with the Lazarist apostolic vicar alone. Essentially the Vatican worried that 
this constitution removed it from the political equation entirely. In response the Lazarist 
superior, Father Etienne, protested to the Vatican that in giving this authority to the 
government he wanted above all “to fix the legal foundation of this establishment so that 
the missionaries can enjoy all necessary independence.”64 Rather than allotting more 
authority to the government, Etienne saw the constitution as ensuring that the government 
could not remove missionaries without first consulting with the apostolic vicar. 
Moreover, by agreeing with the government on the number of missionaries to work in the 
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colony, Etienne claimed that he desired only to ensure that each missionary would 
receive a state salary.65 He concluded: 
 We have not wished at all to restrain the authority of the Holy Congregation 
 ….[but] it is easy to understand that a religious establishment founded in a 
 country ruled by the French government, one founded, organized, and funded by 
 that government, can never be entirely independent of its authority. And thus it 
 is indispensable to set the rules of this dependency, in order to as much as 
 possible avoid all collisions and difficulties.66 
 
The Holy See had hoped that by retaining an apostolic vicariate and confiding it to a 
missionary congregation it could increase its authority over the clergy of Algeria. This 
assumption, however, proved unfounded as the French colonial government sought to 
solidify its own religious authority in the colony. 
 The Propaganda Fide proved especially recalcitrant over article four of the 
proposed constitution, which stipulated that it would only have the right to nominate its 
chosen Lazarist as apostolic vicar, but that the ultimate approval would rest with the 
king. Such a regulation went against established protocol for establishing apostolic 
vicariates and reversed the process by which Father Collin had ascended to the position 
of apostolic vicar in 1830. To add further insult article four also specified that the 
superior general of the Lazarists could change the apostolic vicar after consulting with 
the king alone. As a confidential note in the foreign affairs office in Paris stated on 31 
December 1835, “the pope would never consent to this [article], as he jealously guards 
the rights of the Holy See. He is so inflexible in his pretensions and moans even when he 
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is forced to recognize the right of the king over the nomination of bishops.”67 This 
disagreement over who possessed the authority to appoint the apostolic vicar ultimately 
proved fatal for the entire enterprise. With the Vatican and the ministry of foreign affairs 
unable to reach an agreement, the religious situation in Algeria returned to the chaotic 
status quo ante. 
 
A Diocese of Algiers for a Depraved Settler Community 
 Almost immediately following the breakdown in negotiations between the Holy 
See and the French government, the same problems resurfaced as missionaries competed 
with each other to carve out their own realms of authority in a territory that still lacked 
any real religious order or any recognized spiritual leader. In 1836, the Vatican 
unilaterally appointed the Jesuit Father Montera as apostolic prefect, though his authority 
remained unrecognized by the French government, which nonetheless allowed him to 
stay in the colony in an unofficial capacity. Montera immediately complained to the 
Propaganda Fide that the war ministry had granted ecclesiastical authority to the old 
military chaplain, Father Spitz, who continued to “exercise parish sacraments…outside of 
his authority” and inspired “little confidence in the hearts of the faithful.” Montera also 
noted that another rogue priest without any recognition from either the French 
government or the Vatican had taken it upon himself to come to work in Algiers after the 
bishop of Nancy had expelled him from his diocese. Montera observed that this priest’s 
conduct “correlated with his shameful past” and complained that the administrative chaos 
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had led to “the degradation in which our religion has for a long time wallowed in this 
country.”68  
 Like other missionary priests examined here, Montera sought to further his 
temporal as much as his spiritual authority, or at least saw them as complementary and 
mutually reinforcing. He complained to the Propaganda Fide: 
 Being the only ecclesiastic equipped with legitimate powers, it is also only I 
 who can administer the sacraments and fill all the other ecclesiastical functions; 
 and yet I have had to see these functions, these sacraments of marriage and 
 sometimes even confession, filled by two ecclesiastics without the authority 
 required to do so, without an approved mission, while I have no way of 
 suppressing this state of disorder.69 
 
When Montera brought this complaint to French officials, they informed him that he 
could continue to administer sacraments but that he should not expect a salary from the 
state nor should he impede the work of other ecclesiastics recognized by the state. 
 At the same time, however, the steady stream of colonists that continued to pour 
into Algiers and the other large cities of the colony began to render more urgent a 
definitive religious ruling in the colony. The European population of Algeria grew from 
3,228 in 1831 to 11,251 in 1835 and would reach nearly 30,000 by 1840.70 As Jennifer 
Sessions has noted, the oft-commented-upon immorality of this population began to 
challenge “the racialized assumptions on which the settler colonial order was based.”71 
Sex, alcohol, and slovenliness constituted the daily lives of many colonists. Despite 
efforts by French authorities to tightly control the number of liquor distributors in the 
colony, drinking establishments quickly emerged as the primary business in the areas of 
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European settlement. In the words of historian John Ruedy, “a typical European who 
came to Algeria expecting to become a farmer might well end up opening a bar to serve 
wine and absinthe to French soldiers.”72 Further, due to the disproportionate numerical 
superiority of men over women, prostitution appeared ubiquitous in the major cities.73 
Finally, whereas metropolitan officials did their utmost to create a colony of small 
agricultural proprietors, colonial officials constantly complained that the majority of 
Europeans arrived only as transient and idle land speculators. In sum, the colonial regime 
began to fear that European settlers deprived of religious guidance would assume the 
traits of hyper-sexuality, laziness, and debauchery that it associated with the defeated 
North African population. Although the morality of the colonists had probably changed 
little between 1830 and the latter part of the decade, the colonial regime’s newfound 
preoccupation with this morality reflected the growing importance that it attached to the 
settler population for the future and potential permanence of colonial rule. 
 Missionaries themselves did not fail to connect this immoral and ignorant society 
to a lack of proper religious guidance and to insert themselves as potential disseminators 
of civilization. Writing in 1836, one Jesuit informed his superior in Rome that “the 
corruption of moeurs here has reached its limit…libertinage and money, these are the two 
divinities that are the passions of the inhabitants of the French possessions of North 
Africa.”74 Another Jesuit wrote that “religious observance on Sundays [and] on holy days 
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is virtually unknown” in Algeria,75 while another missionary complained, “I have seen 
people who were previously pious but who today no longer practice; I have seen others 
here who were previously indifferent but now actively disrespect the faith.”76 It is likely 
that, separated from the watchful eyes of their neighbors and families, settlers no longer 
felt bound by the traditional moral codes and religious practices that governed rural life in 
the metropole; and secular and religious leaders felt this moral depravity all the more 
acutely as it threatened to undermine the emerging ideology of the civilizing mission that 
justified imperial rule in the first place. 
 Rather than spread civilization to North Africans, then, many missionaries feared 
that the lives of European settlers began to mirror the “savage” habits of their conquered 
subjects. In 1841, the representative of the Lyon-based Propagation de la Foi in Algiers 
expressed the conception that Europeans and North Africans differed little in their levels 
of civilization. His first impressions of the colony are worth quoting at length:  
            What a city this city of Algiers!…To say nothing of the 1,500 prostitutes that line 
 the streets…Around 8.45 in the morning on the banks of the sea a negress, 
 accompanied by Jewish and Moorish women, after lighting many candles and 
 burning incense, slit the throat of a chicken and drank its blood. While emitting 
 piercing cries each of the women received from the hand of this priestess a cup 
 from this sacred fountain in order to be delivered from the malevolent spirit that 
 torments them... I have said nothing of all the ridiculous and sacrilegious 
 superstitions of the notorious Europeans to the shame of our holy religion.77 
 
In another letter this priest recounted the native belief – perhaps in a misunderstanding of 
the Catholic belief in transubstantiation – that the French practiced cannibalism and that 
French surgeons “cut cadavers into pieces in order to cook them and from this broth they 
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get the remedies to heal the sick.” The priest immediately added, “fanaticism here has 
reached its limits, our so-called colons are not very enlightened themselves.”78 In 1843, 
another missionary expressed his fear that unruly settlers could completely reverse the 
hierarchical dichotomy between colonizer and colonized, as he remarked that “the 
majority [of indigènes] have habits of sobriety which would make our Europeans 
blush.”79 All of these missionaries understood the government’s growing desire to 
differentiate the European from the indigenous population and they saw the issues of 
immorality and ignorance as ones they could capitalize on in order to secure their own 
positions of professional and spiritual authority in Algeria. 
 Although the above reports date from the early 1840s, they doubtless reflect the 
overwhelming sentiment of the government in 1838, when it decided to constitute 
Algeria as an official bishopric identical to those existing in the metropole. The 
undeveloped state of Catholicism that resulted from the impasse with the Vatican 
combined with the flagrant immorality of the ever-growing settler community had 
reached the point that it threatened the very legitimacy of colonial rule itself. Under the 
terms of the Concordat of 1801, France, rather than the Vatican, had the authority to 
nominate and salary its bishops, who in turn appointed secular clergy to serve the 
different parishes in their diocese.80 Since 1801, the French government had used the 
Concordat to ensure that it could appoint bishops with Gallican, rather than ultramontane, 
sympathies. At the same time, confusion continued to reign over whether the government 
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could constitute Algeria as a French bishopric without legally assimilating Algeria to 
France on a wider political and juridical basis. As the minister of foreign affairs wrote:  
 As long as our possessions in Africa are not consolidated as French departments 
 and placed under the laws of the metropole in the same situation as Corsica, the 
 Holy See will never admit that these areas should fall under the regulations of the 
 Concordat.81 
  
The minister feared that only by incorporating Algeria into France as a department of the 
metropole could the government then force the Vatican to recognize the conditions of the 
Concordat that held in France. This legal assimilation would allow the government to 
appoint its own bishop to oversee the spiritual development of the new territory. 
 Although calls for the full legal assimilation of Algeria began in the 1830s and 
increased throughout the 1840s, these calls emanated from a vocal minority, primarily 
consisting of wealthy settlers who sought to protect their business interests in Algeria by 
winning legal representation in the French legislature.82 This outcome would eventually 
come to pass, though not until the Revolution of 1848 toppled the July Monarchy and 
replaced it with the Second French Republic.83 In the uncertain years of the 1830s, 
however, the call for the full assimilation of Algeria made little headway. As a result, 
King Louis Philippe opted to ignore the Vatican entirely and unilaterally constitute 
Algeria as a bishopric parallel to those existing in France despite the absence of the full 
juridical and political assimilation of the colony. It appears that the Vatican ultimately 
acceded to this move simply to bring some religious order to the colony’s growing 
European population.  
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 On 10 February 1838, the French ambassador to the Holy See wrote to the prefect 
of the Propaganda Fide, now Cardinal Lambruschini, that the king had “deemed it 
suitable to replace [this provisional state] with a definitive organization analogous to that 
which exists in France,” adding that “the intentions of the government are to institute a 
bishop whose seat is in Algiers, and it no longer requires the consent of the Holy See to 
accomplish this project.”84 On 25 August 1838, a royal ordinance declared that the French 
possessions of North Africa would form a diocese with an episcopal seat in Algiers. This 
same ordinance designated Antoine Louis-Adolphe Dupuch (in office 1838 to 1845), a 
priest of the diocese of Bordeaux, as the new bishop, while a papal bull of September 
1838 recognized this bishop by canon law. On 9 November, Dupuch was sworn in at the 
Tuileries before King Louis-Philippe. He arrived in Algiers on 6 January 1839 and took 
residence at the old palace of Azizo-Bey, with an annual salary of 12,000 francs. The 
minister of war also granted him 50,000 francs for fees of installing and paying his 
clergy, which included one curé, two vicars, two chaplains, and six incumbents.85 Only 
months previously, a separate royal ordinance had changed the official name of the 
colony from “Les Possessions françaises dans le Nord de l’Afrique” to the more concise 
term “Algérie.”86 
 
Bishop Dupuch and the Origins of the Jesuit Mission, 1838-1845 
 
 The story of the relatively short tenure of Bishop Dupuch – his two successors 
held their positions from 1846-66 and 1866-92, respectively – has been partially 
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recounted by historian Sarah Curtis. Curtis described the power struggle that erupted in 
the period from 1838 to 1840 between the bishop and the strong-willed Emilie de Vialar, 
superior of the Sisters of St-Joseph de l’Apparition. This struggle ultimately resulted in 
the expulsion of Vialar and her congregation, which took refuge in neighboring Tunisia 
under the patronage of its leader, Ahmed Bey.87 Dupuch replaced the Sisters of St Joseph 
with the Filles de la Charité, who he hoped would prove more docile and amenable to his 
authority. As this chapter has already shown and as subsequent chapters will explore in 
greater detail, rather than serving as an aberration this struggle continued previous 
practices of Catholic clerics who used their positions of authority in Algiers to achieve 
levels of power unavailable to them in the metropole. Secondly, it also set a precedent 
that successive bishops would build upon in an attempt to solidify their authority over 
secular clergy and missionary societies alike. To be sure, the fact that Dupuch did not 
consolidate his authority as would his successors resulted primarily from his own 
incompetence rather than a lack of ambition, although it appears that despite his struggles 
with Vialar he was seen as generally pious. As Curtis recounts Dupuch was forced to 
resign in 1845 because of his catastrophic mismanagement of resources and the state of 
financial ruin that he brought to the newly created diocese of Algiers. 
 It is important to note that it was during the tenure of Dupuch that secular clergy 
began to trickle into the colony. Because this still small number of state-salaried clerics 
could not alone meet the needs of the growing settler population, it was also during this 
time that most of the missionary congregations that would continue to populate Algeria 
throughout the nineteenth century arrived in the colony. These religious orders included 
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the female congregations the Filles de la Charité, the Soeurs de la Doctrine Chrétienne, 
the Soeurs du Bon-Pasteur, and the Soeurs du Sacré Coeur as well as the male 
congregations of Lazarists, Jesuits, Trappistes, and an offshoot of Jesuits who founded 
the Society of St. Regis for the Rehabilitation of Marriages. The arrival of the Frères des 
Ecoles Chrétiennes in 1853 completed the list of the numerous congregations that plied 
their trade in Algeria during the nineteenth century (the Salésiens de Don Bosco arrived 
in 1891 and will be discussed in the last chapter). In the following chapter, I will examine 
the conflicting fortunes of each of these congregations in greater detail. 
 The remainder of this chapter will look in depth at the politics behind the 
relationships between Bishop Dupuch, the Jesuits, Governor General Thomas-Robert 
Bugeaud (in office 1840-47), and the war ministry in Paris.88 Despite legal restrictions in 
France and in Algeria, missionaries could best win support through securing the 
patronage of either the bishop of Algiers or the governor general of the colony. Far away 
from politicians in Paris, private influence and political expedience trumped metropolitan 
ideologies and legislation. The Jesuits took advantage of this situation to oversee a 
number of educational establishments in Algeria despite, as we have seen, the royal 
ordinance of 18 June 1828 having prohibited them from doing just this. They owed their 
success to Bishop Dupuch, who unlike his successors saw the Jesuits as useful allies, and 
Governor General Bugeaud, who preferred the Jesuits for their moralizing influence on 
what he saw as the mass of debauched settlers. Ultimately, this section contributes to the 
larger argument that the change in fortune of missionaries in Algeria throughout the 
nineteenth century did not correlate with the major political upheavals of the metropole – 
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the Revolution of 1848 for example – but rather to the successive changes of bishops and 
military patrons in the territory. 
 After assuming power in 1838 Dupuch began to outline plans to establish a junior 
and senior seminary in Algiers to train the future clergy of Algeria.89 A royal ordinance of 
6 August 1842 created the junior seminary, which provided secondary education to 
capable students regardless of their plans for a future vocation. After a failed attempt to 
use secular clergy, Dupuch confided the seminary to the Jesuits, giving them an 
institutional foothold in the colony. In 1844 the Jesuits then paid 120,000 francs to 
purchase 86 hectares of land on which stood an abandoned cavalry garrison in the village 
of Ben Aknoun, about eight kilometers from Algiers. They spent a further 100,000 francs 
on this property making repairs and constructing additional facilities to turn the garrison 
into an orphanage. Much of the funding for this enterprise came from the Propagation de 
la Foi, but Bugeaud himself provided the necessary manpower to help with the repairs 
and to establish a working farm on the property.90 As administrators of the orphanage, the 
Jesuits received a subvention directly from the governor general for overseeing “an 
institution of public utility.”91 As official teachers of the junior seminary, the Jesuits 
received their salaries from Bishop Dupuch, whose own funds came from the minister of 
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war on the express recommendation of the governor general. Despite the flagrant 
illegality of both these establishments, one Jesuit father wrote to the Propagation de la 
Foi in 1844 that “the civil and religious authorities have been so content with the 
amelioration introduced by Father Brumauld [the Jesuit superior in Algeria] that they 
have become entirely devoted to him.”92 In both instances, then, the Jesuits relied on the 
good will of private patrons rather than formal legal protection for moral and financial 
support. 
 This protection did not fail to raise the suspicions of metropolitan officials. In 
March 1845 the secretary of the minister of war wrote to his superior to inform him that 
“the Jesuits, as a congregation not legally authorized to teach in France, have very much 
discovered that in [Algeria] their prohibition has not been possible.”93 The secretary 
blamed the “impudence” of the bishop, who had shown “an unfortunate lack of foresight” 
in confiding the orphanage to this congregation. Although the Jesuits claimed to train 
children as artisans and tradesmen, “to this is always joined a certain degree of primary 
education…[which cannot] be left to religious congregations that are not legally 
established in France.” Although the secretary admitted that the orphanage served a 
valuable purpose for the colony he warned: 
 Everywhere the [Jesuits] appear becomes a permanent foyer of intrigue, as 
 they always keep hidden agendas under a façade of good works… It is too easy 
 to recognize that behind a useful establishment at the head of which one finds a 
 Jesuit, is hidden a question of legality and social order, which one day or another 
 will become the most formidable political question.94 
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Even before Algeria’s legal assimilation to France in 1848 then, the secretary viewed the 
political and legal standing of Algeria as analogous to that of France. In a period of near 
constant workers’ strikes, revolutionary upheavals, and anticlerical agitation, the 
secretary worried that ultramontane Jesuits posed a threat to the stability of the colonial 
regime itself.95 
 Ambitious settlers also capitalized on metropolitan fears in an effort to displace 
Jesuits who occupied positions of power that they coveted as their own. In 1844 a local 
lay teacher published accusations against the Jesuits in the Parisian broadsheet Le Journal 
des Débats in an effort to displace them from a new secondary school they had just 
opened in the Algerian town of Oran. Drawing on longstanding beliefs about Jesuits in 
France, he alleged that these missionaries had hatched a “Carlist and Legitimist 
conspiracy” to overthrow the colonial government.96 The governor general, however, 
immediately leapt to the defense of the Jesuits. In a confidential letter to the minister of 
war, Bugeaud wrote that “political parties being powerless in Algeria, only a very tiny 
number of insurrectionists could dream of conspiring against the state.” The European 
community comprised a minority of the population of Algeria while “the Arabs constitute 
the principal force of the country and…seeing as though they will not make themselves 
either Jesuits, Carlists, or Republicans…they would take the opportunity of a Jesuit 
conspiracy to quickly assert revenge on France.”97 Unlike many metropolitan officials, 
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Bugeaud saw the political problems confronting Algeria as distinct from those in France 
and he used this distinction to refrain from applying metropolitan laws to the colony. 
 Rather than fearing a Jesuit plot, Bugeaud saw the Jesuits as serving a useful 
purpose by providing a moral upbringing to the colony’s ever-growing community of 
orphans. He wrote, “I see no danger in leaving a very small number of Jesuits to exercise 
a charity all the more useful to a colony where we are not able to do it ourselves.”98 He 
praised the Jesuits for imparting the principles of religion, morality, and utility to children 
who “according to all appearances have been abandoned in the streets to a life of crime, 
[but] now become artisans useful to the colony.” Bugeaud admitted himself that the 
government had neither the resources nor the willpower to undertake such a useful work. 
He asked the minister of war if “we must destroy an establishment so important for the 
future of the colony because some jealous imbeciles take umbrage at it?”99 For Bugeaud, 
Algeria possessed no political similarities to France, as metropolitan political alliances 
counted for little in the colony and the primary threat to the colonial regime came from 
the rebellious indigenous community.  
 Further, Bugeaud supported the Jesuits and indeed other religious congregations 
due to their supposed similarities to the military. In a conversation with Father François 
Régis, the superior of a house of Trappiste monks in the nearby town of Staouëli, 
Bugeaud stated: 
 My opinion is that colonization can only succeed by militarily organized 
 populations. And nothing approaches more a military organization than a 
 religious organization. The monk and the soldier have great relationships with 
 each other; they are submitted to severe discipline, accustomed to deprivations 
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 and to obey passively, they both work for the community and they are directed by 
 a single will (une seule volonté).100 
 
This opinion matched Bugeaud’s larger outlook, as he saw the influx of civilians and 
especially civilian rule as a potential detriment to French control over Algeria.101 We 
should note that it was Bugeaud in his capacity as governor general and commander of 
the Armée d’Afrique who orchestrated the most brutal phase of repression in the 
campaign against Abd al-Qadir and other rebel groups between 1840 and 1847.102 As 
Benjamin Brower has written, “Bugeaud is correctly understood as one of the most 
dangerous men ever to have set foot in Algeria.”103 Bugeaud’s brutality did not fail to 
incite criticism from government officials in both France and Algeria, and Bugeaud 
interpreted the traditional alliance between the Catholic Church and the army as a reason 
to offer support to religious congregations that he saw as obedient to his will.104 
 There is in fact no archival evidence that missionaries ever criticized Bugeaud’s 
“war of extermination” against the tribes. Such violence only received any mention 
whatsoever when missionaries noted in passing that the most recent razzia (or “raid” 
against the tribes) had produced a number of new orphans for them to house and had thus 
increased their public utility.105 This lack of empathy is evident in a letter written by a 
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representative of the Propagation de la Foi in Algiers noting that an orphanage run by the 
Dames of Charity (a secular organization in the colony staffed largely by nuns) was 
composed of “European children whose parents have been decimated by misery and the 
deadly climate of Africa and other children in a greater number [who] have been carried 
off from Arabs following razzias.”106 In sum, then, in this early phase of colonization the 
military and religious congregations served as institutions of mutual support, and 




By the mid 1840s an alliance had developed in the colony between the military and 
religious congregations. At this time in the shifting politics of colonial rule, private 
patronage trumped legal rulings, a development that allowed the Jesuits to thrive in 
Algeria. With this support, other missionary congregations and secular clergy began to 
expand throughout the colony. The establishment of a bishopric ensured the colonial 
regime a measure of independence from the Vatican, which by 1840 had lost the struggle 
for authority over the new church in Algeria. It also, for a time, rendered the military 
authorities more trustful of the Catholic clergy. As the parish priest of the newly-settled 
town of Tlemcen wrote on 27 August 1845, “on the first Sunday of July the Catholic 
religion was established in this town in presence of all the military authorities, who are so 
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supportive of our religion.”107 Whereas in 1830 the military leadership had seen 
missionaries as a means of spreading civilization to conquered Muslims, by the 1840s 
they now supported the clergy as long as they directed their supposed civilizing mission 
toward the growing European population, rather than the indigenous one (barring, in rare 
cases, indigenous orphans).  
 The next chapter will show how, by the end of the 1840s, widespread support for 
missionaries among highly placed officials began to wane. Although support by military 
authorities continued more or less unabated, the settler population only grew in numbers 
and confidence, and proponents of civilian rule began to equate both the military and 
missionaries with brutality and fanaticism – two traits incidentally also linked with the 
conquered North African population. At the same time, the ever-growing number of 
missionaries and secular clergy began to compete with each other to secure a dwindling 
supply of patrons. The next bishop of Algiers would go far beyond Bishop Dupuch in his 
efforts to consolidate his rule over the growing number of missionaries in the colony. In 
doing so, he gave financial and moral support to his own parish clergy at the expense of 
more independent missionaries. Missionaries began to compete with each other to secure 
the patronage of military and ecclesiastical authorities. As part of this competition, they 
often exhibited scandalous behavior that undermined their very purpose of moralizing the 
European population. To be sure, missionaries still saw Algeria as a land of opportunity 
and, in the wake of the Revolution of 1848, they increasingly saw it as a land in which to 
construct an alternative religious modernity that rejected the secular modernity emerging 
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in the metropole. To do so, they sought to cultivate the alliances of the minority of the 





1846-1866: A “Golden Age” for Catholic Missionaries in Algeria? 
 
“We must keep Father Girard in Algiers. He is the pivot around which our entire work 
turns. His influence is such around town that the priests and the clergy fear him and 
would never engage in a struggle with him.”1 
-Letter from Lazarist Father Damprun to his provincial superior in Paris, 28 June 1848. 
 
 
“One can never make a society that does not even have a half-century of existence 
resemble effectively one whose origin stretches back centuries. If a mission consists of 
moving from ordinary conditions of Christian society into extraordinary conditions based 
on dates rather than distance, then we are certainly in a missionary land. The proof is in 
the repugnance of a great number of our Jesuits to even come to this country. Many ask if 
they have been sent here by punishment.”2 
-Letter from Jesuit Father Reynaud to his provincial superior in Lyon, 18 August 1858. 
 
 
 The previous chapter illustrated how the colonial government came to rely on 
missionaries to provide a religious education to Algeria’s orphaned or abandoned 
children in order to civilize a population that many people saw as dangerously degraded 
and idle – two characteristics traditionally associated with the colony’s Muslim subjects. 
In the period between 1846 and 1866, the French government also supported missionaries 
because it saw missionary work as a cheap method of molding a diverse settler 
community into a loyal unit that would offer support in the face of indigenous uprisings. 
And yet, in spite of the government’s quest to use missionaries to cultivate the loyalties 
of this diverse colonial population, missionaries just as often sowed divisions: among the 
settler population, between the military and civil regimes, and even within the Catholic 
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clergy itself. By viewing colonization through the lens of missionary work we see that by 
1870, and indeed much later, the vision of a cohesive settler community in Algeria 
remained a complete chimera.3 
 Further, often detested by colonists to a greater extent than their Islamic 
counterparts, Catholic missionaries occupied a liminal space between European rulers 
and North African subjects, and their presence thus disrupted the racialized taxonomies 
on which imperial rule depended.4 Like other settlers, missionaries viewed Algeria as an 
empty space in which to carve out professional opportunities and personal authority that 
remained denied to them in the metropole. In this period, missionaries began to see 
Algeria in particular as a place in which to forge what I will call a “religious modernity” 
that appeared increasingly unrealizable in a secularizing Europe. In this endeavor, 
however, missionaries often incited the ire and jealousy of competing secular and 
religious power brokers who hoped to shape the nascent colony to suit their own visions 
of the future.5 These visions repeatedly came into direct conflict with each other and 
missionaries had to navigate this hostile terrain by cultivating dense networks of privilege 
and patronage with military and religious authorities. Their story thus reveals the 
cultivation of privilege as at least as integral to modern structures of power as any 
impersonal or bureaucratic rule of law. It also complicates the depiction of colonies as 
simple laboratories of modernity, as sites of experimentation whose findings could then 
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be grafted back on to metropolitan society.6 Rather, for missionaries and settlers alike, the 
colonies served in themselves as sites in which to implement modern potentialities. In 
this way, colonial actors began to see Europe as more provincial than the colonial 
periphery it supposedly ruled over. 
 Finally, missionaries’ ability to forge this alternative modernity was undermined 
by their competition for useful patrons and the state salaries they could provide. This 
competition often caused missionaries to denounce one another, challenge each other’s 
authority, and ruin the best-laid plans of the government and missionary superiors alike. 
Secular clergy accused missionaries of encroaching on their territory, while missionaries 
jockeyed with each other in an effort to secure a limited amount of financial resources 
and to climb the ranks of the internal hierarchies of their congregations. Further, although 
historians have shown that the colonies could offer females missionaries in particular an 
escape from the male-dominated metropole, this chapter demonstrates that they too at 
times relied on powerful male patrons for their financial and spiritual existence.7 While 
colonial territories could indeed offer women a refuge from bourgeois notions of 
secularism and patriarchy, they could also provide marginalized men the opportunity to 
reassert a gendered hierarchy that they perhaps felt unable to uphold in a rapidly-
changing Europe.8 To be sure, female missionaries could at times retain a modicum of 
independence by venturing outside ecclesiastical patronage networks and winning 
support and protection from secular, especially military, authorities. 
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Assimilation, Association, and the Paradoxical Place of Foreign Settlers 
 
 It was during the period covered in this chapter (1846-1866) that the colonial 
government began to place great emphasis on monitoring and policing the European 
community of Algeria. This emphasis only intensified throughout the nineteenth century. 
This shift in policy resulted from the increasing realization of the permanence of the 
French occupation of Algeria and from the unrelenting stream of settlers that continued to 
pour into the colony. By 1848, 115,000 Europeans lived in Algeria, compared to a mere 
3,000 in 1831.9 In the mid 1840s, the colonial regime began to undertake the twofold 
endeavor of imparting a sense of shared identity among the colonists and fostering these 
colonists’ loyalty to the colonial state. To be sure, these two goals often conflicted with 
one another, not least because the French identity that stood as the desired paradigm itself 
remained highly fluid and contested, and it changed over time as the sources of 
immigration to the colony also changed. French radicals exiled to Algeria after the 
Revolution of 1848 had a much different conception of Frenchness than did Alsatian 
refugees resettled on Algerian farms after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. 
 To complicate this situation, unlike much of the imperial world in the nineteenth 
century, Algeria from the beginning had a diverse settler population of Italian, Spanish, 
and Maltese speaking families who in many communes outnumbered the French until the 
1880s. In cities like Oran, Spanish speakers continued to outnumber the French almost 
until the turn of the century (a situation mirrored by the Italian population in 
Constantine). As Julia Clancy-Smith has shown, the non-French population of Algeria 
came to comprise the “lumpenproletariat” of Europeans that increasingly settled on the 
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southern shores of the Mediterranean – they came as casual laborers in search of work, as 
dispossessed farmers in search of land, and (less often) as political dissidents in search of 
refuge.10 Rather than assimilate into a cohesive, monolithic French community, this 
motley array of often devoutly religious Europeans clashed with their less faithful French 
neighbors, and their adherence to the Catholic faith could divide them from the French 
more than any other issue. In the words of historian François Renault, although most 
French settlers had lost their faith, “foreigners, like Spaniards, Maltese and Italians, 
continued for the most part to practice their religion, but they had no voice in ruling 
circles.”11 Indeed, until the naturalization law of 26 June 1889, these non-French 
Europeans could neither elect nor serve in the city councils of Algeria, and archival 
documents reveal the constant tensions engendered by these religious, political, and 
ethnic divisions.12 
 Anthropologist Andrea Smith has argued that colonial societies “were based on 
extreme power differentials and the rule of the many by the few…Division between 
colonists within such a society could prove fatal to the entire enterprise.”13 For this 
reason, the imperial state in Algeria preferred French settlers; nevertheless, it reluctantly 
welcomed other Europeans in order to compete with the overwhelming numerical 
superiority of its indigenous subjects. As early as 1843 the minister of war, Marshall 
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Jean-de-Dieu Soult, complained of the “poor policy of letting hordes of foreigners invade 
Algeria.”14 He worried that if another European power attacked Algeria then the 
government could not count on the loyalty of these non-French Europeans. At the same 
time, the French military confronted two larger problems. First, it faced an ongoing 
struggle to subdue indigenous uprisings, the largest of which was led by Emir Abd al-
Qadir; and second, despite official encouragement for French farmers to emigrate to 
Algeria, death and disease ensured that one way or another most of these settlers returned 
to France shortly after their arrival.15 As a result, Soult wrote, “if we welcome foreigners, 
it is with the thought that the substitution of Christian for Arab blood…guarantees us 
more support than from the indigenous population…[and] if the Arabs rise against us, 
[the foreigners] will unite with us for our defense.”16 
 Until at least 1880, metropolitan and colonial officials remained divided over the 
best policy for securing the loyalty of these so-called foreigners.17 This division stemmed 
in part from the strained relationship between military and civilian authorities in the 
territory. The Revolution of 1848 marked a decisive shift in the juridical status of 
colonial Algeria and resulted in the first tentative steps towards civilian rule. In 
September 1848, French colonists in Algeria won the right to elect representatives to send 
to the Constituent Assembly and participate in the creation of a new constitution for the 
Second French Republic. On 12 November 1848 this constitution declared Algeria an 
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official part of the French metropole and divided it into three departments – Oran, 
Algiers, and Constantine – themselves subdivided into communes and arrondissements. 
Each department also won the right to elect local departmental and municipal councils, 
presided over by prefects and mayors, respectively, and to send elected officials to the 
French National Assembly to represent the interests of the colonists.18 This assimilation, 
however, only entailed areas of European settlement, as since 1839 the government had 
divided Algeria into “full communes” (communes de plein exercise), mixed communes 
(communes mixtes), and military communes (communes militaires).19 In full communes 
European residents outnumbered indigenous ones, and in 1848 French citizens in these 
communes theoretically won political rights equal to those of metropolitan citizens. In 
military communes Europeans remained in the minority and a military governor general 
assisted by the notorious Arab bureaus (bureaux arabes) continued to rule over 
indigenous subjects.20 As European colonization progressed it was hoped that military 
communes would pass through an intermediary stage as mixed communes (with mixed 
populations), before gaining the political rights of full communes. 
 In practice, however, this division was not so clear cut. Even in full communes 
non-French citizens had few political rights.21 As a result, the minister of war and the 
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inhabitants to France and French culture. See also Julien, Histoire de l’Algérie Contemporaine: La 
Conquête et les Débuts de la Colonisation, 1827-1871 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1964), 413-
415. 
21 In European communes with municipal councils, the number of European foreigners and indigènes 
combined could not exceed one-third of the total number of municipal councilors, while neither a foreigner 
nor an indigène could serve as mayor or assistant mayor (adjoint). Julien, La Conquête, 352. 
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governor general retained ultimate authority over politically sensitive issues like 
education and religion even in these communes. This system of dual power prevented 
officials from ever adopting or enacting an official policy or legal framework to govern 
the foreign settler population in European communes. Nevertheless, although such 
policies remained unarticulated and inchoate, governmental tactics towards the foreign 
population of Algeria most closely resemble the policies of association and assimilation 
traditionally associated with the conquered indigenous populations.22 Government 
officials, in fact, applied these concepts much more vigorously towards the settler 
population than the indigenous one.  
 In broad outlines, civilian authorities in the European communes in this period, 
and increasingly over time, tended to work towards assimilating the foreigners to French 
culture by imparting French education in the French language; what exactly this culture 
consisted of varied from commune to commune based on the composition of local 
municipal councils. At the same time, the military retained ultimate authority over 
politically sensitive issues and governors general tended to work towards associating 
foreigners to the imperial state by providing for their particular and presumed cultural, 
educational, and religious needs. In this period, the military turned to missionaries to 
fulfill this goal and offered them protection from at times hostile civilian authorities and 
anticlerical colonists. Ultimately, religion played a pivotal role in the conception and 
application of both policies. 
 To be sure, in the 1840s and 50s officials remained uncertain over how to use 
religion to tie these colonists to the imperial regime. In 1845, Governor General Bugeaud 
                                                
22 For the classic account of these two conflicting ideologies, again see Raymond Betts, Assimilation and 
Association in French Colonial Theory. 
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decided to provide for the religious needs of the colonists by assigning a single church 
building to serve both Protestant and Catholic settlers in the city of Algiers. Writing in 
1845, Minister of War Soult warned Bugeaud, “because of the superstition which the 
Spanish as well as Maltese attach to religion it appears to me that such a measure could 
spark the most profound unrest.”23 Rather than offend this religious “superstition,” Soult 
sought to appease these settlers’ religious sensibilities; to do so, he hoped to use Catholic 
missionaries to cultivate the loyalties of these families by providing for their particular 
religious needs. Two years later, however, the director of civil affairs for Algeria voiced 
his fear that missionary schools would compete with public schools that the state created 
specifically “to give a national education that is above all necessary in Algeria, where 
there are a great number of foreign parents who will not teach it within their 
households.”24 Generally speaking, military authorities like the minister of war continued 
to support idiosyncratic policies of association while civilian authorities proved more 
dogmatic in their desire to assimilate foreigners to what they saw as French secular 
customs. Increasingly throughout this period such assimilation connoted less and less the 
practice of Catholicism, especially among the handful of radical French settlers that later 
ascended the political ranks in some communes of Algeria.25 
                                                
23 CAOM F80/1627. Letter from the minister of war to the governor general, 22 February 1845. 
24 CAOM F80/1625. Letter from the director of civil affairs of Algeria, second bureau, to the minister of 
war, 28 June 1847. 
25 For the most recent discussion of the republican sentiments of these communes during the Second 
Empire, see Gavin Murray-Miller, “Imagining the Trans-Mediterranean Republic: Algeria, Republicanism, 
and the Ideological Origins of the French Imperial Nation-State, 1848-1870,” French Historical Studies 
37/2 (Spring 2014): 303-330. Separately, Yvonne Turin has shown that, while many radicals remained in 
Algeria after their exile in 1848, they opted to refrain from politics initially in order not to further court 
suspicion by Napoleon’s authorities in the colony. Only in the mid 1860s did they gain enough renewed 
confidence to run for political office in Algeria, largely on anticlerical platforms (see Chapter Three). 
Yvonne Turin, “La commune d’Alger et ses écoles en 1871. Un problème de laïcité coloniale,” Révue 
d’Histoire et de civilisation du Maghreb 8 (Algiers: Publ. Fac. Lettres, 1970), 86. 
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 For the time being, however, an unforeseen imperative often helped reconcile 
civilian authorities to military designs: the need to minimize expenses. Once they realized 
that missionaries worked for less than half the salary of their secular counterparts, many 
civilian authorities quickly cast their assimilationist tendencies aside. The bishop of 
Algiers recognized as much when he wrote to the superior of the Frères des Ecoles 
Chrétiennes that “here the entire question is reduced to material expenses: salary, rent, 
furnishing.”26 Indeed, teaching frères from this congregation received an annual salary of 
750 francs throughout the 1850s and 60s, compared to as much as 1,800 francs for 
secular teachers.27 The bishop’s opinions were seconded by the minister of public 
instruction, who wrote as early as 1847 that “a purely lay organization of our hospitals, 
our schools, our nurseries in Algeria, with a double or even quadruple expense, only 
produces far inferior results to those obtained with the aid of religious communities.”28 At 
this still early stage of colonization, cities often lacked secular teachers and healthcare 
workers entirely. Missionaries could thus help tie families to the colony in order to give 
them an incentive not to return to France or elsewhere in Europe at the first sign of 
distress. Governor General Bugeaud voiced this fear directly when he warned that “many 
fathers would hesitate to come to Africa and to settle there if they are not assured of 
finding for their children the educational resources that exist in the largest French 
cities.”29 
                                                
26 Archivio Fratelli Delle Scuole Cristiane, Casa Generalizia, Roma. Documents Régionaux et locaux. 
Afrique, Afrique du Nord, Algérie. Historique, Documents Généraux. [Frères des Ecoles Chrétiennes, 
henceforth FEC] NL 461 No 1. Letter from Bishop Pavy to superior of the FEC, 22 April 1853. 
27 FEC NL 461 No 1. See letter from frère Judore, visiting superior, to superior in Paris, 25 April 1853. 
28 CAOM F80/1746. Letter from the minister of public instruction to the minister of war, October 1846. A 
number of historians have remarked on the cost effectiveness of missionaries in the imperial world. See for 
instance Clancy-Smith, Mediterraneans, 256. 
29 CAOM ALG/GGA/50S/2. Notes on public instruction in Algeria, December 1847. 
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 These fears continued throughout the 1850s and 60s and settler petitions proved 
such anxieties to be well founded. Between 1856 and 1859, for instance, the inhabitants 
of the Algerian port town of Cherchell sent numerous petitions to the governor general in 
Algiers, the minister of war in Paris, and, ultimately, Emperor Napoleon III himself in an 
effort to allow missionary sisters to open a local primary school for girls. The petitioners 
worried that their children “were left free throughout the day and that this inaction 
allowed them to abandon themselves to regrettable habits.” Only the sisters, they 
contended, would “inspire in our children first the principles of our religion.”30 They 
further complained that the lack of a Catholic school “had already forced fifteen fathers 
to impose on themselves the enormous sacrifice of separating from their little girls to 
send them to other cities or villages.”31 In a similar instance, the division commander of 
Oran, Jean-Jacques Pélissier, expressed his support for Jesuit secondary school because 
the lack of a Catholic school had previously imposed a “heavy burden” of forcing parents 
“to send their children far away to receive the benefits of an education.”32 He feared that 
families who could not establish roots in the colony would most likely return to the 
metropole rather than defend their territory. In this sense, the future of French rule and 
France’s presence in Algeria depended on the state’s ability to meet the religious and 
educational needs of its settler population. The administration hoped to use Catholic 
                                                
30 Centre d’accueil et de recherche des Archives nationales [Henceforth AN] F17/12325/5, letter from the 
inhabitants of Cherchell to the prince minister of war, February 20, 1859. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu [Jesuit archives, henceforth ARSI], Fonds Algérie 1001. Quoted in 
an anonymous letter from a Jesuit priest to his superior, 3 July 1852. 
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education to keep families together and thus to tie the nuclear family to the colonial 
state.33 
 The Jesuits in particular understood the fine line between providing religious aid 
and cultivating loyalty to the French state. They hoped to capitalize on this double 
imperative in order to cement their own position as power brokers in the emerging 
colonial order. To do so, they actively worked to cultivate the loyalties of the non-French 
population in Algeria. Citing the 20,000 Spanish settlers in Algiers who “languish in 
profound ignorance and flagrant immorality,” one Jesuit father wrote to Rome in 1851 to 
request a new Spanish priest who “knows France and loves the French.”34 In a separate 
letter, he also asked for a “French nationalized Italian” to work in the school at Oran.35 In 
1852, another Jesuit taught himself enough Spanish so that he routinely filled the 
cathedral of Algiers with Spanish parishioners; but at the same time he claimed to teach 
those parishioners to support the French authorities. Although historians have shown that 
French missionaries could most often cultivate favor with colonial regimes by spreading 
French culture and language, the Jesuits, and indeed the military government, understood 
that the diverse settler population of colonial Algeria necessitated a slightly altered 
approach.36 The state could win the loyalties of the non-French settlers by providing for 
                                                
33Ann Stoler has examined the importance of the nuclear family to imperial rule in a later period in the 
Dutch East Indies. See Stoler, Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009). For a similar process in metropolitan France, see Judith 
Surkis, Sexing the Citizen: Morality and Masculinity in France, 1870-1920 (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2006). More recently, Camille Robcis has argued that the family was entirely constitutive of French 
society since the Civil Code of 1804. Robcis, The Law of Kinship: Anthropology, Psychoanalysis, and the 
Family in France (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013). For the importance of the family to the nation 
between the French Revolution and the July Monarchy see Jennifer Heuer, The Family and the Nation: 
Gender and Citizenship in Revolutionary France, 1789-1830 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007). 
34 ARSI 1001, Alger 1-III. Father Jordan to his superior in Rome, 25 April 1851. 
35 ARSI 1001, Alger 1-III. Father Jordan to his superior in Rome, 24 September 1852. 
36 For the requirement that missionaries spread French culture and language to the French colonies see J.P. 
Daughton, An Empire Divided: Religion, Republicanism, and the Making of French Colonialism, 1880-
1914 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). Daughton’s missionaries, however, interacted solely 
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their spiritual needs in their own language, so long as they also taught a love of France 
and of French rule.37 
 To win the support of the military regime that governed Algeria, missionary 
congregations had simply to fulfill three requirements: they must remain reasonably 
solvent, they must allow periodic government surveillance over their establishments, and 
they must refrain from large-scale and overt proselytism towards the indigenous Muslim 
population.38 In 1849, the governor general devised a plan to assign each of the three 
newly created departments of Algeria to a different congregation of missionary sisters: 
Oran to the Soeurs Trinitaires, Algiers to the Filles de la Charité, and Constantine to the 
Soeurs de la Doctrine Chrétienne. Two additional congregations did not make the cut: 
although the Dames du Sacré Coeur helped run a successful orphanage in Mustapha, their 
reputation for a lack of submission worked against them. Indeed, the governor general 
remarked that “these women seem to want to escape all administrative control.”39 
Similarly, the Soeurs du Bon Pasteur, who ran a boarding school at El Biar, lacked 
enough resources to gain government support. In 1848, the minister of war remarked 
unfavorably on the “precarious and disturbing financial situation of this religious 
                                                                                                                                            
with indigenous populations and not with European settlers. Conversely, Claude Prudhomme has written 
that “a focus on the linguistic dimension risks hiding the fact that the French, religious or laic, promoted a 
common culture to their students.” See Prudhomme, “Catholic missions and cultural rivalries in the Eastern 
Mediterranean: 1870-1914,” in Une France en Méditerranée: écoles, langue, et culture françaises. XIXe-
XXe siècles, edited by Patrick Cabanel (Paris: Creaphis, 2006), 51. 
37 This process of attempting to impart French (i.e. Parisian) culture to France’s peasant population only 
occurred after 1870 in France, or much later than it did in Algeria. See Eugen Weber, Peasants into 
Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976). 
For a longer-term process see David Bell, “Lingua Populi, Lingua Dei: Language, Religion, and the 
Origins of French Revolutionary Nationalism,” The American Historical Review 100/5 (December 1995): 
1403-1437. 
38 For a discussion of the handful of native Algerians, mostly Kabyles, who did convert to Christianity, see 
Karima Dirèche-Slimani, Chrétiens de Kabylie (1873-1954). Une action missionnaire dans l’Algérie 
coloniale (Paris: Editions Bouchène, 2004). 
39 CAOM F80/1629. Letter from the governor general to the director of civil affairs for the province of 
Algiers, 4 December 1847. 
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establishment.”40 These failings ensured that neither congregation received government 
patronage to expand their works in any of the newly created departments. 
 The colonial government sought to better control the three remaining 
congregations not by subjecting them to the metropolitan rule of law, but rather by 
leaving them in a state of legal limbo. A royal ordinance of 14 July 1834 forbade the 
establishment of any missionary congregation in Algeria without the approval of the 
governor general. Nevertheless, even upon approval the administration refrained from 
granting official “authorization” to any of these congregations in Algeria. Rather, since 
1843 it had pursued a policy of mere “toleration” for congregations. This strategy ensured 
that if any congregation focused too much on proselytism towards the indigenous 
population then the government could expel it from the colony with a mere decree from 
the minister of war.41 Although the governor general supported missionaries’ work of 
education and moralization with the European population, he feared that proselytism 
towards Algeria’s Muslims would only turn them against the French. As the minister of 
war wrote in 1846, “the Arabs see in their religious belief the very principle of their 
nationality, and are no more disposed to renounce one than the other.”42 The minister 
expressed his fear that the application of the laws of the metropole to the congregations in 
Algeria could “unleash in our colony the most unfortunate consequences…[but] by 
leaving things in this provisional state the government will retain an absolute liberty of 
                                                
40 CAOM F80/1629. Confidential letter from the minister of war to the governor general, 20 January 1848. 
41 If the congregations had official authorization to work in Algeria, the government would have needed a 
royal ordinance to expel them from the colony. CAOM F80/1746. Letter from the minister of war to the 
governor general, October 1846. 
42 CAOM F80/1746. Report from the minister of war to the minister of public instruction, October 1846. 
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acting, such as for the repression of different religious communities.”43 These 
congregations would remain in their provisional state until the 1901 law of associations 
forced them to apply for authorization (see Chapter Four). 
 To further solidify control over missionaries and education in Algeria, the 
minister of war ensured that the French educational laws of March 1850, known as the 
Falloux laws, remained unapplied in Algeria. This reluctance to apply the laws of the 
metropole in Algeria, even towards the European population in full communes, reveals 
the limits of the juridical assimilation of Algeria with France. Under the Falloux laws and 
later amendments, municipal councils could nominate their local public school teacher, 
who only needed approval from the superintendent (recteur).44 In Algeria, however, the 
minister of war and the governor general retained complete authority to appoint 
schoolteachers. Although they originally intended this stipulation to prevent colonists 
from forcing unfriendly teachers on the indigenous Muslim population, it also allowed 
the governor general to appoint Catholic missionary teachers desired by Spanish, Italian, 
or Maltese settlers, who, lacking French citizenship, had no voice in local municipal 
councils. Indeed, these councils at times proved most resistant to missionary teachers and 
often attempted to force secular teachers on the Catholic population under their 
jurisdiction. As we will see in the next chapter the issue over who exactly had the right to 
appoint schoolteachers would nearly spark a settler revolt in the early 1870s and served 
as a touchstone for debates over the broader shift to full civilian rule. 
                                                
43 CAOM F80/1746. Letter from the minister of war to the bureau of politics, administration, and 
personnel, 30 October 1843. 
44 The Falloux laws also gave an extraordinary liberty of teaching to female religious congregations in 
France, as they allowed Catholic sisters to teach without even a brevet de capacité, the minimal 
requirement for all lay teachers. Rather, Catholic sisters could teach with a mere “certificate of obedience” 
from the superior of their congregation. See Sarah Curtis, Educating the Faithful: Religion, Schooling, and 
Society in Nineteenth-Century France (Chicago: Northern Illinois University Press, 2000). 
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 To round out their control over missionaries in Algeria, the minister of war and 
the governor general made a distinction between government funding of congregations as 
a whole and the funding of missionaries as private actors who proved beneficial to the 
colonial state. In 1848, the minister of war wrote that the government must “abstain from 
any measure which would lead congregations to believe that the state is disposed…to 
give them its patronage.” He clarified this position by continuing: 
 The government only sees the members of these corporations as individuals, 
 agents with a specific ability who engage in aid for a particular and predetermined 
 service. For the government, the Lazarists are only auxiliary priests, the Sisters of 
 Charity and the Sisters of the Christian Doctrine are only teachers. The 
 administration maintains establishments of public utility: schools, hospitals, and 
 nurseries. It does not fund religious congregations.45 
 
 Taken together, the policy of official “toleration” (rather than “authorization”), 
the abstention of applying the Falloux laws, and the restriction of funding to “individual 
actors of public utility” all ensured that missionaries had to rely completely on the 
patronage of individual military generals or the bishop of Algiers in order to secure 
support. As a result, individual missionaries competed to win favor and state salaries for 
their work as teachers, preachers, and nurses. These salaries came directly from the 
governor general, who inscribed them in municipal or departmental budgets at his will, or 
they came from the bishop of Algiers, whose own funds came from the minister of war 
upon recommendation of the governor general. In sum, the government’s policy towards 
missionaries differed little from what historian Osama Abi-Mershed has described as its 
policy towards the colonized North African population. For Abi-Mershed, “historical 
context [and] political expedience…more than any ideological clarity, held sway in 
                                                
45 CAOM F80/1629. Confidential letter from the minister of war to the governor general, 20 January 1848. 
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determining the orientation of French policies in Algeria.”46 Although Abi-Mershed does 
well to expose the lack of ideological coherence in French colonial policy on the ground, 
he overlooks the integrality of extralegal measures not only to the governance of the 
conquered and colonized population, but also of the European settler population. The 
government’s strategic use of missionaries reveals that it focused its efforts (alternately 
and haphazardly) of colonial assimilation and association on European settlers more than 
on native Algerians.47 Although it feared missionaries could disturb the religious 
sensibilities of the Muslim population, in the period between 1840 and 1870 it also saw 
missionaries as crucial in cultivating a settler community that pledged allegiance to the 
French state. 
 
Settler Opposition to Catholic Missionaries 
The government’s quest to use missionaries to mold a unified and loyal settler 
population, however, proved elusive.48 Writing in the 1960s, a sister from the women’s 
congregation the Filles de la Charité referred to the period from 1850 to 1870 as “the 
golden age for missionaries in Algeria.”49 Reading the primary documents, however, the 
historian is hard pressed to arrive at the same conclusion. Only when gauged against the 
overtly anticlerical policies implemented after 1870 does this earlier period appear as a 
                                                
46 Abi-Mershed, Apostles of Modernity, 5. This fluidity also applied to the indigénat legal code that 
governed indigenous populations throughout the French empire after 1880. It was never codified and thus 
military commanders could invoke it for any number of unspecified reasons. Isabelle Merle, “Retour sur le 
régime de l’Indigénat: Genèse et contradictions des principes répressifs dans l’empire français,” French 
Politics, Culture and Society 20:2 (2002): 77-97. And Gregory Mann, “What was the Indigénat? The 
‘Empire of Law’ in French West Africa,” The Journal of African History 50/03 (November 2009): 331-
353. 
47 For the military’s attempt during the Second Empire to associate native Algerians to French rule see 
Ageron, Les Algériens Musulmans et la France, 38-48. 
48 Again, this argument goes against Rey-Goldzeiguer, Le Royaume arabe. 
49 Anonymous author, Les Filles de la Charité, Pendant un siècle en Algérie, 1842-1962 (unpublished 
manuscript found in the archives of the Filles de la Charité, written sometime in the 1960s). 
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time of harmony. Rather, a study of missionary work in Algeria reveals what Abi-
Mershed has described as “the uneasy and uncertain relationship between the civil and 
military powers in North Africa” in the period before 1870; but the strains in this 
relationship resulted not only from conflicting visions over the place of North Africans in 
French Algeria.50 Documents in the missionary and national archives attest to the constant 
external threats, internal divisions, and struggles for power that beset missionary 
establishments in this period. One of the two principal sources of opposition to Catholic 
missionaries came from anticlerical settlers and civilian authorities (the other, more 
surprisingly, came from the Catholic bishop and his appointed clergy in Algeria).  
 In the early years of French rule, Europeans saw Algeria as a blank slate on which 
they could carve out their own niches of professional or personal authority; or, as Abi-
Mershed writes, as “a vast, unspoiled canvas on which to create fresh social realities.”51 
At the same time, conflicting visions over how to create these realities often led to 
resentments between competing power brokers. As we saw in Chapter One, certain 
settlers had already begun to express their disdain for missionaries by citing the political 
dangers they supposedly posed to Algeria. In the instance examined above, a lay teacher 
accused Jesuit missionaries of plotting “Carlist and Legitimist” conspiracies to overthrow 
the colonial regime. Bugeaud, for his part, saw this accusation as a ploy by this teacher to 
carve out his own professional opportunity by displacing the Jesuits from their secondary 
school. As a result, Bugeaud succeeded in protecting the Jesuits despite their illegal status 
as a congregation not recognized in France itself. 
                                                
50 Abi-Mershed, 56. 
51 Abi-Mershed, 91. 
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 Such accusations only increased throughout the middle of the century. 
Repressions following the Revolution of 1848 and Louis Napoleon’s coup d’état on 2 
December 1851 resulted in the exile of 6,258 political dissidents to Algeria.52 Although 
many of them would return to France within a decade, many also chose to stay in Algeria 
and use the colony to enact the secular reforms that remained unfulfilled in France. In 
large and newly-enfranchised communes like Algiers a number of self-styled republicans 
ran for and won elections as municipal councilors and mayors, and they sought to use 
their positions of power to enforce anticlerical legislation on, at times, a religiously 
devout (but politically powerless) community of foreign settlers. As one Lazarist 
missionary wrote in 1857, “the mayor [of Algiers] shows us increasing hostility. The 
employees of the mayor and the prefect act the same way and use all their power against 
us…everywhere officials are hostile, apart from 1 or 2 of every 20.”53 The divisions 
caused by this anticlerical turn among the civilian authorities threatened to undermine the 
religious aims of the military governor general and minister of war.  
 To be sure, the republicanism of French exiles soon adapted to the peculiar 
imperial situation of colonial Algeria. As Ruedy has written many “republican” settlers 
“were far from being republicans in the liberal mold of the 1848 revolutionaries… Their 
republicanism was a means to end arbitrary military rule” and extend their authority over 
an indigenous population they saw as unfairly protected by the military and the Arab 
                                                
52 Jean-Pierre Peyroulou et al, “1830-1880: la conquête coloniale et la résistance des Algériens,” in Histoire 
de l’Algérie à la Période Coloniale, edited by Abderrahmane Bouchène et al. (Paris & Algiers: Editions La 
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France, but this return did not mean that their ideas returned with them. See also Julien, La Conquête, 388. 
53 Archives de la Congrégation de la Mission de St Vincent de Paul [Henceforth CM Lazarists] Algiers 
108a, Letter from Father Doumerq to superior in Paris, 31 March 1857. 
 87 
bureaus.54 These settlers continued to associate military rule not only with undue respect 
for Muslims and their religion, but also with undue respect for the so-called foreigners 
and their religion. Although many exiles already had anticlerical sentiments, these 
sentiments combined with and were exacerbated by the association of any religion with 
the fanaticism of the detested Muslim subjects. And this disdain for religion extended to a 
disdain for those who provided financial and moral support to religious congregations 
and, theoretically, native Algerians: the military generals.  
 The petition for a missionary school at Cherchell mentioned above, for example, 
may have won the support of the military government, but it also incited the ire of the 
civilian administration and a portion of the settler population. In 1858, the prefect of 
Algiers informed the director of civil affairs that “the petitions [for missionary sisters] 
stem entirely from the intrigues of a local priest” and that the presence of the missionary 
sisters “was not only useless but also dangerous.” The prefect claimed that the petitioners 
were “persons little esteemed,” who have for years been “slandering the local lay 
institutrices [female teachers] and submitting them to public insults.”55 The military 
regime thus found itself in a bind. It could accede to the demands of the Catholic families 
and help tie these families to the colony, but in doing so it risked offending the 
anticlerical sensibilities of the local French civilian government in what was, after all, a 
French territory.  
 Such situations would play out across Algeria throughout the Second Republic 
and Second Empire. They reveal the tensions that beset colonial rule and belie the 
simplified dichotomy that separates European colonizer from African subject. 
                                                
54 Ruedy, Modern Algeria, 74. 
55 AN F17/12325/5. Report by the director of civil affairs of Algeria to the minister of war, 14 December 
1858. 
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Anthropologist Ann Laura Stoler has argued that “[colonial] statecraft was not opposed to 
the affective, but about its mastery.”56 In this case, affective ties between parents and their 
children in a religiously divided settler community threatened the very legitimacy of 
colonial rule. How could settlers trust a colonial state that could not even keep families 
together? These families, as mentioned above, faced “the enormous sacrifice of 
separating from their little girls to send them to other cities.”57 Conversely, how could the 
military administration overrule the local civilian government in a commune that 
supposedly had the full political rights of the metropole?  
 Throughout this period, the state repeatedly found itself torn between Catholic 
settlers who relied on free moral education provided by missionaries, and religiously 
indifferent or even hostile settlers who saw the missionaries as sowing divisions within 
the European community or monopolizing professional positions they coveted 
themselves. In this period, the military regime most often sided with the missionaries and 
against anticlerical, largely French, civilian municipal councils (though by no means 
were all municipal councils anticlerical, nor were their policies unchanging over time). 
Again, it did so in the hopeless aim of unifying a pan-European community into a 
cohesive unit of national defense. But it did so by spreading a facet of French culture – 
Catholicism – for which most French in Algeria cared little, and some downright 
detested. 
 
Bishop Pavy, Female Missionaries, and Clerical Conflicts 
Reading the documents in the national archives, one is left with the impression that the 
religious divisions that afflicted colonial Algeria stopped here. There is little mention in 
                                                
56 Stoler, Along the Archival Grain, 71. 
57 AN F17/12325/5. Letter from the inhabitants of Cherchell to the Prince, 20 February 1859.  
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the archives of anything other than the secular clergy and religious orders working in 
tandem.58 An examination of missionary and Vatican archives, however, reveals that 
these divisions cut much deeper. Missionaries in Algeria encountered staunch and 
consistent opposition from the Catholic bishop of Algiers and his local parish priests. 
This situation stemmed directly from the liminal space Algeria occupied after 1848 as not 
a colony in the strict sense of the term and at the same time not fully part of the 
metropole.  
 As we have seen, in 1838 the French government opted to unilaterally incorporate 
Algeria into France as an official bishopric of the metropole. In doing so, it appointed a 
French bishop, Bishop Dupuch, who in turn began to appoint secular clergy to serve the 
parishes throughout his diocese. In this respect, even before 1848 the legal framework for 
the Catholic Church in Algeria was analogous to that in France. At the same time, 
however, unlike in France the bishop of Algiers did not have nearly enough secular 
clergy to serve his diocese. As a result, the period after 1838 also saw missionary 
congregations arrive in Algeria en masse. To an even greater extent than in France, not to 
mention other imperial settings, the Catholic Church in Algeria relied on both secular and 
religious clergy to serve the faithful; and, while nearly four times larger than France, the 
territory often seemed too small to accommodate both sets of clergy. If the first bishop of 
Algiers was forced to resign in 1845 due to his catastrophic mismanagement of resources, 
his successors proved much more adept at spreading their authority throughout the 
diocese of Algiers. They did so by ruling authoritatively over potentially independent 
missionary congregations and bestowing patronage on those missionaries who displayed 
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the most loyalty and docility to episcopal authority. To better secure their own 
professional and spiritual footholds in Algeria, these bishops also worked to align their 
interests with those of metropolitan and colonial authorities as much as possible.  
 In the early 1840s, the metropolitan government had watched with dismay as 
Dupuch and Bugeaud allowed the Jesuits to spread themselves throughout the colony in 
spite of their tenuous legal position in France. The war ministry and the ministry of cults 
thus moved to ensure that a more Gallican bishop succeeded Dupuch to rein in the more 
ultramontane Jesuits. In 1846 the government appointed Louis Antoine Augustin Pavy (in 
office 1846-1866) as bishop of Algiers.59 Pavy hoped to displace Jesuits and other 
renegade missionaries by increasing the number of parishes in Algeria in order to 
populate the colony with his own appointed parish priests (who received their salaries 
directly from him). During his tenure the number of official parishes in Algeria increased 
from 29 to 187 and the number of diocesan priests from 48 to 273.60  
 As members of religious orders, however, male and female missionaries drew 
their authority from their motherhouse in France rather than from the French government 
or the bishop. As a result, the Gallican bishop and his clergy from the outset saw 
missionaries as competition to their authority and as dangerously independent and 
unpredictable, but at the same time as necessary for the spread of the Catholic faith.61 
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Historian Gérard Cholvy has written that after the French Revolution many new 
congregations adopted ultramontanism as a means to protest the Concordat.62 Whether or 
not this assertion applied to Algeria, the bishop at least showed himself cognizant of this 
possibility. As late as 1862, a representative of the Propaganda Fide complained that “the 
very little sympathy Pavy has for the religious congregations deprives them of aid which 
would be more useful here than anywhere else.”63 Because he could not afford to rid the 
colony of religious orders completely, Pavy worked to play different congregations off 
against each other in order to better exert his authority over all of them.64 
 Pavy’s maneuverings around the Soeurs Trinitaires and the Filles de la Charité in 
particular reveal his obsession with cultivating obedience to his authority. Both 
congregations were financially solvent and equally pleasing to the military regime. For a 
number of reasons, however, Pavy favored the Filles de la Charité over the Soeurs 
Trinitaires and quickly moved to replace the latter with the former. As female 
congregations, each order relied on male priests to administer the sacraments of 
confession and communion – affirmations of faith that these sisters took very seriously. 
The Soeurs Trinitaires, distrustful of the secular clergy, relied primarily on local Jesuit 
missionaries to administer their sacraments and serve as spiritual advisors. The Filles de 
la Charité, in theory at least, relied for their sacraments exclusively on their brother 
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congregation, the Lazarists.65 As we saw in the first chapter, the Lazarists had a history of 
friendly relations with the French government and secular clergy. As a result of the 
Gallican tendencies of their male confessors, Bishop Pavy thought he could better ensure 
the loyalty and submission of the Filles de la Charité than he could the Soeurs Trinitaires. 
 Further, the spiritual and indeed temporal authority of the Lazarists over the Filles 
de la Charité ensured that a traditional gender hierarchy remained intact and that Bishop 
Pavy would not have to deal with less predictable female superiors. In Algeria, 
missionary sisters relied heavily on individual men for their success; and sisters who fell 
under the direct authority of a male superior found it easier to succeed than did those with 
a female superior. Indeed, Bishop Pavy sought to marginalize the Soeurs Trinitaires 
because they procured their own (Jesuit) confessors and relied ultimately on the authority 
of a female superior. Conversely, Pavy helped draft the regulations of the Filles de la 
Charité in Algeria specifically to ensure that only their male superiors interacted with 
local authorities (though this stipulation did not always correspond to reality). Father 
Girard, the head of the Lazarist mission in Algiers, worked closely with Pavy on drafting 
the regulations for the sisters in Algeria. The resulting constitution established a five-
person council that met once a week “to ensure good order and discipline in the houses” 
of the Filles de la Charité. The council included three sisters, who served an advisory 
role, and two Lazarist priests, who monopolized executive functions. Article five of their 
constitution stipulated that “the sisters composing the council must avoid communicating 
together outside of the council about anything which should be discussed in the council,” 
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while it included no such stipulation for the priests. Similarly, article eleven ruled that 
“the [Lazarist] visiting superior alone, or in his absence the director, will interact with the 
authorities, whether ecclesiastical or civil.”66 As a result of this gendered hierarchy, 
Bishop Pavy and the Lazarist Father Girard developed a close relationship that redounded 
to the benefit of the Lazarists and, to a significant if lesser extent, the Filles de la Charité 
alike. 
 The Soeurs Trinitaires, who worked primarily in and around the city of Oran, did 
not enjoy this support; and their independent and assertive mother superior, Sister 
Aloysia Bilhot, worked tirelessly to maintain her congregation’s chosen Jesuit confessors. 
In 1851, Bishop Pavy moved to rein in the sisters by replacing their Jesuit confessor with 
his own appointed parish priest, Father Avit. Pavy hoped thus to displace the Jesuits, who 
owed no loyalty (or state salary) to Pavy. For his part, Father Avit saw his new position 
as an opportunity to carve out his own niche of authority as a new power broker in 
colonial Oran. As such, he quickly moved to close the chapel the sisters created in the 
local hospital to force them and their patients to attend his own church, whose attendance, 
the military commander of Oran later noted, “was hardly considerable.”67 When the 
sisters refused, Avit wrote to the bishop and called Sister Aloysia a “rogue and 
insubordinate.” He went so far as to nullify any confession these sisters made to a Jesuit, 
telling Aloysia that she and her sisters “may as well have confessed to a dressed-up 
cat.”68 He got to the heart of the matter when he complained to Pavy that by going to the 
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Jesuits the sisters had “constantly diminished his authority.”69 While this example reveals 
the power that male clerics could exert over their female counterparts, it also highlights 
the fragility of male authority. Father Avit himself relied on the missionary sisters to prop 
up his authority and to justify the moral (and ultimately financial) support he received 
from the bishop. 
 The sisters resisted this assertion of male clerical authority as much as possible 
within the constraints of a religion and society shaped by patriarchal networks of power. 
In perhaps the ultimate form of female Catholic resistance to male clerical authority, two 
sisters mortally ill with typhoid preferred to die without receiving their last rites rather 
than receive them from Father Avit. Sister Marie-Françoise commented on her deathbed 
that “it is bad enough to be forced into confession while one is healthy, at least in dying 
leave me the consolation of having another priest, whoever he may be.”70 For women 
who desired confession multiple times per week and saw it as the ultimate profession of 
faith, renouncing this sacrament on one’s deathbed constituted an extreme, if desperate, 
form of political resistance and a powerful assertion of individual autonomy. 
 In other instances, sisters sought to cultivate alternate secular sources of 
patronage. In 1851, Sister Aloysia made the trip to the local headquarters of the division 
commander of Oran (and future governor general of Algeria), Jean-Jacques Pélissier. 
Himself a devout Catholic, Pélissier criticized the government in France for appointing 
bishops and secular clergy based solely on political, rather than religious needs. Pélissier 
told Aloysia that the whole Algerian clergy constituted the riffraff of France, and that 
they garnered no respect among the settler population, “not only as priests, but even as 
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men.”71 Conversely, he expressed his support for the disciplined and devout Jesuit 
missionaries. “It is the bishop,” he wrote, “who wants to expel the Jesuits from your 
house in order to put you entirely under the hands of his clergy.” Pélissier further 
contended that since the Revolution of 1848 Pavy had sought to curry favor by showing 
republican sympathies and had even “degraded himself to the point of blessing the tree of 
liberty.” He reassured Aloysia by writing, “Am I not your father? I am there to protect 
you.”72 In this instance, Aloysia ensured the continued existence of her congregation by 
appealing to a devout military general to defend her order against a Catholic bishop who 
garnered political support from authorities in the metropole. 
 Pélissier proved an equally valuable patron for the Jesuits’ secondary school in 
Oran. Bishop Pavy saw the Jesuit school as a direct threat to the Lazarist seminary that 
Pavy himself established in Algiers. Although the Falloux laws of 1850 had stipulated 
that the Jesuits could again run teaching establishments in France, Pavy issued an order in 
1852 that forbade Jesuits from teaching secondary classes and accepting boarding 
students in Algeria. In doing so, Pavy hoped to force students in Oran to come to Algiers 
to attend schools over which he had direct oversight. Again, however, General Pélissier 
came to the Jesuits’ aid because he saw Pavy’s decision as a danger to the entire colony. 
Pélissier understood Pavy’s intentions, but countered that: 
The population of Oran has no relation with that of Algiers. All its relations are 
with Marseille or the cities of the Midi [in France]. Not finding in Oran any 
means to raise its children it will direct them towards France, and thus Algiers 
will not profit any more than Oran from this prohibition.73 
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The Jesuits thus won this battle with the bishop because their aims dovetailed with those 
of the military administration. They provided a cheap and efficient means of tying 
children to their families and in turn of tying families to the colonial state. Although the 
school in Oran continued to struggle under pressure from Bishop Pavy, the school’s 
administrator assured his superior in 1852 that “once Pélissier is named governor general, 
as everybody expects, our secondary school will not be forgotten.”74 
 
Lazarists, Filles de la Charité, and the Gendered Dimension of Patronage 
 Throughout the 1840s and 50s, the Lazarists expanded their works in Algeria by 
cultivating favor with the bishop, who preferred them to the Jesuits due to their lack of 
ultramontane traits and the supposed control they exerted over the Filles de la Charité. 
Indeed, the Lazarist visiting superior for all of Algeria, Father Girard, accrued immense 
power from securing the patronage of the bishop. Directly after Pavy was named bishop 
in 1846, Girard wrote to his superior in Paris: 
 Things are going so well for us here due to our new bishop…He tells me of his 
 most intimate affairs and asks for advice as though he were one of my fellow 
 priests. As much as he supports the Lazarists, he is equally against the Jesuits 
 whom he nonetheless  appeases because they are very powerful. We are helping 
 the bishop to reorganize the diocese and you will see, I dare say, prosperity come 
 to our houses.75 
 
Such support yielded dividends in 1848, when Pavy appointed the Lazarists to replace the 
Jesuits in the junior seminary and to manage the newly created senior seminary in Kouba, 
nine kilometers from Algiers. The seminary by canon law fell under the control of the 
local bishop, as it trained secular priests to serve the diocese. By maneuvering to get 
Girard named head of the seminary, Pavy brought the recruitment of new priests under 
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his own control, but also ensured Girard and his fellow seminary teachers annual salaries 
of 1,800 francs, thus giving the Lazarists significant advantages over other male 
congregations, notably the Jesuits. As one Lazarist priest wrote to his superior in Paris, 
“we must keep Monsieur Girard in Algiers. He is the pivot around which our entire work 
turns. His influence is such around town that the priests and the clergy fear him and 
would never engage in a struggle with him.”76 
 The Revolution of 1848 revealed the importance of this patronage, as newly 
installed civilian authorities often expressed overtly anticlerical sentiments. In November 
1848 the Lazarist superior of the residence in the Algiers neighborhood of Mustapha, 
Father Dufour, wrote to his superior in Paris: “you would not believe how many 
difficulties we have undergone. The civil authorities have proved very little 
accommodating [and Girard] thinks it better to have recourse to the bishop.”77 The anti-
missionary backlash spread to the press as well, with an article in the moderate journal 
Akhbar accusing the sisters of the Filles de la Charité of sexual impropriety with the 
Lazarist priests. Dufour – who as we will see was no friend of the missionary sisters – 
admitted himself that the sisters took carriage rides to the Lazarist seminary in Kouba far 
too often, writing in February 1849, “I strongly desire that the public not be wrongly 
informed about these trips. If this keeps up our indiscretion will cost us!”78 Despite this 
anticlerical agitation from members of the municipal council and organs of the press, one 
Lazarist affirmed in March 1849 that “the incendiary articles written against us have only 
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excited everywhere general reprobation…they have not done us great harm.”79 At this 
still relatively early stage in the history of French Algeria, anticlerical politicians could 
not rally the support of a large segment of the settler community, who remained largely 
indifferent to anticlerical agitation. 
 To be sure, many settlers remained equally indifferent to the brand of civilization 
missionaries hoped to impart. The most successful missionaries were those who could 
cater specifically to the more religious foreign population of Algeria. In December 1848, 
Dufour informed his superior that one Lazarist taught two catechism classes to “a large 
number of Spanish and above all Catalans… [and] he will soon have more work than he 
can handle.”80 For the non-Spanish or Italian speaking Lazarists, however, work was 
harder to come by. In July 1849 Dufour wrote that “even though the bishop is on our 
side…there are so few people of faith in this city.”81 Moreover, even many people of faith 
contested the power of the Lazarists. Although they may have won the support of the 
bishop, this support did not always extend to other members of the secular clergy, who 
jealously guarded their domains of religious authority. As one Lazarist informed his 
superior, the congregation found itself “surrounded by clergy that is so hostile to us and 
the other male communities that there is no hope of finding sufficient work [in 
Algiers].”82 It was only the continued patronage and salaries provided by the bishop that 
allowed the Lazarists to expand outside of the colonial capital and to serve villages not 
yet staffed by parish priests. 
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 Although this patronage had its origins in the Lazarists’ ability to control the far 
more numerous sisters of the Filles de la Charité – who largely eluded the jealousy of the 
secular clergy – even this desire to implement patriarchal relationships from the 
metropole proved more difficult to achieve in colonial Algeria. On the most localized 
level of power, the juxtaposition of so many missionaries from so many congregations 
allowed the sisters to flout the designs of the bishop and resist their assigned spiritual 
directors, a situation which Father Dufour protested to no end. The sisters often used the 
struggles between and among male missionaries and clergymen as opportunities to play 
different priests against each other and to carve out their own realms of autonomy in the 
schools and hospitals they staffed. Within an admittedly very circumscribed domain, such 
minute political tactics allowed female missionaries to assert a modicum of independence 
and overturn the gendered hierarchy of their congregation. 
 We can see an example of these political tactics through an examination of certain 
sisters of the Filles de la Charité, who worked as nurses in the civil hospital of Algiers 
and who nominally fell under the authority of the Lazarist Father Dufour. Despite the 
rules of their congregation, however, the sisters often sought out Jesuits to administer 
sacraments such as confession and communion. In August 1848 Dufour complained that 
“the confidence the sisters hold for our priests at the hospital is very limited…[and] the 
Jesuit father is held above us in the hearts of the Filles de la Charité.”83 The head of the 
mission in Algeria, Father Girard, began to maneuver to have the bishop remove the 
Jesuits from the hospital; he told Dufour, however, that the Jesuits had pushed the sisters 
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to “delay the move indefinitely.”84 Nevertheless, by 1850 Girard and Dufour had 
succeeded in displacing the Jesuits from the hospital and allotting their state salaries to 
other Lazarists. Following this substitution, Girard reminded Dufour that “the bishop 
would like the Lazarists to recognize the favor he did them by removing the Jesuits from 
the hospital in order to replace them with Lazarists.”85 
 On other occasions, sisters ironically used their very gendered identity to go over 
the head of their male superior and cultivate favor outside of official ecclesiastical 
patronage networks. In 1850, Dufour again bemoaned his continued lack of power over 
the sisters and confided to his superior in Paris that “here, people in high places love 
women, the women of our community above all. The numerous visits that are made to 
them, the caresses they are enveloped in, the daily compliments that they are the object of 
are a real test for them.”86 Dufour complained that their insubordination actually 
overturned the sexual hierarchy so that the Lazarists “find themselves bound to the dress 
of a Fille de la Charité, as here [in Mustapha] our existence depends on her, our work is 
given to us by her; she throws it to us out of charity like a morsel of bread.”87 Indeed, the 
patronage the sisters enjoyed from a local military general allowed them to procure 
funding for their local primary schools independently of both the bishop and their male 
superior. And only once their schools received this funding would the sisters then call on 
the Lazarist priests to serve as confessors for themselves and their students. 
 In part, the sisters proved more useful than male missionaries for the government 
because capable laywomen remained so rare in Algeria during the middle decades of the 
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nineteenth century. Military generals and often even civilian officials desired very much 
to confide various works of education, healthcare, and poor relief to the sisters as 
“individual actors of public utility.” Lazarist priests, on the other hand, existed solely to 
provide for the spiritual needs of the sisters and thus served no secular purpose. Many 
Lazarists sought out other professional opportunities by working as members of the 
parish clergy and responding to the needs of colonists who founded new European 
villages outside of the major urban centers of the territory. As Dufour wrote in 1849, “If 
we do not find work outside [of Algiers] we will be annihilated. Our sisters are expanding 
without us and they will soon have closer relationships with the Jesuits, who are 
everywhere.”88 Indeed, during the cholera epidemic of 1848-9 in particular the minister of 
war chose to send Filles de la Charité to far off “agricultural colonies” to serve sick 
settlers.89 He even inscribed in the colonial budget a salary of 700 francs per sister for this 
task plus funds for travel and lodging. 
 Because of their usefulness to the colony the sisters began to supersede the 
Lazarists in the eyes of the government. Following the creation of the agricultural 
colonies, Dufour bemoaned the fact that “the hopes of our rulers seem to rest in this 
moment on the Filles de la Charité.”90 He was not far off, as in April 1850 the minister of 
war wrote: 
 The sisters have made themselves respected and loved… The local authorities 
 have lauded their great results, and the population would be very upset to see 
                                                
88 CM Lazarists 108a Algiers. Letter from Father Dufour to superior in Paris, 10 December 1849. 
89 On 19 September 1848 the National Assembly approved a plan to send 20,000 Frenchmen to live and 
farm in 42 villages throughout Algeria. They received from the state land, houses, seeds, farming tools, 
draught animals and three years of cash payments. This plan met with near total failure and many settlers 
quickly returned to France. In 1849, 1,500 died and thousands fled during a cholera epidemic. See Sessions, 
By Sword and By Plow, 317. 
90 CM Lazarists 108a Algiers. Letter from Father Dufour to superior in Paris, 19 November 1849.  
 102 
 them leave…The governor general has taken the resolution to substitute them in 
 all agricultural colonies for the existing secular teachers and nurses.91 
 
Father Girard actually complained that the administration gave more support to the sisters 
than the Lazarists because colonial officials interacted more with the sisters than the 
priests on a day-to-day basis, a situation that directly undermined the rules of the 
constitution which Girard himself had helped to draft. He suggested to his superior in 
Paris that “maybe it would be advantageous if we had more frequent relations with our 
governor and our prefect,” adding that, “in the house of Algiers we are under the 
protection of the sisters, who go often to the office [of the governor general] 
themselves.”92 
 The increasing independence and autonomy of the sisters ultimately threatened to 
elevate them above the Lazarists in the hierarchy of colonial power brokers. The 
Lazarists began to fear that this newfound sense of autonomy had given the sisters an 
elevated opinion of themselves, with one priest complaining that the sisters “only respect 
and esteem you in proportion to the degree of authority that you have.”93 In 1851, the 
superiors in Paris dispatched a visiting inspector to Algeria in order to institute reforms in 
the composition of the missionary council and hem in the independence of the sisters. 
Although the details of these reforms remain unclear, it appears that the inspector 
removed the sisters even from their advisory role on the provincial council, a move that 
Dufour heartily endorsed. In March 1851, Dufour wrote that the new reforms 
“completely bound (enchainé) [the sisters] in every action, they can no longer move 
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without the consent of the Lazarists.”94 Further, Dufour wrote that the female superior in 
Algeria now found her authority over her fellow sisters “completely limited,” adding that 
“I alone am their spiritual director [while] Girard is their temporal director.”95 Dufour 
hoped that the new composition of the provincial council would finally “bring peace” to 
the mission. 
 Even this new effort to subordinate the sisters, however, did not end the continued 
strife between male and female missionaries. Four years later, Dufour still complained 
that the female visiting superior (visitatrice) “shows the coldest indifference towards my 
authority.” He attempted to reprimand this sister, but bemoaned that “she had no 
intention of ceasing her actions and [said] that she would act according to her own 
conscience.” He further alleged that she had “incited [her fellow sisters] to revolution.”96 
To bring an end to this continued flouting of the sexual hierarchy Dufour recommended 
the extreme measure of abolishing the position of female visiting superior altogether and 
placing the houses of the sisters directly and completely under the authority of the 
Lazarist superior alone. The administration in Paris showed itself both displeased with 
the insubordination of the sisters and upset at Dufour’s inability to alleviate the escalating 
tensions. In 1856, the motherhouse acted on Dufour’s recommendation and removed the 
position of female visiting superior entirely. It also opted to recall Dufour to Paris and 
place a new superior over the houses of the Lazarists and Filles de la Charité in the cities 
of Algiers and nearby Mustapha. 
 These measures seem to have restored a modicum of stability to the houses. 
Periodic complaints continued throughout the 1860s, but none as vehement as the 
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protests voiced by Dufour. Both the Lazarists and the Filles de la Charité continued to 
expand their works as the settler population spread throughout Algeria. Despite their 
internal discord, these missionaries owed their success to the patronage they enjoyed 
from the military and ecclesiastical authorities. Their story reveals the “little tactics of the 
habitat” that female missionaries could employ to gain independence from their male 
superiors.97 It also demonstrates the limits of these tactics, as male missionaries 
constantly worked to uphold the gendered hierarchy inscribed in both the regulations of 
the congregation and the larger and more fundamental organization of the Catholic 
Church.  To understand the benefits that continued to accrue to these missionaries despite 
their disagreements, it is helpful to examine in detail the plight of a missionary 
organization that for a variety of reasons found it increasingly difficult to secure powerful 
patrons. 
 
The Jesuits in Algeria: A Mission Unravels 
 The Jesuits present an interesting case study because their story further 
demonstrates that by zooming in we can uncover fractures and fragmentations underneath 
a seemingly seamless missionary façade. The Jesuit missions unraveled largely because 
different Jesuit missionaries could not get along with one another and viewed each other 
with suspicion as competing power brokers in this land of opportunity. Further, the 
Jesuits struggled to define the very nature of the mission in Algeria. The Jesuit hierarchy 
in Lyon and Rome – like the civilian government in Paris – saw Algeria as a simple 
extension of the metropole, and as such wanted to run Jesuit establishments there from 
afar. Conversely, the missionaries themselves – like the French military – saw Algeria as 
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a land apart and wanted the freedom to run their mission independently of their superiors 
in Europe. Indeed, the liminal state of the mission stemmed directly from the liminal 
space that Algeria itself occupied in the larger imperial landscape. 
 The Jesuits understood well the need to curry favor with the bishop and they 
hatched ambitious schemes to win his support. By 1848, the congregation had a residence 
of priests in Algiers that ran two nearby orphanages at Bouffarick and Ben Aknoun as 
well as a secondary school at Oran. Initially, the Jesuits thought the political changes 
brought by the Revolution of 1848 would allow them to expand their works in the colony. 
The visiting superior for all the missions in Algeria, the affable if timid Father Reynaud, 
hoped that the new French constitution would deny state salaries to official clergy and 
thus render the Jesuits “eminently useful, [as] Monseigneur [Pavy] would lose the 
greatest portion of his clergy, and as for many of them…he would not lose anything 
important.”98 Another Jesuit who oversaw the residence in Algiers, Father Jordan, also 
understood the necessity of cultivating favor with the bishop. “In France,” he wrote, “one 
does not understand enough that everything is for us based on these intimacies and 
relations with the bishop.”99  Jordan worried that the head of the two Jesuit orphanages, 
the domineering and assertive Father Brumauld, tried to remain too independent of the 
bishop and to “fight the power of the bishop with his own power” (recall that in the mid-
1840s Brumauld had enjoyed the patronage of Governor General Bugeaud). Jordan put 
the matter at its bluntest when he wrote, “I am nothing without the bishop. And when I 
say ‘I,’ I mean the entire mission plain and simple.”100 Jordan thus hatched a scheme to 
win the bishop’s patronage by presenting him with a donation of 10,000 francs that he 
                                                
98 ARSI, Fonds Algérie 1001. Letter from Reynaud to superior, 31 May 1849. 
99 ARSI, Fonds Algérie 1001. Letter from Jordan to superior, 30 December 1849. 
100 Ibid. 
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received from the Propagation de la Foi to fund an “Arab seminary” in Constantine. 
“Such an act would leave [Pavy] grateful to the Jesuits forever,” he reasoned, adding that 
“if we dare take such a decisive step Algeria will be ours.”101 
 The Arab seminary, however, proved a great disappointment. The government 
tolerated it at first because the Jesuits agreed only to recruit indigenous orphans who had 
lost both parents. Its failure, rather, stemmed from internal disagreements among 
competing Jesuit superiors. Apparently the Propagation de la Foi thought the seminary 
had already begun functioning.  Jordan wrote to his superiors in Rome to ask how to 
respond to the Propagation. “Of the 1,000 embarrassing questions,” he wrote, “where is 
the seminary? Who are the seminarians? Where have the funds gone?” He accused the 
Jesuit superior of the two orphanages at Bouffarick and Ben Aknoun, Father Brumauld, 
of siphoning the money for his own works and of sabotaging other Jesuit establishments. 
Jordan further explained that he could not tell the Propagation that “the men designated 
by the superior cannot get along with Father Brumauld…that the Arab seminary consists 
of an Arab coffee shop with a couple of Jesuit fathers…that while we await results the 
10,000 francs will be used to pay the debts of [the orphanage at] Ben Aknoun.”102 By 
1853, Brumauld had succeeded in transplanting the handful of indigenous “seminarians” 
to his own orphanages and thus shuttering the misbegotten venture entirely. Within a year 
the remaining indigenous orphans had left his establishments and returned to live with 
their extended families. 
 After having alienated the Propagation de la Foi, Brumauld moved to gain 
financial support for his orphanages from the French government. He did so by switching 
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the focus of his civilizing mission – away from potential Arab seminarians and towards 
European children themselves.  Brumauld initially opened the orphanages by 
transplanting 200 orphans from Paris to Algiers “to aid in the colonization of Algeria.” 
To replenish his orphanages Brumauld devised a strategy to round up additional orphans 
across France and resettle them in Algeria.103 In 1854, he wrote a letter to Emperor 
Napoleon III in which he asserted that the climate of Algeria had rendered the original 
200 orphans “robust, as they never would have been in Paris,” especially in agricultural 
labor.104 He claimed that the glut of would-be proprietors in Algeria combined with the 
shortage of day laborers put the colony “in a veritable and dangerous state of crisis.” The 
administration had granted so many land titles, he claimed, that the grand proprietors 
could no longer find day laborers to cultivate their fields. Brumauld added that the 
smaller proprietors typically had no idea how to run an estate. He thus proposed to rid 
France of its costly orphans to “change the destiny of Algeria and provide it with a large 
working and farming population.” Ultimately, Brumauld claimed his plan would 
transform these orphans “from dangerous and ruinous dregs into precious citizens.”105 
Brumauld spent three years lobbying the government unsuccessfully to fund his scheme. 
 In the meantime, attendance at the orphanages continued to decline. Other Jesuits 
blamed Brumauld’s personality for this failure. One Jesuit lamented that “for two years 
we have done [the orphans] very little and superficial good that contact with the world 
would have soon brought itself.”106 Father Reynaud accused Brumauld of being “overly 
                                                
103 According to Brumauld in the eight years of the two orphanages’ existence, they had housed a total of 
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104 ARSI, Fonds Algérie 1001. Letter from Brumauld to superior, 8 December 1854. 
105 Ibid. 
106 ARSI, Fonds Algérie 1001. Anonymous letter from Jesuit to his superior, No date. 
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authoritarian towards his inferiors, which is also the cause of our difficulty with the 
administration.”107 In 1858, the Jesuits dispatched a visiting inspector, Father Gautrelet, 
to ascertain the situation. Gautrelet had little sympathy for any of his fellow Jesuits in 
Algeria and wrote that the children “think we exploit them for our profit [and] do not like 
us much.”108 (Indeed, another Jesuit claimed that “our house has taken the aspect of a 
prison and we have become the guards.”109) Gautrelet accused Brumauld of prioritizing 
the exploitation of land and labor over the moralization of children. In a passage of 
extreme candor, he confided to his superior: 
The orphanages have lost their reputation. Brumauld has exhausted his influence: 
bad with the governor general, bad with the prefect and the municipal councils, 
seen in Paris as a utopian, he can hardly even give to the orphans the minimal 
service he has rendered up until now.  He is too rude, too imperious, and too 
exaggerated in his requirements. He is hardly better with the bishop than with the 
civil administration. He is more feared by our own personnel than he is esteemed. 
Reynaud does not dare to resist him and weakens before this iron will.110 
 
Gautrelet recommended that the Jesuits abandon the orphanages entirely. He also 
questioned the prudence of Brumauld’s plan to resettle French orphans in Algeria, asking 
if “the mother country really wants to colonize Africa by means of its orphans.”111 In this 
instance, the success of the two orphanages declined precipitously because their superior 
failed entirely to meet any of the requirements for securing patronage in Algeria: he lost 
the support of the military, civil, and ecclesiastical authorities; he lost the support of his 
own superiors; and he failed to maintain a good reputation for his establishments in the 
eyes of the settler population. 
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 This failure of leadership engendered a discussion over the very nature of the 
mission in Algeria. Gautrelet criticized the missionaries by writing that “religious spirit 
and orderly discipline are more or less lacking in all our African houses; there is hardly 
any morality.”112 He then argued that, just as Algeria constituted an extension of France 
and could be run from the metropole, the Jesuits too could run the Algerian mission from 
Europe. He went so far as to question whether the establishments in Algeria even 
constituted a mission. A true mission, he argued, must procure its own resources rather 
than rely on funds from its motherhouse, while true missionaries “devote themselves to 
the mission for life” and do not depend on the motherhouse to replenish their personnel 
every year. The proximity of Algeria to Europe rendered the mission a revolving door for 
curious Jesuits. In this sense, he asserted, “Africa for us is not in the rigorous sense of the 
word a mission.”113 
 For Reynaud, on the contrary, Algeria constituted a missionary land plain and 
simple. Of course, as superior of the mission in Algeria Reynaud’s status as a power 
broker depended entirely on this assertion. He chided his superiors for thinking they 
could “know how to direct our affairs as easily as one can do for the affairs of a 
[metropolitan] province.” He summed up his position by stating: 
 One can never make a society that does not even have a half-century of existence 
 resemble effectively one whose origin stretches back centuries. If a mission 
 consists of moving from ordinary conditions of Christian society into 
 extraordinary conditions based on dates rather than distance, then we are 
 certainly in a missionary land. The proof is in the repugnance of a great number of 
 our Jesuits to even come to this country. Many ask if they have been sent here by 
 punishment.114 
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Reynaud cared less about the physical distance between Algeria and Europe and more 
about the temporal and developmental lag between the two localities. In this sense, his 
argument mimicked that of the European settlers, who saw native Algerians as too 
underdeveloped to enjoy the political rights of the metropole; at the same time, however, 
Reynaud saw the European population of Algeria as equally underdeveloped and in need 
of a civilizing mission.  
 Indeed, Reynaud blamed the underdeveloped state of the settler community on the 
failure of French colonial rule writ large. “We follow step by step the progression of a 
colony,” he wrote, “a difficult work in its own right, more difficult still when it falls into 
the hands of a nation which does not have a taste for it.”115 He then compared the Jesuit 
superiors in Rome to Emperor Napoleon III, who wanted to govern the country at his 
whim based on an idealized vision that did not at all correspond to reality.116 In doing so 
the emperor constrained the authority of the governor general, who had far better 
knowledge of the situation on the ground. In the same way, the metropolitan superiors 
constrained Reynaud from effectively running the mission on his own. Reynaud accused 
the Jesuit superiors in Europe of “no longer having the taste for this slow and patient 
work of Christian colonization just as France does not have the taste for contributing to 
the material development of Algeria.”117 
 In this sense, again, Reynauld built upon existing settler critiques of the overreach 
of metropolitan officials in their hapless effort to govern Algeria. Historian Gavin 
Murray-Miller has recently argued that “the colonial administration’s supposed disregard 
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for the needs and interests of the settler community became a centerpiece of colon 
opposition as reformers held the government accountable for the colony’s sluggish 
economic development.”118 In their effort to secure independence from metropolitan 
authorities, missionaries, like their secular colon counterparts, portrayed themselves as 
uniquely positioned to use their more intimate knowledge of local conditions to work for 
the benefit of Algeria, though, to be sure, an Algeria in which the native population 
remained conspicuously absent. Finally, if missionaries closely resembled civilian settlers 
in their desire for autonomy and the competition they engaged in with one another to 
secure this autonomy, they still differed from the rest of the settler population in the 
ultimate vision that they held for the French territory. Missionaries alone preached a 
brand of the civilizing mission for which Catholicism proved the most salient 
characteristic. 
 By 1865, the Jesuit mission constituted a mere shadow of its former self: Reynaud 
had lost his battle and been recalled to Marseille; the mission had abandoned hopes of 
establishing a secondary school in Algiers; it had closed the orphanage at Bouffarick and 
transferred the remaining orphans to Ben Aknoun; and enrollment at the school in Oran 
had plummeted and its closure seemed imminent. The Jesuits still had enough priests to 
staff their residence in Algiers, but, in an ironic twist that brings this chapter full circle, 
the residence began to suffer from internal divisions that split the congregation along 
lines of ethnicity. On his tour of Algeria in 1866, Reynaud, now a visiting inspector, 
remarked that the Jesuit priests had grouped into competing factions between the Spanish 
Confrérie de la Vierge and the Italian Confrérie de St Joseph. “The diverse nationalities 
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in the house enter into excessive rivalries,” he wrote, adding that they “appear ridiculous 
in the eyes of the people.”119 The head of the residence reported that the Italian faction 
had nearly come to blows with the Spanish faction after the Italians proposed to hold 
separate collections in mass for the Spanish and the Italian parishioners. The Spanish 
rejected this plan due to their less numerous followers (and thus their smaller collections). 
The superior noted that in Algeria above all “we have a great need…to encourage unity 
[while] the factions only create rivalries, divisions, and hostilities.”120 Indeed, the Jesuits’ 
attempt to win the favor of the military administration by using Italian and Spanish-
speaking priests to unify the settler population had actually backfired and only sown 
divisions within the congregation itself. Not only did the Jesuits fail to assist the 
administration in tying foreign colonists to the French regime, they also only accentuated 
ethnic rifts for all the settlers to see. In doing so, they revealed the potential dangers 
inherent in the military’s policy of using Catholic missionaries to cultivate a cohesive 
settler community. When the Second Empire fell in 1870, and a civilian government 
replaced the military regime in Algeria, missionaries would increasingly find their 
position under threat. 
 
Conclusion 
In the end, if the Jesuits failed, many other missionary congregations succeeded in 
spreading their schools and hospital services throughout the colony in the period before 
1870. The reasons behind the successes and failures of missionaries reveal much about 
the larger position and purpose of Algeria within the European colonial imaginary during 
the period of the Second Empire. First, as the missionary archives make abundantly clear, 
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many missionaries came to Algeria for the same reason as other colonists did: to establish 
themselves as power brokers and to carve out positions of authority that remained closed 
to them in the metropole. It was not least this desire that ultimately led to competition and 
division between missionary congregations and within individual missionary orders. The 
missionaries who achieved the greatest amount of success were those, like the Lazarists, 
who won the support of highly placed patrons. Female missionaries, meanwhile, were 
more likely to find patrons outside of traditional ecclesiastical networks of authority. By 
appealing to secular or unauthorized religious authorities they could secure their own 
niches of autonomy that overturned the gendered hierarchy of Catholic religious orders. 
 Secondly, as the language exchanged between missionaries and metropolitan 
Jesuits makes clear, Jesuits in Algeria, like their more successful Lazarist counterparts, 
not only struggled with one another and with hostile colonial officials; they also worked 
to assert their autonomy from metropolitan organs of control, most notably their own 
motherhouses. This autonomy was important and even necessary, they came to argue, 
because the metropole lacked the critical know-how for navigating the cultural 
particularities of Algeria – a colony they framed as exceptional and distinct from France. 
Notably, Algeria’s distinctness from the metropole was borne not of the cultural 
difference between indigenous and European populations. What made Algeria so 
particular and missionary work so urgent was the need to create difference between 
populations whose dissimilarities were not yet clear enough. After failing to make 
headway in their attempts to assimilate native Algerians to European cultural norms, 
missionaries changed strategies and positioned themselves in the vanguard of a 
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movement to spread civilization to the European settler population alone, a move which 
would actually better distinguish Europeans from their colonial subjects. 
 Further, and at the same time, missionary success depended on mimicking the 
strategies employed by the wider community of settlers, who struggled either to work on 
the outskirts of metropolitan legal confines, within what Frederick Cooper has described 
as the “crevices of [colonial] authority,” or to justify their importance to metropolitan 
officials by touting their superior knowledge of Algeria and its inhabitants.121 Although 
all of these settlers relied on seemingly premodern networks of patronage to climb the 
colonial hierarchy, they also hoped to use these networks to create their own version of 
modernity as an alternative to the ones they perceived as developing in the metropole. 
For missionaries, as the next two chapters show in great detail, this aim entailed the 
creation of a Catholic modernity that they saw as increasingly foreclosed in a 
secularizing France.  
 In the end, however, Algeria’s very demographic peculiarity allowed a number of 
competing actors to envision vastly divergent plans for the colony’s future, with male and 
female missionaries, settlers, and metropolitan officials all struggling to implement their 
own visions for French Algeria, a relatively new colony in this period and one whose 
central importance to the hexagon was still in the making. As these case studies of 
Catholic missionaries reveal, competition among ambitious settlers over the exact type of 
modernity they hoped to create in Algeria proved the rule, and cooperation the exception. 
It was perhaps this competition that ultimately undermined visions of colonial 
assimilation, not only those directed towards the native Algerian community, but also 
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those that aimed to create a supposedly civilized and acculturated settler community – a 
fiction, as we have seen, but a goal that nevertheless remained central to the legitimacy of 
empire. 
 To be sure, despite its many unintended consequences, the military’s unofficial 
policy of colonial association through missionary work, while not a total success, neither 
proved a total failure. Missionaries did provide for the spiritual needs of a number of 
foreign colonists who continued to practice their religion, and in doing so they typically 
further tied these colonists and their families to the colony on a permanent basis. We 
must keep in mind, however, that in this effort missionaries also further divided the 
Catholic foreign population from their largely religiously indifferent, and increasingly 
anticlerical, French neighbors. The onset of civilian rule in 1870-71 and the shift in 
emphasis towards assimilation as an anticlerical French paradigm would lead to 
widespread unrest and threatened to tear apart the diverse settler population. Vocal 
protests came especially from the foreign population that remained excluded from 
positions of political power. Missionaries and settlers alike would return to the themes of 
moralization and the fears of vagabondage and idleness in order to plead their case to 
metropolitan and colonial officials.  
 Even throughout the 1870s, however, missionaries found willing patrons in the 
form of the civil governor general, who rather confusingly continued to be chosen from 
among the ranks of the military until 1877. Only after this time would the civilian rule of 
law slowly begin to trump extra-legal military rule when it came to the administration of 
missionaries and foreign settlers. Finally, over the course of the 1870s missionaries also 
progressively lost the patronage of their most important ally: the new archbishop of 
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Algiers. This archbishop succeeded in bringing his chosen missionaries completely under 
his authority by taking the unprecedented step of founding his own missionary 









The Decline of Patronage and the “Long Decade” of 1867-1883 
 
 
“Our freedom of belief must not be trampled under foot in Algeria in the presence of the 
Muslims… as here more so than elsewhere Catholicism must be the national religion of 
France.”1 
-Letter from the archbishop of Algeria to the minister of war, 19 December 1870. 
 
 
“The children of foreign colonists will only truly become Frenchmen through the 
institution of the school, and they will only go to schools where their parents can find 
their religious sentiments satisfied.”2 




“I told [the governor general] with tears in my eyes that we all as Frenchmen feel deeply 
humiliated by his conduct… because he is the highest authority in the colony and he has 
allowed his most formal orders to be vilified, spat upon by a horde of demagogues, and 
that in my eyes this is the ultimate degradation of my unhappy country… But he said very 
painfully that he could not set the country ablaze and spill blood over the question of 
schools.”3 
-Letter from the visiting superior of the Frères des Ecoles Chrétiennes to his provincial 
assistant, 4 May 1872. 
 
  
 In the years surrounding the proclamation of the Third Republic in 1870, 
metropolitan and colonial leaders continued to struggle over how to govern the European 
population of the colony as much as the conquered North African population. The 
religiosity of the European foreigners provided the main impetus for metropolitan 
officials to refrain from fully assimilating Algeria to France on a juridical level and from 
dispensing entirely with the quintessentially imperial position of governor general, even 
                                                
1 FEC NL 460 No 1. Letter from Archbishop Lavigerie to Minister Crémieux, 19 December 1870. 
2 FEC NL 460 No 1. Petition by Lavigerie to the Government of National Defense, December 1870. 
3 FEC NL 460 No 1. Letter from Frère Aimarus to his assistant, 4 May 1872. 
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after the supposed switch to civilian rule in Algeria in 1870-71. This hesitancy stemmed 
both from the foreigners’ perceived importance for consolidating the hegemony of the 
settler community and from their continued lack of political rights.4 Because they could 
not express their will through democratic institutions, the governor general took it upon 
himself to use his own authority to ensure foreigners could continue to rely on him as a 
more personal, extralegal outlet through which to ensure their religious sentiments were 
met. 
 To compound matters, the definitions of and discourses surrounding the concepts 
of assimilation and association in this period rose to unprecedented levels of confusion as 
political upheavals in the metropole and the colony rendered increasingly opaque what 
exactly it meant to be French and, after 1870, to be republican.5 Gavin Murray-Miller has 
recently described “the dearth of scholarship examining the relationship between French 
republicanism and the colonies prior to the Third Republic.”6 Murray-Miller highlights 
the fact that republicans who applied democratic ideals inclusively in France easily 
adapted these principles to exclude Muslims in Algeria. At the same time, by eliding the 
fact that most foreigners also remained excluded from Algerian politics, Murray-Miller in 
a way perpetuates the dichotomous conception of colonial society that he seeks to break 
down – one that posits a clear division between colonized and colonizer. 
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 In Algeria, moreover, it was church officials before and after 1870 who argued for 
the more inclusive definition of French republicanism, one that invited all believers 
regardless of citizenship status into the democratic fold. If Catholic foreigners won 
representation in local assemblies, church officials reasoned, then they could work 
democratically to stifle the anticlerical policies championed by the French minority. In 
the end, however, self-defined radicals ultimately succeeded in applying their own 
conception of republicanism in a more narrow and exclusive manner – one that 
disenfranchised roughly 98% of the total population in the territory (and roughly 75% of 
the European population, including foreigners and women). This struggle over who held 
the discursive and political authority to legitimately articulate republican belonging in 
Algeria began even before the fall of the Second Empire and had causes completely 
separate from those in the metropole.7 It derived rather from the particular exigencies of 
imperial rule and, specifically, the diverse religious and racial demographics that defined 
Algeria. 
 The period 1867 to 1883 witnessed two crises that profoundly shook the territory 
of French Algeria. First, in 1867 the greatest famine in Algerian history caused and 
combined with a cholera outbreak to kill as many as one million native Algerians. No 
sooner had the epidemic subsided than on 4 September 1870 the Second Empire fell to 
the Prussian army and a Committee of National Defense in Paris proclaimed the advent 
of the Third French Republic. By 1871, prodded by French-Algerian deputies in the 
newly elected National Assembly, officials in the Republic moved to institute full civilian 
                                                
7 Here, I derive the idea of discursive authority from François Furet’s interpretation of the French 
Revolution as primarily a struggle over who held the right to public speech, or discourse. See François 
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rule in Algeria. This transition above all entailed the replacement of a military governor 
general with a civil governor general, who would work to facilitate the policies of the 
colonists and implement a full transfer of power from military to civilian officials. 
 For many historians, this transfer of power signaled a decisive shift in the history 
of French Algeria. Osama Abi-Mershed expresses a general consensus among historians 
when he writes that “the uneasy and uncertain relationship between the civil and military 
powers in North Africa was not effectively resolved until 1871.”8 An analysis of the 
political conflict over missionary work, however, reveals that even in the decade after the 
advent of the Third Republic civilian leaders in Algeria remained unable to completely 
cast off the yoke of military rule due to continued divisions over the ultimate purpose of 
the territory and the best way to go about governing its vast and diverse European 
population. What emerged in the 1870s did not resemble a transfer of authority so much 
as the failure to create a consensus over who actually held authority in the colony and on 
what legal foundation this authority was based. 
 In addition to having to negotiate their way through these two critical events, 
missionaries in Algeria now had the delicate task of appeasing two new sets of actors that 
emerged on the colonial scene in this period: Archbishop Charles Lavigerie and the 
radical municipal councils of Algeria. Both of these power brokers saw Catholic 
missionaries as capable of either transmitting or subverting their own authority in Algeria 
and they accordingly worked to bring missionaries completely under their own control. 
To be sure, they hoped either to use or dispense with missionaries in order to enact 
entirely conflicting visions of modernity in colonial Algeria. Whereas Lavigerie thought 
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he could harness specific missionaries to transmit his own religious authority throughout 
the territory, the municipal councils saw missionaries as sources of religious subversion 
that only hindered the extension of their authority as newly-installed secular power 
brokers in Algeria.   
 The first of these new actors, Charles Martial Allemand Lavigerie (1825-1892), 
arrived in Algiers on 27 March 1867 following the death of Bishop Louis Pavy. On 25 
July 1866 the government in France transformed the bishopric of Algeria into an 
archbishopric that now oversaw subordinate bishoprics in Constantine, Oran, and Algiers. 
Perhaps best known for his crusade to end the slave trade throughout Africa, Lavigerie 
originally inherited an archdiocese that contained 187 parishes, 273 diocesan priests, 54 
missionary priests, 70 missionary brothers, and 800 missionary sisters.9 He held his 
position until his death on 25 November 1892, by which time he would also oversee, now 
as Cardinal Lavigerie, the apostolic vicariate of the new French protectorate of Tunisia, 
with its seat in Carthage. 
 Lavigerie both built on past precedents and vastly expanded the authority of his 
office. Most importantly, he succeeded where his predecessors had failed and used his 
domineering personality to bring missionaries and their work almost entirely under his 
control and oversight. He accomplished this aim by immediately creating his own 
missionary society, the Missionnaires de Notre Dame d’Afrique (better known as the 
Pères Blancs due to their distinctive white robes), which he hoped would lead the crusade 
against Islam and paganism throughout all of Africa. Although Lavigerie would 
periodically support other missionary orders in Algeria in the face of government 
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opposition, he also ensured that all funds coming from the government and outside 
organizations like the Propagation de la Foi and the Propaganda Fide went entirely to his 
own congregation. In doing so, Lavigerie ultimately proved a poor patron for all other 
missionaries and did little to ameliorate the situation of those persecuted by increasingly 
anticlerical authorities. To be sure, he did at times offer some congregations, most 
notably the Frères des Ecoles Chrétiennes (FEC), moral and (however fleetingly) 
financial support.10 
 Secondly, missionaries encountered consistent opposition from radical municipal 
councils throughout the territory. This opposition began in 1867, when the municipal 
council of Algiers willfully misinterpreted a circular issued by the governor general – a 
circular that had as its intent religious toleration – in order to expel missionary teachers 
from all public schools in the city. Following the proclamation of the Third Republic on 4 
September 1870, this offensive against missionary teachers spread to all the other major 
European cities of Algeria.11 An analysis of the ensuing, decade-long struggle between 
missionaries and municipal councils contradicts the notion that the onset of the Third 
Republic marked the final transition to civilian rule and the full assimilation of Algeria to 
the metropole; it also proves that well into the 1870s a unified settler community with a 
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societies to continue their work with Europeans of Algeria. For the pro Lavigerie argument see Renault, 
Cardinal Lavigerie. 
11 This incident has been recounted in a brief 12-page article by Yvonne Turin. This chapter will expand on 
her argument and also, by extending its focus to include the period before and after the uprising, draw 
rather different conclusions. It will also go into the threat that the situation posed for the larger system of 
colonial rule. See Yvonne Turin, “La commune d’Alger et ses écoles en 1871. Un problème de laïcité 
coloniale,” Révue d’Histoire et de civilisation du Maghreb 8 (Alger: Publ. Fac. Lettres, 1970): 83-95. For 
the tumult caused in France following the proclamation of the Third Republic and the advent of the Paris 
Commune see Robert Tombs, The War Against Paris, 1871 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1981). 
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common vision for the future of Algeria had yet to emerge.12 By analyzing religious and 
educational policies (or lack thereof) we see that into the 1880s the political and juridical 
status of the territory remained mired in confusion. Further, while Catholics and the 
anticlerical laity both saw Algeria as an area in which to construct an alternate modernity, 
they had vastly differing ideas of what that modernity entailed and how to go about 
constructing it.  
 
The Arab Orphanage and the Competition for Patronage 
  
The famine of 1867-68 and the ensuing cholera epidemic created one of the largest 
demographic catastrophes in Algerian history. Annie Rey-Goldzeiguer estimated that 
500,000 people lost their lives over this two-year period, while the geographer Djilali 
Sari puts the figure at more than one million.13 In the short term, Algerians’ susceptibility 
to cholera in 1868 resulted from widespread famine and starvation, themselves caused by 
a combination of the invasion of hordes of locusts and one of the worst droughts in 
recorded history. Over the longer term, however, scholars have traced the causes directly 
to French imperial policy. Decades of war had ravaged the countryside, while colonial 
speculators had snatched up what remained of the best farmland. Although Napoleon III 
drafted the sénatus-consulte of 1863 to designate and protect tribal lands from the 
rapaciousness of French speculators, in reality disgruntled colonists ensured that the 
ruling remained largely unapplied throughout the remainder of the Second Empire.14 As a 
                                                
12 For this argument see Rey-Goldzeiguer, Le Royaume arabe. 
13 Jean-Pierre Peyroulou et al., “1830-1880: la conquête coloniale et la résistance des Algériens,” in 
Histoire de l’Algérie à la Période Coloniale, edited by Abderrahmane Bouchène et al. (Paris & Algiers: 
Editions La Découverte, 2012), 40-41. 
14 Ruedy, Modern Algeria, 74-76. The constitution issued by Napoleon III on 14 January 1852 gave to the 
Senate the right to rule all the colonies by decrees known as senatus-consultes. No specific text was ever 
drafted for Algeria, so throughout the Second Empire it was ruled by imperial decrees alone, except for the 
two senatus-consultes of 1863 and 1865 (discussed below). See Julien, La Conquête, 396. 
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result, tribal groups had for years desperately resorted to emptying their silos just to 
survive. At the time Europeans proved all too eager to blame the famine on Muslims’ 
alleged indolence, but as Kamel Kateb has written, “the existence of the silos 
demonstrates that…the famine did not stem from the ‘legendary lack of foresight’ in the 
indigenous society. These reserve silos were a means specifically of reducing the impact 
of drought, locusts, famines, and epidemics.”15  
 An analysis of the religious policies surrounding the famine and epidemic reveals 
how Archbishop Lavigerie moved from bestowing patronage on an already existing 
missionary order to withdrawing his patronage from this same order when he succeeded 
in establishing his own congregation and installing himself as superior. This maneuver 
set a precedent that continued throughout the next two decades of his tenure. Lavigerie’s 
correspondence with FEC superior Frère Aimarus and the frères’ correspondence with 
one another demonstrate the great lengths to which missionaries went in their attempts to 
appease the archbishop. As such, this correspondence testifies to the extent of Lavigerie’s 
power, even during the early years of his 25-year tenure in Algeria.  
 The famine carried off entire families and left thousands of indigenous orphans 
and abandoned children in its wake. As historian Bertrand Taithe has written, “no one 
knew where the refugees came from nor where they might go but, every morning, corpses 
were discovered in the villages near Algiers and in the suburbs of all the colonial 
cities.”16 Lavigerie saw the famine as an opportunity to begin the long-desired project of 
converting Algeria’s Muslims to Catholicism. The situation proved especially promising 
                                                
15 Kalem Kateb, “Le bilan démographique de la conquête de l’Algérie, 1830-1880,” in Histoire de l’Algérie 
à la Période Coloniale, 87. 
16 Bertrand Taithe, “Algerian Orphans and Colonial Christianity in Algeria, 1866-1939,” French History 
20/3 (2006), 246. Taithe only examines the orphanages after Lavigerie transferred their control away from 
the FEC and to the Pères Blancs. 
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because orphaned children had no living parents to protest their conversion. The move 
also came at a propitious time in the history of the colony, as the new governor general 
and future first president of the Third Republic, Patrice de MacMahon (1808-1893), 
arrived with the (rather utopian) vision of mixing indigenous and European children to 
achieve the gradual “fusion of the races,” though not necessarily by conversion to 
Catholicism.17 
 By the spring of 1868 Lavigerie had collected 800 orphans to raise in his own 
orphanage. The military had originally housed these children in tents around military 
barracks, but their ever increasing number and their high mortality rates in the camp 
(1,000 children had already died after three months) rendered the authorities more than 
willing to pass them and their expenses onto the new archbishop, who raised funds from 
the faithful and even succeeded in setting up an “adopt an orphan” campaign to gain 
further resources from charitable Catholics in France.18 To oversee these orphans 
Lavigerie initially solicited the help of the FEC. These frères had arrived in Algeria in 
1853 after a presidential decree of 24 July 1852 granted them permission “to found and 
direct schools in the French possessions of North Africa.”19 The FEC appealed in 
particular to Lavigerie and his secular clergy because, as teaching frères and not priests, 
                                                
17 This fusion entailed implementing MacMahon’s own peculiar and nebulous policy of assimilation by 
intermixing European and indigenous children in the school, so that the latter could better understand the 
superiority of French culture and willfully embrace it. This was not fully a policy of assimilation, as 
MacMahon planned to provide every student with French education, but also to allot time for religious 
instruction of the student’s choosing. In theory, this fusion would create a truly interracial society, though 
only in the distant future. In practice, because it relied on the assumption that Algerians would inevitably 
come to see their culture as inferior, it never gained any traction. For the policy of the fusion of the races 
see Yvonne Turin, Affrontements culturels dans l’algérie coloniale: écoles, médecines, religion, 1830-1880 
(Paris: Maspero, 1971), 208-217 and elsewhere throughout. MacMahon, though the first president of the 
Third Republic, won election as a legitimist in 1873 and subsequently attempted to reinstall the monarchy 
in the “16 May 1877 crisis.” 
18 Taithe, 248. 
19 FEC NL 460 No 1. Decree by President Louis Napoleon, 24 July 1852. 
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these missionaries could not themselves administer sacraments and thus did not incite the 
jealousy of other missionaries or priests in the territory. Indeed, like missionary sisters, 
the frères too relied on religious or secular priests to administer the sacraments to them. 
This lack of competition encouraged their expansion in the colony and by 1860 they had 
opened primary schools for boys in every major European city of Algeria, where they 
educated an estimated 4,500 students at no tuition cost, rendering them especially 
appealing to the territory’s impoverished foreign population.20 
 Lavigerie initially hoped to use the frères to marginalize the work of another 
group of missionaries: the Jesuits. In this respect, Lavigerie continued the anti-Jesuit 
stance of his predecessor, telling his two subordinate bishops in 1868 “not to have 
anything to do with the Jesuits, [for] they will take everything and leave you with nothing 
but the shirt on your back.”21 Lavigerie largely succeeded where Bishop Pavy had failed, 
as over the course of the next decade ecclesiastical and state persecution resulted in the 
Jesuits losing control of their last remaining establishments in Algeria.22 Indeed, 
Lavigerie saw the Jesuits’ foundering orphanage at Ben Aknoun, with its large already-
existing workshops, 17 hectares of vineyards, and 30 hectares of arable land, as the ideal 
spot to found his “Arab agricultural orphanage.” In February 1868, Lavigerie proposed 
that the FEC purchase the property from the Jesuits for 50,000 francs. Lavigerie promised 
                                                
20 FEC NL 461 No 1. Notes on the establishment of Frères des Ecoles Chrétiennes in Algeria, 24 August 
1859. 
21 FEC NL 463 No 1. Quoted in a letter from Frère Aimarus to his superior in Paris, Frère Philippe, 14 
March 1868. 
22 In 1880 the French government dissolved the Jesuits and prohibited them from teaching in France, but 
according to Ralph Gibson by 1890 the Jesuits “began a cautious return” and returned almost in full by 
1900 (they were again dissolved by the 1901 law on associations). Ralph Gibson. A Social History of 
French Catholicism (New York: Routledge Kegan & Paul, 1989), 104. 
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that by teaching the orphans to harvest the vineyards the FEC would easily recoup the 
expense.23 
 Despite Lavigerie’s desire to bestow the work of the Arab orphanage on the FEC, 
the visiting superior, Frère Aimarus, initially appeared reluctant to accept the offer. In 
addition to the FEC’s already precarious financial situation and their unfamiliarity with 
the Arab language, Aimarus feared that work with indigenous orphans could incite 
charges of proselytism from unfriendly secular authorities, who feared the political 
repercussions that could result from religious affronts to Muslim parents. This accusation, 
as we saw in the last chapter, could lead to their expulsion from the colony completely. 
Further, a handful of municipal councils in Algeria had already begun to express openly 
their anticlericalism, and Aimarus worried that assuming control of such a visible public 
project would only exacerbate these sentiments. In this respect, Aimarus perceived 
correctly that most settlers in Algeria attached little import in the project of spreading 
European values to North African children. 
 Ultimately, however, Aimarus saw more benefits than drawbacks in accepting 
Lavigerie’s offer. First, despite anxieties over proselytism, Governor General MacMahon 
had already approved Lavigerie’s orphanage and his proposal to staff it with the FEC. 
Second, fear over rising anticlericalism among civilian authorities in fact led Aimarus to 
see the orphanage as a way to bolster the FEC’s presence in Algeria if the municipal 
councils succeeded in expelling the frères from public primary schools in the European 
cities of the territory. As he wrote to his superior in Paris on 2 March 1868, “an 
establishment of this type is perhaps the only certain way…of saving our communal 
                                                
23 FEC NL 463 No 1. Letter from Frère Aimarus to his superior, 29 February 1868. 
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schools.”24 Aimarus went so far as to tell his superior that “it seems to me that this 
question is one of life or death for us in Algeria [as] our communal schools only hang by 
a thread.”25 If they did lose control of their communal schools, the orphanage could offer 
them an alternative source of public utility in the eyes of the military and allow the frères 
to continue to work in the territory and to receive salaries directly from the colonial 
budget. 
 Equally important, Aimarus saw the orphanage as a perfect opportunity to secure 
the patronage of the new archbishop. Indeed, when the municipal councils did attempt to 
secularize the public schools, Lavigerie’s support would prove decisive. At the same 
time, Lavigerie had a reputation as a domineering personality with a short temper. When 
Aimarus told Lavigerie that he would have to ask the advice of his superior in Paris 
before accepting his offer, Aimarus wrote that “Lavigerie left me in a wretched state, as 
he wants the matter to be decided right now,” before adding, “the fact is that he appears 
to have all of Algeria in his hands.” Aimarus told his superior that Lavigerie possessed 
enormous influence both with the emperor and the Vatican and that he: 
 has too much generosity to abandon those who put themselves in his hands, but 
 the least defiance or the smallest deviation from his will infuriates him…[The 
 orphanage’s] failure would not leave any stain on our reputation [but] if 
 Monseigneur succeeds without us his opinion of the need he has for us will 
 likely be significantly  modified.26  
 
It was this need to secure such a valuable patron in view of current and potential future 
battles with secular authorities that ultimately swayed the superior in Paris to accept a 
modified version of Lavigerie’s offer and assume control over the new orphanage. In the 
end, Lavigerie himself leased the property from the Jesuits for 15,000 francs (with the 
                                                
24 FEC NL 463 No 1. Letter from Frère Aimarus to his superior in Paris, 2 March 1868. 
25 Ibid. 
26 FEC NL 463 No 1. Letter from Frère Aimarus to his superior in Paris, 29 February 1868. 
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hope of purchasing it entirely in the near future) and ordered the Jesuits to send their 
handful of remaining European orphans to other establishments in Algeria and France. 
Two Jesuits alone remained at the orphanage to administer sacraments to the frères.27 
 On 13 April 1868, 12 frères from the FEC arrived at the new Arab orphanage at 
Ben Aknoun to, as Aimarus phrased it, “contribute to the regeneration of this bastardized 
race.”28 Lavigerie allotted each frère the paltry salary of 400 francs per year, while again 
assuring them that soon the products of the children’s labor and agricultural work would 
more than suffice to ensure their existence.29 Despite the small salary, Aimarus confided 
to his superior that “in the material aspect we lack nothing” and that their lodging and 
board were superior to what was found in all the other missions of the colony. They 
enjoyed a glass of wine and coffee in the morning, a plate of meat in the afternoon, and a 
full dinner in the evening. As Aimarus wrote, “Monseigneur understands that breathing 
the same air as the Arabs requires more substantial nourishment.”30 In April 1868 the 
orphanage counted 320 children, and by June this number had almost doubled. The 
children, one frère remarked, exhibited “a submissiveness that our French children would 
not recognize whatsoever,” a comment that likely reflected the children’s fragile 
emotional state after the loss of their parents and subsequent displacement.31 The frères 
divided the children into groups of 200 (though 400 were soon too sick to work) and gave 
                                                
27 FEC NL 463 No 1. Letter from Frère Aimarus to his superior in Paris, 14 March 1868. 
28 FEC NL 463 No 1. Letter from Frère Aimarus to his superior in Paris, 14 March 1868. 
29 FEC NL 463 No 1. “History of Ben Aknoun, the Agricultural Orphanage for Arabs, begun on 14 April 
1868,” anonymous note. 
30 FEC NL 463 No 1. Letter from Frère Aimarus to his superior in Paris, 11 April 1868. 
31 FEC NL 463 No 1. Letter from Frère Aimarus to his superior in Paris, 15 April 1868. 
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them two hours of education per day with the rest of the day devoted to work in the 
gardens, vineyards, or workshops.32 
 Aimarus’ hopes that meeting the demands of Lavigerie would bring the FEC 
success and security, however, proved unfounded. Two factors combined to lead to the 
dismissal of the FEC from the orphanage in 1870, just two years after their arrival. First, 
the Franco-Prussian War sapped the donations that Lavigerie received from the 
metropolitan faithful (he had received nearly 100,000 francs in aid in 1868-9). On 1 
September 1870, in the midst of the Battle of Sedan and three days before the 
proclamation of the Third Republic, Lavigerie wrote Aimarus that “the increasingly 
detrimental impact that the war in France has had on the donations to our orphanage 
forces me to restrain all expenses,” adding that “it has become impossible for me to 
provide the salaries and the maintenance of your frères and I am forced to reject their 
continued aid.”33 He informed Aimarus that the FEC would have to leave the orphanage 
by the end of the month. 
 If geopolitical events proved necessary to separate the FEC from the Arab 
orphans, however, they did not prove sufficient. By 1870 Lavigerie had begun to 
organize his own missionary society, the Pères Blancs. Despite claiming a lack of funds, 
Lavigerie did not abandon the orphans; he simply withdrew his patronage from the FEC. 
Over the summer of 1870, Lavigerie had begun to move the orphans and the frères to the 
vast estate that housed the Pères Blancs’ new novitiate at the nearby Maison Carrée.34 
Once this novitiate had produced a sufficient number of its own missionary priests, 
                                                
32 FEC NL 463 No 1. “History of Ben Aknoun, the Agricultural Orphanage for Arabs, begun on 14 April 
1868,” anonymous note. 
33 FEC NL 463 No 1. Letter from Archbishop Lavigerie to Frère Aimarus, 1 September 1870. 
34 FEC NL 463 No 1. “A History of Ben-Aknoun. 13 April 1868 to 23 September 1870,” anonymous 
author, written at the FEC novitiate in El Biar, Algeria, 20 November 1906. 
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Lavigerie made the decision to dismiss the FEC and use his missionaries alone to 
continue raising the Arab orphans. In this effort, the FEC had merely served as a stopgap 
until the Pères Blancs’ novitiate had established itself on a permanent basis.  
 The fate of these orphans after 1870 has been recounted by Bertrand Taithe and 
Karima Dirèche-Slimani.35 Lavigerie instructed the Pères Blancs to found two “Arab-
Christian” villages, Saint Cyprien and Saint Monique, where they raised the orphans as 
Catholics with the ultimate goal of using them to convert the rest of the Algerian 
population and ultimately all of Africa. Although the orphans did largely convert to 
Catholicism, this conversion only alienated them from Muslim society, and most ended 
up marrying Europeans. Further, the handful of these children who went on to receive 
higher education – at least one would attend medical school in France – found all 
professional avenues blocked to them in the metropole and had to return to Algeria, 
where they remained marginalized from European and native Algerian societies alike. As 
such, Taithe concludes that “the collective venture proved to be a failure.”36 
 Regardless of its success or failure, this episode is important for the precedents it 
set for the remainder of Lavigerie’s tenure. In addition to acquainting missionaries with 
Lavigerie’s authoritative personality, this experience hinted that the archbishop, while 
expressing nominal support for other missionary orders, would in the future funnel nearly 
all funds – whether from his parishes, from the Propagation de la Foi, or from the 
Propaganda Fide – into his own missionary society. Indeed, the FEC’s experience of 
marginalization recurred repeatedly with the Lazarists as well, with one priest writing in 
                                                
35 Taithe, “Algerian Orphans and Colonial Christianity” and Karima Direche-Slimani, Chrétiens de 
Kabylie (1873-1954). Une action missionnaire dans l’Algérie coloniale (Paris: Bouchène, 2004). Direche-
Slimani’s account does not deal directly with these orphans, but rather with Arab Christian communities set 
up by Lavigerie and the Pères Blancs in Kabylie. 
36 Taithe, 254. 
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1870 that “Monseigneur proposes to give us work when in reality he negotiates to have it 
for himself [i.e. his own missionary congregation].”37 In doing so, Lavigerie succeeded 
where his predecessors had failed by forming his own missionary society with himself as 
superior and thus ensuring that he exercised total control over these missionaries.  
 As mentioned previously, Church historians like François Renault have portrayed 
Lavigerie as the single most important Catholic clergyman in nineteenth-century Africa. 
In the end, however, his self-aggrandizing maneuvers only hindered the development of 
the Catholic faith in Algeria by diverting funds from the already-existing Catholic 
European population into his own pet projects for conversion – projects that largely failed 
and that at the same time made ministering to the European population more financially 
unfeasible. The resulting deprivation of funds only exacerbated the difficulties that 
missionaries increasingly encountered from civilian authorities. By 1880, valuable 
patrons, whether in the form of the bishop of Algiers or the governor general, became 
increasingly hard to secure. 
 
Governor General MacMahon and the Proposal of Mixed Schools 
 
At the same time that the frères assumed control of the orphanage at Ben Aknoun, they 
also began to find their positions as teachers in Algeria’s communal schools under threat, 
especially in Algiers. By 1867, the FEC educated 2,313 students in the capital city alone 
with 16 frères receiving annual salaries of 750 francs each from the budget of the 
municipal council. The frères taught three times more students than did the city’s secular 
schools, whose enrollment in Algiers totaled 835 students, even while lay teachers 
                                                
37 CM Lazarists 108b, Algiers. Letter from Father Doumerg to superior in Paris, 10 June 1870.   
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received as much as 2,500 francs per year from the communal budget.38 By the late 
1860s, however, a handful of municipal councils in the larger cities of Algeria had begun 
to push for widespread secularization of public schools. In many of these municipalities 
political exiles of 1848 had recently won elections as city councilmen. As Yvonne Turin 
has recounted, these exiles “played a more noticeable role in the second half of the 
Empire” than in the first, as they initially lay low to avoid the suspicion that had led to 
their deportation to begin with.39 By the 1860s, however, the liberalizing Second Empire 
had relaxed its organs of political repression and, in far-off Algeria especially, radicals 
felt freer to express their republican sentiments.40 
 Chief among these sentiments was anticlericalism, which the republicans of 1848 
had inherited from the Jacobins of the French Revolution. Although this anticlericalism 
remained latent throughout the early years of the 1860s, a circular issued by Governor 
General MacMahon on 14 October 1867 gave the municipal council of Algiers the 
opportunity to overtly attack the city’s missionary teachers. As it happened, MacMahon 
did not intend the circular to apply to the territory’s European schools. Rather, he issued 
it to stem Lavigerie’s continued attempts to convert to Catholicism the indigenous Berber 
population in mountainous Kabylie east of Algiers. This effort resulted from Lavigerie’s 
belief in the widely disseminated “Kabyle Myth,” which posited that due to their 
supposedly insufficient Islamicization, their lighter skin color, and their sedentary 
lifestyle the Kabyles would more likely accept European culture and religion than the 
                                                
38 FEC NL 460 No 1, “History of the houses of the District of Algiers, 1851-1945,” anonymous Internal 
history of the Frères des Ecoles Chrétiennes in Algeria, anonymous author, no date [1968?]. 
39 Turin, “La commune d’Alger et ses écoles en 1871,” 86. 
40 For the radical elements within the Second Empire in France see Philip Nord, The Republic Moment: 
Struggles for Democracy in Nineteenth-Century France (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1998). 
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supposedly more fanatical, lazy, and nomadic Arab population.41 With this thought in 
mind, Lavigerie assigned a number of Pères Blancs and two Jesuits to travel to the mixed 
commune of Fort Napoleon to begin their work of proselytization. This effort, however, 
only met with failure. As one tribal leader would later write to MacMahon, “we would 
prefer to see all our children die than to have them convert to Christianity.”42 
 It was at this point that MacMahon, worried about the political repercussions of 
Lavigerie’s actions, issued his circular of 14 October. The circular had two mutually 
reinforcing goals: first to protect the religious sentiments of the Muslim population and 
second to bring about the “gradual fusion of the races” (mentioned above). The circular 
thus ordered the generals commanding the provinces and the civilian prefects to establish, 
where the size of the indigenous population merited, mixed schools (écoles mixtes)43 for 
Europeans and North Africans in which “the education…will remain essentially French, 
without any bias for religious education, which will be given to children of different 
faiths by a minister of their religion: priest, pastor, taleb, or rabbi.”44 The circular aimed, 
then, to allow indigenous students to benefit from a French curriculum while at the same 
time allotting time for the teaching of Islam as well. In this way, Muslim children would 
come to see French society as both tolerant and superior and would thus gradually adopt 
                                                
41 See Patricia Lorcin, Imperial Identities: Stereotyping, Prejudice and Race in Colonial Algeria (New 
York: I.B. Taurus, 1999). For the episode at Fort Napoleon, see Taithe, “Algerian Orphans and Colonial 
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it as their own. As many historians have recounted, this goal held no chance of success, 
as nearly all Muslims in Algeria saw study of the Quran as the sole purpose of 
education.45 
 MacMahon’s circular sparked the outrage of Lavigerie, who, however much he 
desired to spread Catholic civilization to Algeria’s Muslims, had no intention of “de-
civilizing” Algeria’s Europeans by exposing them to Islamic beliefs and Muslim 
customs.46 On 23 January 1868 the archbishop issued a circular of his own that drew on 
the racialized conception of imperial rule to argue that the plan would have terrible 
political repercussions for the colony. Lavigerie encouraged the government to uphold 
the “freedom of belief” of colonial mothers and fathers that held specific importance “for 
Algeria more than anywhere else.”47 He lamented that in MacMahon’s circular “the 
Catholic priest, that is to say the French representative of the national religion, finds 
himself placed on the same rank as the taleb or the rabbi.”48 Further, if Catholic and 
Muslim students attended the same school then the state would have to exert “vigilant 
surveillance over the Muslim children, whose corruption occurs at such a young age, in 
order to prevent contact that would be devastating to our European children.”49 Lavigerie 
attempted to turn his Catholic parishioners against the French government by telling them 
that the regime asks those “who constitute here the superior and conquering race, to 
sacrifice the dearest, most sacred interests of their children in favor of the heinous 
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White, “The Decivilizing Mission: Auguste Dupuis-Yakouba and French Timbuktu,” French Historical 
Studies 27/3 (Summer 2004): 541-468. 
47 FEC NL 460 No. 4. Circular from Monseigneur the Archbishop of Algiers to the Clergy of his diocese 




prejudices…and deplorable habits of Muslim children.”50 Finally, lest these fear tactics 
failed to work, Lavigerie instructed his clergy to refuse first communion to any child who 
attended the mixed schools.51 
 The competing circulars sparked a media frenzy that further divided the colonial 
population. In the words of one frère, the circulars put “the whole city in an uproar and a 
polemic began between the good and bad journals.”52 Meanwhile, a Lazarist priest wrote 
to his superior that the archbishop’s “absolute, abrupt, and impetuous tone…will lead him 
to difficulties that I fear he will never surmount.”53 The priest added that Lavigerie and 
General MacMahon had a tenuous relationship and that “unfortunately they carry out 
their public spats in writing and the press has a field day with it.”54 Indeed, in April 1868 
Lavigerie published an article in Le Courrier Français in which he wrote of the necessity 
that “France give religion to the Arabs, or, I do not deceive myself…they will retreat into 
the desert, far from the civilized world.”55 In response, the journal Akhbar published an 
“edited” version of the same article that quoted Lavigerie disapprovingly as saying that 
“France must either convert the natives or expel them into the desert.”56 These polemics 
sparked a worried letter from the minister of war, who saw a rift developing between 
MacMahon and Lavigerie. The minister expressed his concern to the governor general 
that Lavigerie wanted to “end freedom of belief for the Muslims of Algeria.”57 The 
minister also wrote to Lavigerie to warn him of the danger of pursuing such a path, but he 
                                                
50 Ibid. 
51 Turin recounts that Lavigerie first made this threat after the proclamation of the Third Republic and 
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56 CAOM F80/1746. Quoted in letter from Lavigerie to minister of war, 26 April 1868. 
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assured the archbishop that he had misunderstood the spirit of the governor’s circular and 
that “the governor has always been sympathetic” to the Catholic religion.58  
 In the fall of 1868, MacMahon demonstrated his support for the Catholic teachers 
by clarifying the intentions of his circular. This clarification came after a number of 
municipal councils of Algeria moved to willfully misinterpret the circular and rid their 
schools of any public religious influence whatsoever. MacMahon did not intend at all for 
the circular to ban Catholic education from schools that taught almost exclusively 
children from Catholic (or lapsed Catholic) families.59 And indeed, the schools that used 
congregationist teachers in the European communes counted, with rare exceptions, only 
European children among their students.60 Nevertheless, on 22 November 1868 the city of 
Algiers took advantage of an internal change in teaching staff at the FEC’s communal 
school on the Rue Doria to inform the frères that it would simply replace the outgoing 
teachers with secular teachers (rather than other FEC missionaries). Further, rather than 
following the orders of the circular and staffing ministers of different religions, the 
council opted simply to use secular teachers to teach “issues of morality that applied 
equally to all religions.”61 In making this substitution, the municipal council sought to 
apply its own version of secular assimilation to European children by taking advantage of 
a little-known ministerial circular of 2 March 1853 (henceforth amended to the Falloux 
                                                
58 CAOM F80/1746. Letter from the minister of war to Archbishop Lavigerie, 25 May 1868. 
59 This misinterpretation for anticlerical ends is briefly mentioned by Turin, though she admits “The 
governor general explained his thoughts in a text that it is not possible to analyze here.” Turin, “La 
Commune d’Algiers et ses écoles,” 91. For his part, MacMahon considered himself a very pious Catholic. 
See Julien, La Conquête, 440. 
60 FEC NL 463 No 1. As one FEC frère remarked in his memoires, “except for rare exceptions, the 
indigènes did not attend our schools. Our influence was then nil on the infidels.” Quoted in “A History of 
Ben-Aknoun. 13 April 1868 to 23 September 1870,” written at the FEC novitiate in El Biar, Algeria, 20 
November 1906. 
61 FEC NL 460 No 1. Quoted in an anonymous, unpublished history of the FEC in Algeria. Entry written on 
15 November 1867.  
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laws of 1850), which allowed councils to unilaterally appoint teachers of their choosing 
(without consulting the prefect first) upon the “dismissal, retirement, or resignation” of an 
existing teacher in the middle of the school year.62 But as the FEC, Lavigerie, and 
General MacMahon soon pointed out – and as the last chapter demonstrated in detail – 
the Falloux laws and their later amendments remained unapplied in Algeria. As such, 
Lavigerie and MacMahon continued to attempt to tie Catholic settlers to the colonial state 
by providing specifically for their religious needs. 
 Nevertheless, other municipalities soon followed the lead of the council of 
Algiers. In the town of Sidi-Noussa, the municipality voted to prohibit any priest from 
entering the schoolhouse on any occasion whatsoever. Other communes informed their 
secular teachers never to speak to children of matters of religion, while the council of 
Oran voted to remove the crucifix from all public schools.63 We should note that these 
attempts to secularize public schools in Algeria all occurred before any similar attempts 
in France, where the authorities exerted tighter and closer control over sensitive matters 
like education and where article 23 of the Falloux laws stipulated that “primary education 
                                                
62 See the circular of the minister of public instruction of 2 March 1853 relative to the nomination of 
communal teachers. Octave Gréard, La législation de l'instruction primaire en France depuis 1789 jusqu'à 
nos jours. Vol V, 1848-1863 (Paris: impr. de Delalain frères, 1902), 517. See also the explication of this law 
in, among many other documents, the petition redacted by Lavigerie in December 1870. FEC NL 460 No 1. 
There is an extensive literature that deals with how French public schools replaced Catholic with secular 
morality. The legal implementation of this change occurred with the Ferry Laws of 1880-81. In the end, 
these different moralities, while important to actors at the time, actually possessed many similarities, as 
both stressed the importance of labor, gender, and family roles, with secular morality simply replacing 
worship of God with that of the fatherland. See Surkis, Sexing the Citizen; Stephen Harp, Learning to be 
Loyal: Primary Schooling as Nation Building in Alsace and Lorraine, 1850-1940 (DeKalb: Northern 
Illinois University Press, 1998); and Laura Strumingher, What Were Little Boys and Girls Made of?: 
Primary Education in Rural France, 1830-1880 (Albany: SUNY University Press, 1983). For girls’ 
morality in particular see Linda Clark, Schooling the Daughters of Marianne: Textbooks and the 
Socialization of Girls in Modern French Primary Schools (Albany: SUNY University Press, 1984). 
63 FEC, NL 460 No 4. Recounted in the Circular from Monseigneur the Archbishop of Algiers to the Clergy 
of his diocese relating to the proposal to establish mixed schools in Algeria, 23 January 1868. 
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includes moral and religious instruction.”64 Rather, the secularization campaign of 1867-
68 stemmed from the peculiar exigencies of imperial rule – specifically the lack of 
explicit legislation, which was withheld precisely to facilitate imperial rule – and the 
juxtaposition of different religions in such close proximity.65 Further, the councils used 
the rhetorical, and at most half-hearted, desire of assimilating Algerian subjects to French 
culture to in reality pursue their anticlerical agenda. These anticlericals gave little thought 
to indigenous beliefs, but used the religious diversity of Algeria to force through 
secularizing reforms that they could not yet pursue in the metropole. 
 To be sure, MacMahon remained a military man, and he had no intention of 
allowing civilian authorities to disobey his orders and remove the missionaries from their 
teaching positions in purely European schools. He blamed the municipal councils for 
wrongly applying the circular and wrote as follows to the prefect of Algiers: “I said that 
purely religious education be given to children of diverse religions by a minister of their 
religion, but it has been interpreted that the primary schools must not provide any 
religious or Catholic education.”66 This problem continued to plague Algeria until the 
1880s because at root it stemmed from the lack of any specific legislation over who had 
                                                
64 Sarah Curtis has argued that the congregationist schools in France first began to come under attack from 
the government after the Third Republic and, especially, after the Ferry Laws of 1880. Curtis, Educating 
the Faithful: religion, schooling and society in nineteenth-century France (DeKalb: Northern Illinois 
University Press, 2000). For the text of the Loi Falloux. see http://dcalin.fr/textoff/loi_falloux.html. Titre II: 
de l’enseignement primaire; Chapitre premier: dispositions générales, Article 23. 
65 There was a muted effort in France throughout the 1860s to create mixed schools for Protestant and 
Catholic children, but Protestant families repeatedly complained that Catholics dominated the municipal 
councils and refused to fund mixed or Protestant schools. Further, officials in charge of education 
continued to see Catholic education as a means of warding off socialism. See Patrick Cabanel, “De l’école 
protestante à la Laïcité: La Société pour l'encouragement de l'instruction primaire parmi les protestants de 
France (1829-années 1880),” Histoire de l'éducation 110, Les Protestants l’école et la laïcité: XVIIIe-XXe 
siècles (mai 2006): 53-90. The one place where Protestants and Catholics did alternate church attendance at 
the same building was in Alsace, due to its highly mixed religious demographics. See Rebecca McCoy, 
“Alsatians into Frenchmen: The Construction of National Identities at Sainte-Marie-Aux-Mines, 1815-
1851,” French History 12/4 (December 1998): 429-451. 
66 AN F17/12335. Letter from General MacMahon to the prefect of Algiers, 19 December 1868. 
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the right to appoint teachers in the territory. As a result, military, civilian, ecclesiastical, 
and metropolitan officials all displayed confusion over who exactly possessed the 
authority to govern these matters in the European communes of Algeria. MacMahon 
further informed the prefect that: 
 Until special legislation for Algeria has been passed that states otherwise, it is 
 that of France which must serve as the basis of our rulings [and]…for the Catholic 
 students, the teaching of prayers and the Catechism must then in Algeria as in 
 France continue to form the first object of primary teaching and instruction.67 
 
As we know, MacMahon’s reasoning was disingenuous at best, as his military 
predecessors had failed to pass legislation with the express goal that the legislation of 
France not necessarily serve as the basis for their rulings.  
 The municipal council of Algiers seized on this legislative confusion to assert its 
own claim to authority and to forge a secular society in Algeria. The council argued 
indeed that Algerian educational policy must follow that in use in France, specifically the 
amendment to the Falloux laws that on 2 March 1853 (Article 89) gave the councils the 
right to choose a new teacher themselves upon the “removal, resignation, or retirement” 
of an existing teacher in the middle of the school year.68 The municipality used 
MacMahon’s own argument to the prefect to justify applying (its interpretation of) 
metropolitan legislation to Algeria and thus allowing the municipal councils to choose 
their own teachers. This interpretation would have allowed the Algiers municipality 
legally to prevent the appointment of new congregationist teachers at the school on Rue 
Doria and to instead replace the outgoing missionaries with secular teachers. 
                                                
67 Ibid. 
68 CAOM F80/1731. This law is quoted in a letter from the minister of public instruction to the minister of 
war on 25 February 1869. 
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 Faced with this argument, MacMahon backed away from his original stance and 
instead moved to highlight the legislative particularities of the territory. Indeed, although 
the Falloux laws and later amendments allowed municipalities to name their own teachers 
in certain circumstances, article 81 of the law stated that “a ruling of the public 
administration will determine the dispositions of the present law which are applicable to 
Algeria.”69 This ruling never arrived. In 1850 and on many occasions afterwards the issue 
had come up for debate in metropolitan circles, but as MacMahon recounted, 
“circumstances did not permit it to have an immediate hearing and the status quo was 
maintained.”70 The failure to issue a definitive ruling stemmed initially from the 
administration’s desire not to impose an unfriendly teacher on the indigenous population. 
At the same time, MacMahon now invoked it to prevent civilian officials from imposing 
an antagonistic secular teacher on Algeria’s Catholic European population. Further, 
MacMahon noted that municipal councils of Algeria had not chosen their teachers in the 
past in part because they did not have any knowledge of the background or personality of 
these teachers. He confided to the minister of public instruction that the failure to apply 
metropolitan legislation resulted from the fact that “in general it had been difficult for the 
municipal councils to give an enlightened opinion [on the teachers] because whether 
secular or religious almost all the teachers came from France.”71 
 Between 1848 and 1870, however, much had changed in Algeria. First, while only 
six municipal councils actually existed in 1848, by 1870 the councils “embraced all the 
                                                
69 Loi Falloux, Title IV: Dispositions Générales, Article 81: “Un règlement d’administration publique 
déterminera les dispositions de la présente loi qui seront applicables à l’Algérie.” See 
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civil territory of Algeria.”72 Second, years of settler occupation had created a local supply 
of Algerian-born French teachers. To this end, an imperial decree of 4 March 1865 
established the territory’s first teacher training school (école normale) at Bouzarea, on the 
outskirts of Algiers.73 Not only did this local teacher training school allow the councilors 
to better know their chosen teachers, but it also received most of its funds from their own 
tax dollars. In December 1868, MacMahon himself admitted to the minister of public 
instruction that “since they have become elective the municipalities of Algeria, those of 
the large cities in particular, show themselves so impatient to exercise their authority that 
they have sought to apply metropolitan legislation, and they impose on themselves the 
greatest sacrifices in favor of their schools.”74 
 Although he kept his opinions from the municipal councils and the prefect, 
MacMahon hoped to work towards a definitive solution by drafting new legislation. He 
further confided to the minister of public instruction that “the dangers of this situation 
have begun to reveal themselves with a certain gravity…and the superior authority lacks 
the power to resolve them.”75 He encouraged the minister to articulate an administrative 
ruling based on article 81 of the law of 15 March 1850. At the same time, MacMahon 
hoped that this new legislation would work towards his long desired “fusion of the races” 
by applying the directives first outlined in his circular. As we have seen, despite their 
constant rhetoric of “assimilation” the municipal councils had no desire to actually 
accommodate Muslim beliefs, teachers, or institutions. Indeed, by misinterpreting 
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73 For the école normale, see Fanny Colonna, Instituteurs Algériens, 1883-1939 (Algiers: Presses de 
Science Po, 1975). 




MacMahon’s original circular to banish all religious education schools the councils in 
reality ensured no Muslim child ever set foot in a French public school. To be sure, this 
outcome mattered little to the municipal councils because they placed their emphasis 
rather on assimilating European Catholics to their own version of a secular modernity in 
French Algeria. 
 MacMahon, on the other hand, told the minister of public instruction that the new 
ruling must have as its aim to admit Muslim children to the new mixed schools “on as 
large a scale as possible” and even “to plan for the case where the number of Muslim 
students exceeds by a great deal that of Catholic students, and where the teacher will be 
himself a Muslim, drawn from the école normale of Algiers.”76 MacMahon encouraged 
the government in Paris to convene a special commission to draft this law. The 
commission would have as its head the minister of public instruction supported by the 
governor general, the prefect and mayor of Algiers, and two Muslim notables chosen by 
the governor general himself.77 This proposal, however, proved utopian at best, for as this 
entire episode has shown, the municipal councils and the mayor had entirely different 
ideas on the purpose of education than did the governor general, without even taking 
account the minister of public instruction, not to mention the two Muslim notables. As a 
result, the government failed to enact any definitive legislation before the fall of the 
Second Empire.  
 In the end, MacMahon solved the conundrum of the school on the Rue Doria by 
having the minister of war inscribe an annual credit of 6,000 francs in the budget of the 
governor general to skirt the law and fund the salaries of the FEC teachers at the school 




indefinitely. This act temporarily appeased both the municipal council of Algiers by 
removing all financial responsibility from the city budget and Algerian Catholic families 
by providing their children with a religious education.78 In other communes, the conflict 
temporarily abated due to the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War in July 1870, when 
the government recalled MacMahon to lead the Army of the Rhine. Not long before his 
departure, MacMahon still lamented the lack of “precise and definitive legislation” and 
warned that such a “vague and precarious regime can only give birth to numerous 
difficulties and conflicts.”79 This prediction proved well founded when the fall of the 
Second Empire led to the ascension of radical municipal councils throughout Algeria. 
These councils again attempted to enact their anticlerical legislation, but they went far 
beyond previous efforts by attempting to dismiss missionary teachers from all publically 
funded teaching positions in the territory without any pretext whatsoever. The chaos only 
continued through the 1870s because a definitive ruling on public instruction in Algeria 
would not arrive until the application of the Ferry Laws on 13 February 1883. 
 
The Third Republic, Radical Municipalities, and Foreign Families 
 
 The fall of the Second Empire and the proclamation of the Third Republic on 4 
September 1870 unleashed a power vacuum in Algeria. No longer recognizing the 
authority of the military governor general, and encouraged by new Minister of War Léon 
Gambetta, on 5 September leading colons formed a Republican Committee of Defense 
that by October had succeeded in winning the recall of Bonapartist Governor General 
Durrieu, setting in motion the progressive abandonment of the Arab Bureaus, and in 
                                                
78 FEC NL 450-460. Discussed in an extract from the meeting of the municipal council of Algiers, 22 
November 1868. 
79 CAOM F80/1731. Letter from the governor general to the minister of public instruction, 23 March 1869. 
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holding elections for new municipal councils throughout the territory. Leadership in 
Algeria then fell to the municipal council of Algiers and the Republican Committee of 
Defense. Throughout the winter of 1870-71, a series of decrees passed by the 
Government of National Defense in France aimed at removing all power from the 
military in Algeria in order to attach administrative functions to the relevant civilian 
ministries in France.80 Some colonists even went so far as to threaten secession from 
France if the military retained the highest positions of authority in Algeria.81 
 The new leaders in Algeria desired a republican regime, but their idea of 
republicanism differed in many important respects from that in France. Put another way, 
many aspects of republicanism in Algeria reveal strains of exclusivity in republican 
thought that remained latent in the metropole until quite recently.82 First, republicans in 
Algeria had a very circumscribed conception of democracy, one that in no way implied 
popular sovereignty. In October 1870, male French citizens in Algeria went to the polls to 
elect mayors, prefects, and councilmen for all the European communes of the territory. 
Although the politicians in Algiers claimed to owe their authority to “universal” suffrage, 
they actually owed it to an electorate of just 5,000 people in a city whose population 
totaled 70,000. Women, Muslims, and, most importantly for our context, European 
foreigners remained politically powerless despite their overwhelming numerical 
                                                
80 For a detailed discussion of the transition to civilian rule see Julien, La Conquête, 454-467. 
81 Ruedy, Modern Algeria, 76-7. 
82 For the exclusiveness of modern republican universalism, see Joan Scott, The Politics of the Veil 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), Shepard, The Invention of Decolonization, and Jeremy 
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majority.83 These disenfranchised elements did of course continue to bear the brunt of the 
tax burden. 
 In addition to its circumscribed nature, republicanism in Algeria connoted a 
hatred of the military, which republicans saw as an extension of the despotic regime of 
Napoleon III and his Arab Kingdom.84 An article appearing in the journal Le Courrier de 
Tlemcen in November 1870 helps illuminate this position. The author remarked:  
 It goes without saying that the elections could not fail to return republicans 
 [because] for us the [Second] Empire manifested itself under one of its most 
 odious forms: the Arab Kingdom, with a caste of French Mamluks [i.e. the army], 
 exploiting the indigènes and hindering colonization.85 
 
Republicanism in Algeria meant an end to military rule and the Arabophile policies of 
Napoleon III, embodied especially in the position of a military governor general and the 
detested Arab bureaus. These latter held the responsibility for governing tribal affairs and 
protected tribal lands from civilian speculators. As such, they allowed Muslims to 
maintain their personal status under Islamic law and to continue to occupy tribal (that is 
non-private) property. Civilians had for years called for the assimilation of indigènes to 
French society and they blamed the military for preserving native institutions via a policy 
of association.  
 In reality, this accusation served purely as a rhetorical device that allowed the 
colonists to further exploit the indigenous population. Specifically, by reorienting the 
purpose of the sénatus consulte of 1863 – which attempted to protect tribal lands from 
colonial speculators – the civilian administration moved to impose French law on all 
                                                
83 Laure Blévis, “L’invention de l’indigène français non-citoyen,” Histoire de l’Algérie à la Période 
Coloniale, 216. The Crémieux Decree of 24 October 1870 automatically granted French citizenship to 
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84 For the civilian hatred of the military in Algeria during the 1870-1 crisis, see Julien, La Conquête, 454-
457. 
85 CAOM F80/1731. Supplément au Courrier de Tlemcen, 7 June 1872. 
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property transactions between Europeans and Algerians. As a result of this effort, 
between 1877 and 1920 the colonists would appropriate 1.75 million hectares of tribal 
land.86 Finally, the colonists revealed the emptiness of their rhetoric by their efforts to 
create a regime of exception to govern indigenous subjects in the form of a separate law 
code (the indigénat), special native taxes (the impôts arabes), and the use of forced labor 
on public works (the corvée).87 
 Thirdly, republicans in Algeria – like many of their counterparts in France – 
despised the Catholic Church, to say nothing of Islam. As we have seen, this 
anticlericalism stemmed in large part from the political clout accumulated by exiles of the 
Revolution of 1848. It also owed much to colonists’ association of Catholicism with 
Islam, as they repeatedly labeled adherents of both religions with the derogatory epithet 
“fanatical.” On 23 June 1873, for example, the Spanish parish priest of the town of 
Tlemcen “violently and insistently” accused the city’s “radicals” of delaying the 
procession of the Fête-Dieu. This accusation led the mayor’s office to suggest to the 
prefect that “it would be good to take measures in order to avoid any scandal that a 
fanatical priest could incite among the population if he continued to act this way.”88 
At the same time, republican colonists continued to employ the rather contradictory 
argument that Catholics offended Islamic sensibilities and thus made imperial rule more 
difficult.  
                                                
86 The two laws that specifically allowed for this confiscation were the Warnier Law of 26 July 1873 and a 
follow-up law of 22 April 1887. See Ruedy, Modern Algeria, 81, and Ageron, Les Algériens Musulmans et 
la France, 78-88. 
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 Finally, due to the historical ties between the military and the Church – especially 
the patronage shown by military generals for missionary orders in Algeria – republicans 
in Algeria quickly moved to cut public funding for all missionary work. In this struggle, 
they had the loyal support of most organs of the press, which “adopted a language that 
Marat would not have disowned.”89 To this end, as Yvonne Turin has briefly recounted, 
on 15 October 1870 the mayor of Algiers informed all congregationist teachers in the city 
that by the end of the year they must evacuate all the communal schools of Algiers.90 By 
the end of 1871, the communes of Blida, Mustapha, St Eugène, Douera, Tènes, 
Constantine, Bône, Philippeville, Oran, and Tlemcen had followed suit. Ultimately, these 
municipalities hoped expulsion would help them to achieve “the complete separation of 
church and commune.”91 Turin draws the astute conclusion that the communes failed in 
their efforts because of the influence of the large Catholic population of Spanish, Italians, 
and Maltese, the intransigence of Archbishop Lavigerie, and the panic caused by the 
Kabyle uprising of 1871.92 
 Although Turin correctly concludes that the communes failed in the short term, 
she neglects to tease out the wider implications that this failure held for the transition 
from military to civilian rule in Algeria. Lavigerie’s success in convincing the governor 
general to overturn the anticlerical actions of the communes reveals the continued 
inability of civilian officials to overthrow military rule and to fully assimilate Algeria 
with France on a juridical level. At the same time, however, by extending Turin’s 
                                                
89 Turin, “Le commune d’Alger et ses écoles en 1871,” 90. 
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analysis throughout the decade, we see that while the governor general may have won the 
battle in the early years of the 1870s, by the early 1880s he and his successors had lost 
the war. Indeed, despite an official decree by the counseil d’etat that aimed to reinstall 
the congregationist teachers in 1872, radical municipalities stubbornly continued to 
refuse to actually reinstate these missionaries. This conflict was exacerbated by the 
metropolitan state’s failure ever to extend definitive legislation to Algeria in matters of 
religion and education. Finally, in 1883 the intransigence of the councils forced the 
government to apply the Ferry laws of the metropole onto Algeria.93 These laws rendered 
primary education free, secular, and obligatory and, finally, marked the definitive legal 
assimilation of the European cities of Algeria to France in matters of education. To be 
sure, the desired aim of this assimilation remained elusive due to continued resistance 
from below, as the territory’s foreign (and still disenfranchised) population still saw the 
Catholic religion as a vital source of identity and belonging. 
 In the immediate aftermath of the expulsion of the congregationist teachers in 
1871, Archbishop Lavigerie mounted a stern defense of their public utility. At this point, 
he still hoped to get these teachers’ salaries re-inscribed in the municipal budgets in the 
near term. He wrote to the FEC superior in December 1870, “my clergy and I have 
decided to take all measures possible…to conserve your care over the children in our 
schools.”94 Lavigerie told the frères that he and his clergy would provide resources to 
allow the FEC to open new private schools (écoles libres) and he welcomed the frères to 
lodge for the time being in his episcopal palace. Finally, Lavigerie created a Committee 
                                                
93 The only full-length study on the birth of secular education in Algeria remains Colonna, Instituteurs 
Algériens. For a discussion of the application of the Ferry Laws to Algeria’s Muslims see Ageron, Les 
Algériens Musulmans et la France, 337-342. 
94 FEC NL 460 No 1. Letter from Archbishop Lavigerie to Frère Aimarus, 17 December 1870. 
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of Patronage of Catholic Schools, administered by him with the help of his clergy and the 
faithful of the territory, to channel donations to the congregationist teachers.95 
 Lavigerie saw these measures as providing only a temporary stopgap during what 
remained a chaotic political transition in Algeria and in France (he had no intention of 
acting as a permanent financial patron for the schools of the FEC). In December 1870, he 
appealed to the metropolitan government to overturn the decisions of the municipal 
councils. He did so by employing the racialized rhetoric that had served him so well in 
1868, informing Minister of Justice Adolphe Crémieux that colonists’ freedom of belief 
“must not be trampled under foot in Algeria in the presence of the Muslims…as here 
more so than elsewhere, Catholicism must be the national religion of France.”96 At this 
point, however, the provisional government in France maintained a fiercely republican 
bent, and the minister responded to Lavigerie that the juxtaposition of different religions 
in Algeria meant that the Government of National Defense could not “force the 
communes to conserve a mode of primary education that presents in their eyes a 
monopoly for the benefit of one religion alone.”97 Crémieux – himself famous for the law 
that granted automatic French citizenship to Algeria’s Jewish population – supported the 
spread of secular education and championed the schools’ “absolute disinterestedness in 
matters of religion.” And yet, he refrained from pursuing any definitive legislation, 
writing that he would “leave to the future national assembly the problem of finding a 
solution that conforms best with the interest and grandeur of the Republic.”98 
                                                
95 FEC, NL 460 No 1, “History of the houses of the District of Algiers, 1851-1945,” internal history of the 
Frères des Ecoles Chrétiennes in Algeria, anonymous author, no date [1968?]. 
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97 Ibid. 
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 Lavigerie then resorted to what seemed to him a quintessentially republican 
method of protest: an appeal to popular sovereignty. In December and January, Lavigerie 
organized a petition that in the city of Algiers alone collected 7,000 signatures, a number 
that exceeded by far the 5,000 citizens listed on the electoral ballot (though to be sure 
many of Lavigerie’s signatures came from women and children).99 The petition claimed 
that in the name of liberty and equality the governor general must overturn the “arbitrary” 
rule of the municipal councils. The petition demanded that the government uphold the 
freedom of belief and the right to education for the families that constituted a majority in 
Algeria. Ultimately, it appealed to a different ideal of French belonging by claiming to 
speak “for the colonists from Alsace and Lorraine who…have at heart Christian 
sentiments, for the Maltese, Spanish, and Italian foreigners who are as numerous in the 
colony as the French themselves and who do not have any political rights.”100 The 
petition also claimed that the religious schools served the assimilating interest of 
colonization as “the children of foreign colonists will only truly become Frenchmen 
through the institution of the school, and they will only go to schools where their parents 
can find their religious sentiments satisfied.”101 
 Lavigerie’s rhetoric resembles the “creole medievalism” described by Michelle 
Warren that emerged in the thought of Joseph Bédier (1864-1938), a French colonial 
from La Réunion. Bédier and a number of other creoles – by which Warren means the 
white French colonial elite – located French identity in a medieval past, long before the 
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rise of anticlericalism, and claimed that the creole community of La Réunion embodied 
this identity better than did the French of the metropole.102 Lavigerie too appealed to a 
rapidly disintegrating ideal of Catholic France in order to champion a version of 
modernity that was denied him in the metropole. Unfortunately for Lavigerie, his 
opponents also hoped to use Algeria to create their ideal of secular France, an ideal which 
– rather than locating French identity in the medieval past – looked back towards the as 
yet unrealized Jacobin ideals of the Revolution of 1789 in order to forge a modernity that 
had not yet come to fruition in metropolitan France. Both groups grew out of a long 
tradition of colonial actors, most notably the Saint Simonians, who saw Algeria as a 
space in which they could create their ideal society, one they nevertheless both saw as 
quintessentially modern.103 
 Secondly, Lavigerie’s argument in part recalls that of Governor General Bugeaud 
and Minister of War de Soult in the 1840s (see Chapter Two), as the two generals hoped 
to use Catholic missionaries to tie foreign colonists to the nascent colony. At that time, 
the two military men pursued a policy of association by providing for the particular 
religious needs of foreigners in order to cultivate their loyalty to the colonial regime. In 
this instance, however, Lavigerie, while maintaining the importance of Catholicism, 
claimed that religious schools would assimilate these foreigners to what he saw as a 
normative French society. Again, however, he did so by appealing to an aspect of French 
culture, Catholicism, that most French in Algeria and most members of the provisional 
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government cared little for, and some downright detested. Indeed, throughout this period, 
whether championed by the clergy or by the civilian regime, efforts of assimilation 
repeatedly foundered due to ongoing struggles over what exactly it meant to belong to the 
French nation. The petitioners thus drew on two previous, and previously contradictory, 
strands of thought in colonial policy, rendering their argument fundamentally problematic 
and difficult to implement. 
 By 1871, however, a confluence of events served to sway opinion in France 
towards the side of Lavigerie and the congregationist teachers. First, as Lavigerie 
predicted, many families refused to send their students to the newly organized schools. 
Statistics for the city of Algiers show that before the secularization campaign a total of 
2,633 students attended congregationist communal schools in Algiers, compared to 1,270 
students in secular communal schools (for a total of 3,903 students). By July 1871, only 
2,094 students attended the (now all secular) communal schools in the city, marking a fall 
in enrollment by almost half.104 According to the prefect of Algiers “the establishments of 
the congregations, having made themselves private, have not seen a noticeable decline in 
attendance, and they still count today 2,158 students thanks to the favor they enjoy with 
Spanish families.”105 The congregationists had lost public funding, but they now received 
(much reduced) salaries and lodging either from voluntary tuition paid by wealthier 
parents or from Lavigerie’s Committee of Patronage of Catholic Schools.  
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 Moreover, in cities where the clergy could not support the frères’ private schools, 
many children ceased attending school whatsoever rather than move into the secular 
schools. In Oran, the bishop argued that the lack of Catholic schools had begun to unravel 
the fabric that held colonial society together. He wrote to the minister of justice that many 
local children now sat “in the most dangerous idleness and most alarming vagabondage,” 
thus situating them in the same conceptual framework used to denigrate and exclude 
Algeria’s Muslim colonial subjects.106 He further expressed his fear that many families 
who could no longer rely on Catholic education “will hasten to leave this country.” These 
colonists, he argued, came to Algeria precisely because metropolitan and colonial 
lobbyists ensured them they would “find the parish priest of their village and the sisters to 
instruct their children.”107 The project of the municipal councils thus threatened their 
entire existence. The bishop contended that the Catholic religion alone could “form bonds 
between colonists of different nationalities…who only come together at the church.”108 
 Other clergymen expressed their fear that by specifically restricting the rights of 
the Catholic population the administration threatened to overturn the colonial order of 
things. In June 1871 the municipal council of Mostaganem passed a law prohibiting 
traditional Catholic processions on holy days (specifically the Fête-Dieu) on the grounds 
that they offended the city’s non-Catholic population. A local parish priest asked how the 
councilors could prohibit this procession “while they suffer without a word all the noisy 
public processions of the Muslims.”109 He further observed that Muslims and Jews have 
offered public prayers in times of drought, and while he “did not blame them for this 
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drought” he could not understand why city authorities allowed these prayers in public 
while prohibiting Catholic ones. Finally, he asked why nobody had “ever prevented the 
blacks from making in town their disgusting processions, leading a cow whose neck is 
half cut off and whose blood soaks its shoulders, all accompanied by the tam tam and the 
most lascivious cries and gesticulations.”110 In the eyes of the parish priest, the secular 
policies of the municipal council forced France, the supposedly dominant nation, to 
renounce its religious ceremonies entirely and subordinate itself to the superstitious 
beliefs of its uncivilized colonial subjects. 
 The second event that helped tip the scales in favor of the missionary 
congregations was the appointment on 21 March 1871 of Louis Henri, the Comte de 
Gueydon, as the first “civil” governor general of Algeria. Despite his civilian title, de 
Gueydon had previously served as vice admiral in the French navy and as military 
governor general of Martinique. He had no intention of subordinating himself to radical 
civilian municipal councils (de Gueydon would eventually win election to the national 
assembly as a royalist in 1885).111 Upon arriving in Algeria, de Gueydon stated publicly, 
“I have spent my life protecting Catholic missions around the globe. I cannot allow them 
to be persecuted on French territory.”112 De Gueydon’s appointment stemmed from 
another key event that hindered the transition to full civilian rule: the Kabyle insurrection. 
Shortly before de Gueydon’s arrival, tribal leaders, fearful of the extension of civilian 
rule over previously protected indigenous lands, rose up and began laying siege to French 
towns and killing French soldiers. As John Ruedy has written, “the prospect of rule by 
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the colons, who had made no secret of their program for Algerian society, filled the 
country with fear” and itself contributed to the very uprising the colons claimed they 
would prevent.113 
 On 5 May 1871, Muhammad al-Hajj al-Muqrani, the insurrection’s leader and an 
erstwhile ally of the French military, died from a shot to the head. 114 But the rebellion 
continued throughout the spring and summer of 1871, as de Gueydon moved to extend 
martial law over much of Algeria, including the European communes. De Gueydon used 
his extraordinary powers to, among other things, attempt to overturn the secular laws of 
the radical municipalities. Turin has argued that the insurrection occasioned the 
reconciliation of the squabbling colonists and the backing down of the municipal 
councils.115 In April 1871, however, de Gueydon wrote to the minister of war that he had 
thought the Kabyle insurrection would “calm the revolutionary fervor of the commune of 
Algiers…but far from this the newspapers become each day more aggressive.”116 More 
importantly, de Gueydon contended that the chaos surrounding the municipal councils 
has “certainly contributed more than anything else to causing this insurrection and giving 
the Arabs the spectacle of our weakness and disorganization.”117  
 Further, de Gueydon understood the political importance of the religious 
sensibilities of both the rebels and the foreign colonists. As Ruedy has written, “most 
Muslims pitied the minority of Frenchmen who were observant Christians and held in 
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secret contempt those who were not.”118 De Gueydon thus began to see the 
congregationists’ reintegration as a pressing political necessity. The general wrote to the 
minister of war to ask if “one could protest that in suppressing the congregationist 
schools the municipality of Algiers has harmed the sentiments of the majority of heads of 
families?” He lamented the “moral violence committed upon colonial fathers,” which had 
caused a further decrease in the number of students at an increased expense for the 
government. “The question is serious,” he concluded, “a solution is urgent.”119 This 
urgency to appease family fathers can also be understood in the context, described by 
historian Judith Surkis, of a simultaneous attempt by the government in France to 
mobilize a wide array of institutions and propaganda in the hope of using fathers to tie 
families to the French nation.120 At the same time, while the secular school provided a 
primary site for the transmission of this propaganda in France, military leaders in Algeria 
saw the peculiar demographic situation of Algeria as requiring the continued use of 
Catholic schools to achieve this same end. 
 To achieve this goal, de Gueydon preferred to implement a dictatorial solution 
that entirely disenfranchised the municipal councils. He clearly expressed his vision for 
the future of Algeria in a conversation with the Lazarist Father Doumerg, telling him that:  
 Many laws applied in France must not be in Algeria, and universal suffrage even 
 less so. Seeing as the indigènes, Jews, foreigners (and most French conservatives) 
 do not vote, the elections will always be unfailingly radical, since the voters are 
 political deportees or hardly better.121 
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By “universal suffrage” de Gueydon meant suffrage by all male French citizens. Such 
sentiments led other missionaries to try and curry favor with the governor general by 
appealing to his undemocratic sentiments. In 1871, FEC superior Frère Aimarus wrote to 
de Gueydon about his admiration for other colonies where education “instead of being 
left to arbitrary passions of individuals is ruled by the higher administration…which 
retains the exclusive direction over such an important question.”122 Aimarus went so far 
as to contend that this divergence in educational policy could explain the failure of 
Algeria to attract colonists to the same extent as other settler colonies, specifically the 
English colonies of Australia and South Africa.  
 At the same time, the municipal councils still possessed great leverage and de 
Gueydon sought to offer them a compromise that he secretly thought would ultimately 
redound to the exclusive benefit of the congregationists. In the words of de Gueydon’s 
ally, the superintendent of Algiers, this compromise consisted of “reestablishing in the 
communal budget the congregationists’ salaries, without suppressing the lay schools 
founded by the cities.”123 De Gueydon added that municipal councils could issue free 
tuition reimbursement (cartes d’enseignement) to poor families to allow them to send 
their children to the school of their choosing. De Gueydon surmised that in a territory 
with so many foreign families this system would eventually lead to the closure of the 
secular schools due to a lack of students.124 His “compromise” thus masked a solution 
that he hoped would serve to reinstate the Catholic teachers everywhere in the public 
schools. 
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 De Gueydon proved a valuable and willing patron for all missionaries in Algeria – 
something they had lacked since the recall of Governor General MacMahon and the 
political void left in his wake. In October 1871, De Gueydon’s successful suppression of 
the Kabyle insurrection won him great sympathy and support in Paris. In France itself the 
new government led by Adolphe Thiers had succeeded in brutally suppressing its own 
radical communards in the capital.125 With relative stability finally on the horizon there 
began to take shape the so-called government of Moral Order, led by former Governor 
General MacMahon himself, and the new regime sought to distance itself from the radical 
ideas of the communards by recovering France’s “traditional” values.126 In 1872, then, 
circumstances converged to allow the governor general to work with the new government 
in Paris to rein in the power of the municipal councils and to continue to thwart attempts 
to institute full civilian rule in Algeria. Two years after the creation of the Third 
Republic, Algeria still remained under military rule and this situation stemmed directly 
from the importance of protecting the religious sentiments of the disenfranchised foreign 
population of the territory.  
 As such, de Gueydon received free reign to reinstate the congregationist teachers 
against the will of the municipal councils. Rather than passing any definitive educational 
legislation, or even creating a compromise situation, on 22 February 1872 de Gueydon 
informed the prefect of Algiers that “the minister of public instruction has delegated all 
his authority to me and it is thus to me alone that you must henceforth address yourself 
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for everything concerning this matter [of the schools].”127 On 21 and 27 March 1872, de 
Gueydon issued two decrees that declared null and void the municipal councils’ decision 
to secularize the communal schools. He instructed the prefects in the three departments of 
Algeria to ensure that their municipal councils reinstated the congregationist teachers 
immediately.128 Unable to solve the question based on the rule of law – as no law yet 
existed – the military governor general issued an executive decision that superseded the 
authority of the civilian municipal councils.  
 Although Turin concluded that the situation of the schools ended with the 
decision of the governor general, in fact even this executive and fully authoritarian act 
failed to tame the recalcitrant municipal councils, as they persevered in the struggle to 
institute their own peculiar brand of republicanism in Algeria.129 In France, the 
government had long since reinstated congregationist teachers expelled by radical 
municipalities during the height of the Commune. In Algeria, however, the struggle 
continued. In June 1872, the municipal councils of Algiers and Constantine filed a formal 
appeal with the Council of State (conseil d’état) to overturn the decree of the governor 
general that aimed to reinstate the congregationists. The appeal claimed that the governor 
general had exceeded his authority and acted illegally by violating the laws of the 
metropole, which as we have seen allowed the prefect to name communal teachers based 
on the advice of the municipal councils. For his part, de Gueydon sought to influence the 
Council of State by writing to the ministers of the interior and public instruction that the 
issue “is a political question of the highest order and the administration must take it upon 
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itself to decide the question authoritatively (autoritairement).”130 The Council of State 
would take almost a year to issue its decision.  
 In the meantime, the situation continued to threaten the very foundation of 
imperial rule. The municipalities openly flouted the decree of the governor general and 
refused to pay the salaries of the congregationists. In the opinion of Frère Aimarus, de 
Gueydon had “lost and lost without honor” in his struggle with the municipal councilors, 
who called his decision “illegal” and pushed for his recall to France. Aimarus wrote to his 
assistant: 
 I told [the governor general] with tears in my eyes that we all as Frenchmen 
 feel deeply humiliated by his conduct…because he is the highest authority in the 
 colony and he has allowed his most formal orders to be vilified, spat upon by 
 a horde of demagogues, and that in my eyes this is the ultimate degradation of my 
 unhappy country…But he said very painfully that he could not set the country 
 ablaze and spill blood over the question of schools.131 
 
The governor general himself recognized the futility of his decree and wrote to the 
minister of public instruction on 9 May 1872 that although his ruling returned all the 
rights to the congregationist teachers, it “remains a dead letter and is attacked as illegal 
by the municipal councils of Algiers and Constantine.”132 
 The conflict escalated throughout 1872 and even threatened to cause an 
international incident. In May the prefect of Constantine wrote that the congregationist 
teachers at the private school of Philippeville had run out of resources and had begun to 
make plans to return to France. In response, the frères’ supporters drew up another 
petition signed by 790 inhabitants, including 300 French, 490 Italians and Maltese, as 
well as the English consul (representing the Catholic Maltese population) and the Italian 
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and Spanish consuls. As Lavigerie himself later asked, what would France do “if we went 
to war with one of these nations, Spain, for example? Do we not fear the 70,000 Spanish 
colonists who populate our cities and farms?”133 The superintendent of Constantine wrote 
that “the assembly still believes itself authorized to treat this mass of people as a minority 
because the bulk of the children come from foreign families.”134 He pointed out, however, 
that these families still provided half of the city’s tax revenue and thus felt they had a 
right to help decide the religious orientation of the city’s public schools.  In response, the 
prefect wrote to the minister of public instruction that the French radicals “see a political 
danger in favoring too much the foreigners,” adding that “the French of Algeria are 
radical by their own standards, without being in any way egalitarian with the 
foreigners.”135 
 In the town of Tlemcen, this rift between the foreigners and the French boiled 
over into violence. On 7 June 1872, a petition published in the local newspaper claimed 
to speak in the name of “the students in tears, the indignant masses, the frères pulled from 
their houses, mistreated, beaten, trampled under the eyes of the fathers and mothers of 
these families.”136 The local newspaper the Courrier de Tlemcen reported that when the 
police came to take the keys from the schoolhouse “the frères chained themselves to the 
benches and the tables. One of them tried to grab the neck of the inspector who, seizing 
the frère by the arms, led him to the police station.” The paper reported that the next day, 
when the police shut the classes with padlocks, “the police chief had hardly left when the 
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padlocks were broken by the frères and the children were recalled.”137 Despite these 
increasingly commonplace episodes, the metropolitan government continued to refrain 
from issuing any definitive legislation, leaving everyone confused as to who actually held 
authority in the colony. 
 Finally, on 23 May 1873, the Council of State issued its decision to reject the 
appeals made by the municipal councils. The government informed the municipalities 
that they must reinstate the congregrationist teachers on 1 October 1873, the first day of 
the school year. Because even this ruling did not result in more definitive legislation, 
however, unforeseen circumstances meant that many previously Catholic schools would 
continue to lack congregationist teachers. As late as December 1873, the communal 
schools in Tlemcen, Mostaganem, Bône, Philippeville, and Oran still employed the new 
secular teachers. In these towns, preexisting contracts between the FEC and the 
communes that dated from the 1850s had stipulated that in the case of removal of the 
frères before the end of their contracts the communes must pay the equivalent of six 
months’ salary for each frère and moving fees for the return to France. These communes 
had agreed with the frères to pay these fees and thus the frères had renounced their 
contractual right to their positions as communal teachers. The municipalities thus saw it 
as their legal right to replace the departed frères with teachers of their choosing since the 
congregationists had voluntarily left. At the same time, despite this voluntary departure, 
settler petitions continued to circulate for the reintegration of the congregationist 
teachers. The governor general thus found himself in the position of having to actually 
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appoint new and different congregationist teachers.138 The petitions of the largely foreign 
population thus forced him to go beyond even the text of the decree issued by the Council 
of State: rather than “reappointing” the old frères he had to name entirely new ones and 
thus assume for himself the authority to name new communal teachers in Algeria without 
having any legal foundation for this act.  
 In the end, the council’s decision did not solve the fundamental problem of the 
lack of legally conferred authority in the territory, a problem that continued to plague 
Algeria throughout the decade. The failure to reinstate the religious teachers led the 
governor general (now Antoine Chanzy) to write to the minister of the interior and 
complain again of the “absence of all legislation in the matter of public instruction.” He 
admitted that despite his act he had no actual legal ability to appoint new missionary 
teachers, writing in near desperation in October 1873, “I am thus led to ask myself who 
currently possesses the authority in Algeria to legally name a primary school teacher.”139 
Presented with no precise legislation, with hostile municipal councils, and with unwieldy 
foreign parents, Governor General Chanzy temporarily opted to assume himself all 
expenses related to the reinstallation of congregationist schools, which now functioned 
alongside lay schools funded by the communes. This precarious situation lasted for the 
next two years until it began to drain the resources of the office of the governor general. 
 Finally, on 15 August 1875, the long-awaited decree on public instruction in 
Algeria arrived. It granted temporary respite to the congregationists while pointing the 
way forward for full civilian rule in the foreseeable future. The decree granted all 
authority over education to the minister of public instruction, who would rule on the 
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advice of an academic council in Algiers composed of the superintendent as president, his 
academic inspectors, and the heads of the faculties of the secondary schools. In addition, 
the law stipulated that the superintendent appoint primary school teachers – for both 
public and private schools – from a list drafted either by the departmental council or by 
the superior of an authorized religious association, respectively.140 The ruling stipulated 
that the congregationists who currently worked in communal schools would continue in 
their functions until the expiration of their individual contracts with the communes, at 
which point “the municipal council will be allowed to express its opinion on the 
continued employment of the congregationist teachers or their replacement by lay 
teachers.”141  
 This ruling, while appeasing missionary orders and foreign families in the short 
term, would only exacerbate their precarious position in the longer term. It also marked a 
key moment in government policy towards the foreign population of Algeria, as from this 
point forward the policy of assimilation to an anticlerical and universal cultural norm 
would consistently win out over that of association based on particular (religious) 
sentiments. This is not to say, however, that the policy would fail to encounter difficulties 
in the form of foreigners who still desired that their children receive a Catholic education 
and missionaries who continued to have a different conception of what French national 
belonging entailed, especially in an environment as religiously and racially diverse as 
Algeria’s. 
 
Cardinal Lavigerie and the Decline of Ecclesiastical Patronage 
                                                
140 Article 9 of the Decree of 15 August 1875, Decree relating to the organization of public instruction in 
Algeria. See Octave Gréard, La législation de l'instruction primaire en France depuis 1789 jusqu'à nos 
jours. Vol IV, 1863-1879 (Paris: impr. de Delalain frères, 1902), 569. 
141 CAOM ALG/GGA/50S/2. Ruling of 15 June 1875 applicable to Algiers. 
 166 
 
The ruling on public instruction in Algeria on 15 June 1875 marked the first step on the 
path to full assimilation with the metropole in matters of public instruction. This path 
culminated on 13 February 1883, when the metropolitan government opted to apply the 
Ferry laws of 1880-81 to Algeria in full (for European inhabitants). The ruling of 1875, 
however, did not solve the problems surrounding the foreign colonists of Algeria, who 
would not gain the political rights of Frenchmen until the 1889 law of naturalization. As a 
result, when congregationists’ contracts with municipal councils expired, the former 
moved to open private schools to continue serving the Catholic inhabitants of the 
territory. Although Lavigerie initially instructed his clergy to offer these schools their full 
support, including substantial economic assistance, the rising anticlericalism and the 
systematic defunding of the Catholic religion in Algeria put increasing strains on the 
relationship between the archbishop and his secular clergy on the one hand and all the 
missionary congregations on the other. At the same time, Lavigerie continued to divert 
financial resources from other missionary congregations to fund his own missionary 
order, the Pères Blancs. 
 Upon the expiration of contracts in the late 1870s and early 1880s, the fate of 
publically funded Catholic schools in Algeria fell entirely to the discretion of the 
municipal councils. Many municipal councils expressed the opinion that foreign parents 
only sent their children to Catholic schools out of habit. As a municipal councilor of 
Philippeville opined to the council in 1879, “the foreign parents [are] for the most part 
illiterate and thus incapable of appreciating the value of one type of education over 
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another.”142 Most municipal councils thus voted to install lay teachers in their public 
schools in order to assimilate these foreign children to their ideal of French secular 
culture. By 1881 the FEC could only count two remaining communal schools, those at El 
Biar and Stora, with six frères alone continuing to receive salaries from local 
governments.143 At the same time, the FEC still had 93 total frères in the colony (66 of 
whom did not possess the brevet de capacité), and these frères worked to open private 
schools in order to continue to meet the demand of largely foreign families for Catholic 
education.144 
 To do so, the FEC had to rely on the largess of Lavigerie, his subordinate bishops 
and appointed clergy, and individual families. Unlike in the early 1870s, Lavigerie now 
began to recognize that FEC schools would have to rely on him as a permanent source of 
funding for their continued existence. In many instances, Lavigerie and his clergy chafed 
at this prospect. In Mostaganem, for instance, the FEC opened a private school funded by 
the local clergy after the municipality had secularized the communal school in 1877. By 
1879, however, the school’s director, Frère Ignatius, wrote to his superior that they would 
have to close the school for a lack of funds. He claimed that while the clergy had offered 
its support initially, “now that [the school] is open and functions as well as 
possible…everyone seems to withdraw this support and abandon us.”145 He specifically 
blamed the local parish priest who “has turned against us…[he] leaves us to struggle and 
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makes it seem that we embarrass him.”146 The priest promised Ignatius a salary of 900 
francs per month supplemented by another 500 francs from the bishop of Oran, but 
neither payment ever materialized. Ignatius wrote that although the school counted nearly 
100 students, these children comprised “the dregs of the city [and they] can give us 
nothing.”147 By May 1879, Ignatius had to shut the school and return to Algiers. A similar 
course of events unfolded in numerous European cities of Algeria. 
 Missionaries also suffered due to the continued growth of Lavigerie’s own 
missionary orders. Reflecting on the situation in 1892, Lavigerie’s successor wrote that 
the late cardinal, “preoccupied exclusively with his own missionary works [i.e. those of 
the Pères Blancs], has channeled in their favor the vast majority of the credits that the 
Propagation de la Foi has opened to this diocese.”148 Lavigerie’s own letters to the 
Propagation de la Foi and the Propaganda Fide corroborate this accusation. As early as 
1874, Lavigerie requested the unprecedented sum of 459,000 francs from the Propagation 
de la Foi, all of which he designated for his own missionary societies, specifically in their 
work in the Arab-Christian villages and in their attempt to penetrate deeper into the 
Sahara and Equatorial Africa.149 Two years later, Lavigerie told the cardinal prefect of the 
Propaganda Fide in Rome that “I very strongly request your eminence to reserve for [the 
Pères Blancs] alone the new missions to found in all of North Africa.”150 When the 
Propaganda Fide considered funding a second missionary society to aid the Pères Blancs 
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in their mission in the Sahara, Lavigerie warned that “two missionary societies side by 
side will lead to injurious competition and, ultimately, serious scandal for the church.”151  
 Thus, by 1880 most missionary orders in Algeria had largely lost the patronage on 
which they had relied since the conquest in 1830. On an ecclesiastical level, Lavigerie 
progressively shifted his focus away from the imperative of spreading Catholic 
civilization to the settler population and toward converting the Muslim population, an 
effort that would swallow hundreds of thousands of francs and yield very meager results. 
Nevertheless, by ensuring that all funds flowed through his office and by channeling 
those funds to his preferred missionary orders, Lavigerie emerged as the most powerful 
bishop in the history of French Algeria, even if his ascension to power did little to help 
the numerous missionaries who worked with the European population of Algeria. On a 
secular level, 1879 saw the appointment of Albert Grévy – brother to President Jules 
Grévy – as the first truly civilian governor general of Algeria.152 The arrival of a civil 
governor general signaled the abandonment of the military’s policy of funding 
missionaries to tie Catholic settlers to the colonial regime. Henceforth colonial officials 
would pursue a strict policy of assimilation based on the conception of republican 
universalism emerging at the same period in metropolitan France.  
 Although both the civilian leadership and Lavigerie represented two distinct and 
opposed interests, the rise of both demonstrates the triumph of official networks of power 
in Algeria. Specifically, it reveals the transformation of the territory of Algeria from a 
place where renegade or opportunistic individuals could carve out their own realms of 
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authority and autonomy deprived them in the metropole into a veritable extension of the 
metropole itself. Whether arriving as lay settlers or as members of religious orders, those 
who ventured to Algeria in an unofficial capacity to pursue dreams they found foreclosed 
in metropolitan France increasingly found their efforts equally stymied in Algeria, as 
legal codes and bureaucratic processes replaced the dense patronage networks that had 
previously ensured their existence, reliant as they were on the individual whims of 
powerful military generals or self-aggrandizing clergymen. 
 The case of the Jesuits in particular demonstrates this transformation’s impact on 
missionary works. In the 1840s the Jesuits’ legal suppression in France in no way 
prevented them from operating in and even expanding throughout the nascent colony (see 
Chapter One). By the 1870s, and especially following their latest legal dissolution in 
1880, the Jesuits could no longer count on friendly secular or ecclesiastical patrons to 
provide them with protection. In 1874, a dire lack of resources (and orphans) had finally 
forced the Jesuits to sell their property at Ben Aknoun, after which their secondary school 
at Oran served as their last remaining establishment in Algeria. Further, Lavigerie then 
moved to close the school in Oran because it competed with his new seminary in the city. 
One Jesuit father recognized that “we will be sacrificed if the new seminary…[run by the 
Pères Blancs] can continue without requiring our support.”153 Writing at the same time, 
another Jesuit complained of “the difficulties we have in living in good harmony with the 
archbishop.” He further feared that “we attempt the impossible in seeking to appease 
Monseigneur, as however hard we try we cannot satisfy him.”154 In 1876, another Jesuit 
got to the root of the matter when he wrote that the archbishop “always supports the 
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parish priests and his congregation over the Jesuits.” He accused Lavigerie of only giving 
the Jesuits missionaries work that his parish priests could not perform on their own and 
claimed that the archbishop was “completely suspicious of the congregations of the 
parish.”155 
 To be sure, Lavigerie’s persecution of the Jesuits largely continued the policies of 
his predecessor, Bishop Pavy. Lavigerie, however, also far exceeded this precedent by 
also attempting to dispense with Pavy’s handpicked missionary congregation, the 
Lazarists. In 1874, Lavigerie drafted a new contract between the diocese and the 
Lazarists in which he combined the posts of superiors of the senior and junior seminaries 
into one position with a single salary. This combination allowed Lavigerie to suppress 
what he saw as superfluous salaries of Lazarist priests. As Father Girard wrote, this move 
“would reduce expenses for Lavigerie, but goes against our regulations that each superior 
must remain master of his own house,” and added frankly that it “imposes on us the 
obligation to spend a lot of money.”156 The new contract also required that the Lazarists 
pay out of their own pocket for the teachers, domestics, and meals at their seminaries, 
with Lavigerie funding the rent payments and the salary of one superior alone. 
 Three years later, Lavigerie went even further by threatening to close the senior 
seminary entirely. The conflict stemmed from a circular issued by Lavigerie on 19 March 
1877 that forced seminarians who received scholarships from the diocese (which 
included nearly all of them) to swear an oath upon entering the seminary promising that 
they would stay and work for their entire lives in the diocese of Algiers rather than 
returning (or going for the first time) to France immediately after entering the priesthood. 
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Lavigerie justified this decision by claiming the need “to retain the priests who come here 
to steal their vocations from us and return to France without any pretext.”157 Realizing 
that the measure might not go over smoothly with the seminarians, Lavigerie first 
convened the senior Lazarists to inform them of his decision in order that they work to 
make it more palatable to their students. Rather than the Lazarists helping to facilitate its 
acceptance, however, Lavigerie complained that “everything I have said of the most 
serious and the most confidential matters to the directors…they have entirely repeated to 
the students, and they have even included their own criticisms and orders, which goes 
beyond treason.”158 
 As a result of what Lavigerie saw as the treasonous disposition of the Lazarist 
teachers, many seminarians refused to take the oath. Lavigerie informed the Lazarist 
hierarchy in Paris that the actions of the faculty had “unleashed the open resistance of the 
students and, due to the lack of a firm authority on the part of the directors, an open revolt 
on their part.”159  Lavigerie accused the director of the seminary, Father Rouget, of 
“contesting the legitimacy of the measure that I have taken by supporting the rebellion of 
the students.” He told Rouget that the director of a seminary cannot maintain his position 
by “turning the seminary against the bishop.” Ultimately, Lavigerie warned the Lazarist 
hierarchy that the seminarians’ resistance to his authority had reached the point that he 
might close the seminary entirely. Although he stopped short of this extreme measure, 
                                                





Lavigerie convinced the superiors in Paris to recall Father Rouget, whose “imprudence 
and lack of virtue,” he wrote, “border on madness.”160 
 Without a powerful patron in the ecclesiastical hierarchy or among the civilian 
administration, the works of the Lazarists began to crumble. In July 1877, the new 
Lazarist superior, Father Doumerg, wrote to Paris to request that the mother house 
provide them “with sufficient resources so that we do not need to rely on a salary from 
the archbishop nor on outside aid.”161 These resources were not forthcoming, and in 1879 
Doumerg warned that “the two seminaries are crumbling before our eyes.”162 The 
Lazarist teachers there had only managed to survive the year with proceeds from the 
grape harvest so that they could “live despite the penny pinching which continues to 
burden us due to our archbishop.”163 On 10 April 1880 the government informed the 
Lazarists that it would seize the house they occupied in Algiers (not to be confused with 
the seminary at Kouba) in order to sell it at public auction. By August 1880, the Lazarists 
only had the funds to support two priests in Algiers and two in neighboring Mustapha to 
serve the orphanage run by the Filles de la Charité.  
 Nor were these sisters immune from the persecution. In September 1880, the 
government temporarily expelled the Filles de la Charité from the orphanage at Mustapha 
that they had directed since 1846 and moved to auction off this house as well. The sisters 
employed a strategy that had served them well over the preceding forty years by again 
looking outside of traditional ecclesiastical and civilian networks and instead turning to 
the few remaining military patrons that existed. As such, they “took refuge in the military 
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prison, though as of yet nobody there has actually loosened the purse strings.” Although 
the sisters ministered to these prisoners for a year, in June 1881 the civilian government 
seized the military prison and transferred the prisoners to the civilian prison, which it 
refused to allow the sisters to enter. Faced with a dwindling number of patrons, Doumerg 
complained that even the clergy withheld funds from missionary orders “based on the 
absurd proverb that the congregations are rich enough.”164 Only in 1883, after the 
anticlerical fervor surrounding the Ferry Laws had abated, did the civilian regime 
partially reverse course and allow the sisters to resume their work at the orphanage of 
Mustapha. The sisters after all still provided an immensely useful service by raising the 
city’s large number of orphans at a very low cost to the state. 
 Finally, the financial situation even began to affect the Lazarists’ founding 
establishment and its largest work in Algeria: the senior seminary at Kouba. In September 
1880 the director wrote that “someone must help restore this vast seminary at Kouba 
which the government has left to slowly deteriorate.” 165 In addition to water leaking 
“from all parts of the ceiling” a wall on the building’s western side had apparently 
crumbled entirely. When the superior asked the state inspector to make the necessary 
repairs, the inspector responded that “it is not our responsibility to maintain the buildings, 
as this falls under the authority of the archbishop.”166 Unfortunately, the Lazarist superior 
wrote, the archbishop “is at this present time far from showing us favor.” He lamented 
the days when Father Girard had established the grandeur of the seminary and had 
“obtained all the money from a ministry that was less hostile and more favorable to 
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us.”167 Although the senior seminary would continue to struggle along, the junior 




 The “long decade” of the 1870s represented the greatest period of transformation 
for the colon population in nineteenth-century Algeria. This transformation comes into 
full focus when viewed through the lens of missionary work in the territory. In 1867, 
Archbishop Lavigerie bestowed on the FEC what he saw as the most important 
missionary work in the history of French Algeria, the Arab agricultural orphanage. 
Similarly, when faced with expulsion from their positions as public school teachers in 
1868-69, the FEC could count on the support of both Archbishop Lavigerie and Governor 
General MacMahon, who unilaterally moved to reinstate them against the wishes of the 
municipal council of Algiers. The situation changed, however, due to the creation of the 
Pères Blancs and the fitful onset of civilian rule. The transfer of the orphans to the new 
Pères Blancs mission at the Maison Carrée marked the first step in the archbishop’s 
attempt to consolidate his power over the territory by withdrawing his patronage from 
outside missionary congregations. Separately, the rise of the Third Republic and the 
empowerment of municipal councils in 1870 made it harder still for missionaries to 
secure patrons from friendly authorities, as authority itself remained hotly contested in 
the territory. 
 At the same time, the fact that the government in Paris spent the first half of the 
decade coming to the aid of the missionary supporters, and that it only very reluctantly 
                                                
167 Ibid. 
 176 
granted the municipal councils the rights of the metropole, reveals the logistical difficulty 
it encountered in transforming Algeria from a colony into an actual extension of France. 
This difficulty stemmed not from an attempt to incorporate the majority indigenous 
population into the French body politic; few if any Frenchmen envisioned enfranchising 
Algeria’s 2.1 million Muslims.168 The difficulty, rather, stemmed from the continued need 
to satisfy the religious sentiments of the large European population of Algeria that itself 
did not possess French citizenship or the political rights of the metropole. The affair of 
the schools that wracked Algeria throughout the 1870s brings into stark relief the ethnic 
and religious divisions that continued to afflict the settler population after forty years of 
imperial rule.  
 The fact that both the Catholic clergy and the secular municipal councils wanted 
to use their schools to assimilate these foreigners to their own ideals of French 
civilization reveals that the contestation over French belonging that unfolded in the 
metropole in the 1870s spread to the territory of Algeria as well. Unlike in the metropole, 
however, these two camps continued to find themselves on opposite ends of the political 
spectrum throughout the decade. Rather than working to mimic the political census that 
slowly developed in the metropole, these two camps continued to polarize opinion and 
only further radicalized their demands. This radicalization actually marginalized both 
sides from the more moderate political culture that began to take shape in France. 
 At the same time, as a direct result of this marginalization both sides saw Algeria 
as a space in which they could articulate their own version of Frenchness that remained 
unattainable in France itself. Whereas Catholics looked to an idealized past – a “creole 
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medievalism” in the words of Michelle Warren – to realize their vision of a religious 
present, anticlericals aspired to an as yet unrealized future based on the principles of the 
French Revolution in which they could turn the long-desired separation of church and 
state into a social and political reality. The fact that these radicals finally won this 
struggle stemmed less from political events in France than from the peculiar makeup of 
French Algeria, where they could seize on the juxtaposition of different religions to 
justify the removal of Catholicism from the public sphere. Throughout, any desire to 
elevate Islam to the level of Catholicism remained mere empty rhetoric. 
 Finally, and as a result of this last effort, the decade of the 1870s demonstrates the 
growing pains inherent in the creation of a self-styled republican regime in a society that 
based its very foundation on a policy and principle of exclusion. Religious difference 
could not be tolerated in Algeria because religious belief had for so long served as the 
defining characteristic of a subjected people, and existing legislation specifically invoked 
religious difference to deny this population French citizenship and legal protection. The 
colon population that came to power in the 1870s increasingly defined the foreign 
population in terms of religion and used this difference to deny them political rights as 
well. In refusing to fund their Catholic schools the municipal councils told the foreigners 
that they could enter the French community on an equal footing, in the public schools, 
only after they agreed to subordinate their religious identity to the councilors’ peculiarly 
Algerian version of a French universalist ideal. This new subjectivity entailed the belief 
in a republicanism based on exclusion and a society based on a rigid racial and religious 
hierarchy. 
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 To be sure, the foreigners were not yet ready to accept this new subjectivity. As 
we will see in the next chapter, Catholic clergy and their followers in Algeria continued 
to fight for the right to practice their religion. At the same time, the continued persecution 
they felt from the authorities only further divided the colon community throughout the 
period up to the First World War. Civilian authorities blamed foreign missionaries 
especially for perpetuating these divisions. Authorities looked with particular suspicion 
upon a new missionary order that arrived in Algeria in 1889: the Salésiens de Don Bosco. 
Indeed, the Salésiens’ Italian origins rendered them especially odious to French colonial 
officials, who began to create elaborate surveillance networks to monitor every move of 
the Salésien missionaries and their followers. It is to these missionaries and their largely 









Foreign Citizens and Foreign Missionaries in French Algeria, 1883-1914. 
 
 
“If, in favor of the numerous foreigners who live in our Algerian colony, we welcome into 
our congregation some priests of their nationality, there is nothing illegal in this. It is 
rather a means to make foreigners esteem the taste of hospitality that is so liberally 
practiced in France, and it shows that France knows how to grant to those who come to it 
seeking aid the liberty to freely and easily practice their religion.”1 




“Spanish monks have disembarked here as though in a conquered land and they are 
impossible to control.”2 




 The practice of Catholicism, more than Islam, continued to divide the settler 
community in Algeria up to the First World War. In this period, the association of 
European “foreigners” with religious fanaticism in the minds of civilian officials and in 
the words of the republican press only grew more intense. Although the law of 1889 
granted French citizenship to all foreigners of European descent born in Algeria it did not 
signal the definitive creation of a cohesive European community. Rather, the law 
frequently provoked the anger and increased the insecurities of the French colonial elite 
by transforming previously powerless foreigners into potent political actors. In many 
European villages, especially in the Oran department, the ethnically French population 
often no longer held the numerical majority in the electorate or the municipal councils 
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and thus could not always enforce its anticlerical agenda on what it continued to refer to 
as the foreign population of Algeria (despite their new status as French citizens).3 Finally, 
during the period from 1901 to 1914, the piecemeal application of metropolitan laws of 
laïcisation often went against the wishes of the newly nationalized settler population and 
provided a further source of division amongst the colonists and anxiety for the colonial 
regime.4 Because they continued to enjoy the support of what officials came to refer to as 
the “neo-French” (néo-français) population, missionaries only intensified their efforts to 
spread Christian civilization to Algeria’s Europeans despite their precarious and at times 
illegal existence.5 
 Historian Oissila Saaïdia has argued that “a paradoxical situation dominated the 
years from 1880 to 1914 [in Algeria]. While in the metropole the period was marked by 
intense clashes between clericals and anticlericals, in the colony it was the search for a 
consensus that brought together these two currents of opinion.”6 My findings complicate 
Saaïdia’s depiction, which begins from the broader theoretical assumption that the 
dichotomous difference between colonized and colonizer structured all aspects of 
colonial society. In late nineteenth-century Algeria, colonial settlers often proved more 
preoccupied with divisions within their own camp than with those between themselves 
and native Algerians. As in metropolitan France, these divisions coalesced around the 
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issue of Catholicism. The dangers that Catholicism supposedly posed to Algerian society, 
however, differed in crucial ways from those it posed to French society in the metropole.  
 Clashes between clericals and anticlericals came to a head especially in debates 
and discourses surrounding a missionary congregation new to Algeria in the 1890s: the 
Salésiens de Don Bosco. As such, the Salésiens will constitute this chapter’s primary 
object of analysis. Because of their Italian origin and their alleged use of foreign priests, 
the Salésiens served as a touchstone for larger debates about the place of foreigners in a 
territory that increasingly did constitute a fully assimilated extension of the metropole 
(for the European population). The case study of the Salésiens further reveals the 
unsteady foundations of imperial governance in a land where the division between ruler 
and ruled was itself based largely on religious difference. The religiously devout portion 
of the settler community – or “fanatics” as their enemies labeled them – continued to 
constitute an intermediary group between the militantly anti-clerical settler elite and the 
excluded mass of the native Muslim majority. On rare occasions the religious sensibilities 
and social marginalization of the foreign population actually led them to seek out 
indigenous healers and sorcerers, who readily took advantage of their credulity. Such 
blurring of racial and religious boundaries preoccupied and puzzled colonial officials 
until the eve of the First World War. 
 In the three decades between 1880 and 1910, civilian authorities in Algeria and 
France expressed increasing anxiety over the large number of foreigners in the territory. 
This obsession stemmed in part from a concern over the falling population in France 
itself.7 In Algeria, however, it took on characteristics that stemmed directly from what we 
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might call the ethnic demographics of empire. Although the 1860s saw the French 
colonial population equal and eventually surpass in number the total foreign population, 
by the 1880s the foreigners, especially those of Spanish descent, began to close this gap 
due to their higher levels of reproduction. On 20 November 1884, Governor General 
Louis Tirman (in office 1882-1891) gave a speech to the High Council of Algeria in 
which he warned: 
 The last census, in 1881, noted that the French population…exceeds the foreign 
 population by only a mere 14,064 individuals. This gap, which consisted of 
 26,248 individuals in 1865, is getting smaller every year, and in the Oran 
 department the national element is no longer in the majority.8 
 
According to historian Patrick Weil, the governor general and the metropolitan 
administration began to fear that the large number of Spanish and Italian nationals in 
particular might cause Spain or Italy to challenge France’s claim to Algeria. This fear 
only increased in 1882, when Italy joined Germany and Austria-Hungary to form the 
Triple Alliance, a move in part motivated by Italy’s anger over the new French 
protectorate in Tunisia, which many nationalists hoped Italy would colonize for itself.9 
 Plans to grant French citizenship to European foreigners in Algeria dated at least 
to the senatus-consulte of 1865. Although typically invoked by historians for its 
application to the Muslim population of Algeria, the decree applied equally to European 
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foreigners.10 It stipulated that non-French Europeans who had lived in Algeria for more 
than three years could apply for French citizenship. As Weil writes, “The three categories 
of Algerian inhabitants who were not fully French – 30,000 Jews, 3,000,000 Muslims, 
and 250,000 foreigners – were dealt with separately but on almost the same basis in this 
ad hoc nationality law that was applied henceforth in Algeria.”11 The law, however, did 
not have the intended effects, as between 1865 and 1881 only 4,428 foreigners had 
applied for and won French citizenship, or an average of 276 individuals per year. We 
should note that the law had an equally negligible effect on Algerian Muslims, as it 
forced them to renounce their personal status and their adherence to Shari’a law and 
subject themselves entirely to the French civil code.12 
 The 1880s saw a renewed effort to nationalize the foreign, if not the Muslim, 
population of Algeria. As the previous chapter demonstrated in great detail, the foreign 
settlers’ religiosity proved one of the largest stumbling blocks to the institution of full 
civilian rule. In 1884 and again in 1885 the civil governor general, Louis Tirman, lobbied 
the metropolitan government to nationalize en masse Algeria’s non-French European 
population. The government initially proved reluctant, because this effort would require it 
to break with the conception of citizenship enshrined in the civil code and embodied by 
the concept of jus sanguinis – which based acquisition of French citizenship on one’s 
French ancestry. By nationalizing the foreigners of Algeria the government would have 
to abandon this conception of nationality in favor of one based on jus soli, or citizenship 
                                                
10 For more on the senatus-consulte see Ruedy, Modern Algeria, 75-76, and Abi-Mershed, Apostles of 
Modernity. 
11 Weil, How to Be French, 209. Algeria’s 30,000 Jews were automatically naturalized by the Crémieux 
Decree of 1870. 
12 Weil, How to Be French, 213. Between 1865 and 1875 a total of 371 Muslims were naturalized as French 
citizens. Ageron, Les Algériens Musulmans et la France, 344. 
 184 
according to place of birth. Only in 1889 did the metropolitan government finally adopt 
the concept of jus soli and grant French citizenship to all foreigners born in French 
territory once they reached the age of 21. Although this new policy stemmed in part from 
French anger and jealousy that foreigners could avoid conscription in the metropole, Weil 
has asserted that support from Algeria’s representatives in the National Assembly 
“undoubtedly contributed to the adoption of the law.”13 
 Historians have depicted the law of 26 June 1889 as marking a turning point in 
the history of French Algeria. Writing in 1961, Pierre Nora stated that the law of 
naturalization “created the French of Algeria properly said.”14 Similarly, in 1968 the 
preeminent historian of French Algeria, Charles Robert Ageron, called the law “the birth 
certificate of the European people of Algeria.”15 More generally, David Prochaska, 
perhaps the first historian to undertake an in-depth archival study focused solely on the 
European community of Algeria, has written that “a ‘new race’ of hybrid Europeans, a 
unified colonial society, began to take shape in the 1890-1914 period.”16 In sum, 
historians agree that by the turn of the century a cohesive unit of colonial settlers had 
emerged that would effectively assert its will until its wholesale expulsion from the 
territory following Algerian independence in 1962.17 
 An examination of missionary work in the decades before and after the law of 
1889, however, reveals that the law did little to attenuate the religiously tinged ethnic 
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that of their anscestral nation. See Andrea L. Smith, Colonial Memory and Postcolonial Europe: Maltese 
Settlers in Algeria and France (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2006). 
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divisions that had plagued the settler community since the conquest in 1830. To be sure, 
the law marked the final step in the progressive abandonment of the military’s policy of 
associating the foreigners to the French state and the acceptance of the civilian 
leadership’s policy of assimilating them to French society more broadly. But the policy 
did little to alter the reality. Far from uniting the settler community, the law of 1889 only 
sowed further and unexpected divisions – divisions that resulted directly from 
disagreements over the place of religion in public discourse and civil society. Rather than 
assimilating the foreign community to French secular sensibilities, the law actually 
empowered these neo-French settlers to attempt to shape Algerian society according to 
their own religious sensibilities.  
 Ultimately, an examination of foreigners and faith in the period of high 
colonialism builds on Ann Stoler’s depiction of a colonial state based not on the rule of 
reason, but rather one that accumulates “a discursive density around issues of sentiment 
and their subversive tendencies, around ‘private’ feelings and their political 
consequences.”18 At the same time, this analysis complicates Stoler’s portrayal in two 
significant ways. First, it shows that such colonial governmentality did not only 
necessitate a policing of relationships that blurred the lines between indigènes and 
Europeans and the métis offspring such relationships threatened to produce. Rather, the 
colonial state relied equally on surveillance of the nature of intra-European relationships 
and daily behavior that often had little or nothing to do with France’s conquered colonial 
subjects. Secondly, this analysis inserts faith and religiosity as sentiments that, in colonial 
Algeria at least, held a subversive potential that was in some ways similar to that of 
                                                
18 Ann Laura Stoler, Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 58. 
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deviant or otherwise non-normative sexualities. Faith too, like sexuality, turned out to be 
a “dense transfer point for relations of power.”19  
 
Faith, Foreigners and the Law of 1889 
In the years leading up to the law of 1889, the government reluctantly tolerated foreign or 
unauthorized priests because it did not have enough French priests to serve all the new 
villages that popped up throughout Algeria. Even after the colonial regime applied the 
metropolitan law dispersing Jesuits to Algeria on 30 October 1880, many foreign Jesuit 
priests stayed in Algeria to work as individual missionaries or, where possible, as 
members of the secular clergy, often with the benefit of state salaries.20  The use of 
foreign priests proved especially necessary for the department of Oran, where foreign 
settlers continued to outnumber French ones. As late as 1891 the department counted 
98,724 French citizens to 102,453 Spanish nationals, not including the substantial number 
of Italian and Maltese settlers.21  
 The lack of priests both threatened to unravel the ties that bound colonial society 
together and to leave settlers in what church leaders described as a state of uncivilized 
savagery. In March 1882, the bishop of Oran asked the minister of cults to pay for more 
parish priests, as “the new European cities that appear every day do not have priests to 
serve them.”22 The bishop tied the need for priests to the future of the colony by claiming 
that “this state of spiritual abandon is one of the causes that contributes the most to 
                                                
19 Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol. I, 103. 
20 CAOM 1U/106. Letter from the governor general to the prefect of Oran, 14 October 1880. The decree 
dispersing the Jesuits in Algeria on 30 October 1880 applied to the territory the metropolitan decree of 29 
March 1880. Neither decree affected the Jesuits as individual actors but only as members of a congregation. 
21 Jean-Jacques Jordi, Les espagnols en Oranie, 1830-1914: histoire d’une migration (Montpellier: 
Collection Africa Nostra, 1986), 26. 
22 AN F19/2551. Letter from Bishop Etienne to the minister of public instruction and cults, 29 March 1882. 
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discourage the colonists…I have heard them state loudly that if they had foreseen this 
deplorable situation, they would have never come to Algeria.”23 As late as 1894, there 
still remained 87 villages without parish priests, and the archbishop of Algeria warned 
that the colonists who came from Europe did not want “to live and die without the aid of 
a priest.”24 After failing to make headway with the minister of cults, he begged the 
Propagation de la Foi to provide priests for the colonists. “This situation,” he warned, “is 
1,000 times more trying than that of the most wretched missionaries who live amongst 
the savages and barbarians of all the continents.”25 Without the aid of parish priests, far 
away from the culture of the metropole, settlers themselves threatened to succumb to 
barbarism. 
 It was such a state of affairs that led the government to allow one such Italian 
Jesuit to continue to receive a salary for his services in the villages of Mers-el-Kebir, 
Tamzourah, and Arbal in the Oran department. At some point in 1884, however, the 
government had ceased to pay this Father Pollaci, telling him:  
 You have manifested overtly hostile sentiments to France and its institutions. You 
 travel to the villages of Oran…where under pretext of doing missionary work you 
 incite against us your compatriots the Italians...You have aroused the fanaticism 
 of the Italians of Mers-el-Kebir to the point of having them beat each other in 
 expiation (coups de discipline) in the chapel with the doors shut.26 
 
Pollaci defended himself from each of these accusations in a letter to the prefect of Oran 
on 15 February 1886. He admitted that he “said publically that today it is no longer 
permitted to speak of Jesus Christ,” but he asked how the government could interpret 
                                                
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Archives of the Propagation de la Foi, Fonds Lyon G9. Letter from the archbishop of Algeria to the 
prefect of the Propagation, 30 January 1894. 
26 AN F19/5836. Father Pollaci quotes the accusations against him in a letter to the prefect of Oran, 15 
February 1886.   
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such a statement as inciting the Italians against the French. He further blamed an 
“impious press” for trying to have him removed by claiming wrongly that he hated the 
Republic. 
 Whereas the prefect accused Pollaci of arousing the “fanaticism” of his 
parishioners, Pollaci portrayed himself as a civilizer and claimed that he worked to 
actively rid his parishioners of religious superstitions. Indeed, he readily conceded to 
their so-called fanaticism, asking why the French should fear “these poor Italian fishers, 
occupied day and night with their fish, no matter how great their fanaticism is.”27 He also 
admitted that he directed them to beat each other while inside his chapel to atone for their 
sins. He explained these actions by writing that: 
 For the French it is out of fanaticism that I want to give these disciplinary blows 
 in the church, but for the Italians it is not so. The Italians are used to doing and 
 seeing this in their country…If the Italians want to give disciplinary blows to each 
 other, what is there in this that is hostile to France?28 
 
Pollaci explained that he intended the beatings to break the Italians of the superstitious 
habit of “going to consult the Moor, the Moresque, the Jew to learn the cause of their 
despairs.” Apparently the Italian settlers sought to improve their fortunes by taking 
potions from indigenous healers. “With these people, ignorant to the point of believing in 
this type of sorcery,” Pollaci added, “there is no other means of wholeheartedly 
renouncing these acts of superstition.”29 
 In this instance the foreigners and the foreign priest proved a threat on two 
accounts. First, the prefect saw the Italians as posing a potential political danger to 
French rule; and he feared the foreign priest only worked to exacerbate this danger. 
                                                
27 Ibid. 
28 AN F19/5836. Letter from Pollaci to the prefect of Oran, 15 February 1886.   
29 Ibid. 
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Second, by their superstition the Italian settlers threatened to erase entirely the line that 
supposedly divided European colonizer from indigenous colonized to the point that the 
former actually sought out the latter for spiritual and temporal guidance. Whereas both 
the prefect and the priest saw this crossing of racial boundaries as dangerous and an act of 
“fanaticism,” the prefect saw the priest’s reaction to it as equally dangerous. Pollaci thus 
failed to fulfill either of the primary purposes that justified allotting him a state salary. He 
did not cultivate the Italians’ loyalty to the French state just as he did not provide them 
with any sort of moral values that would assimilate them to French civilization. Indeed, it 
was this fear that a priest could “turn his compatriots” against the French – morally, 
culturally, and politically – that contributed in large part to the adoption of the law of 
1889. 
 When the law did arrive, however, it did little to overcome these divisions. In 
1895, six years after the law’s passage, officials continued to worry that foreign priests 
manipulated foreign settlers for their own ends.30 In the village of Bou Sfer in the Oran 
department one Father Pomarès, a priest of Spanish origin (though now a naturalized 
Frenchman), drew numerous complaints from the village mayor, who alleged that 
Pomarès had “occupied himself with politics and incited hostility towards local 
functionaries.”31 The mayor also accused the priest of granting asylum to Spaniards 
expelled from Algeria and of preaching in Spanish rather than French, even when French 
parishioners attended mass. In October 1895, the bishop of Oran sent his vicar general to 
                                                
30 In this argument, colonial officials adopted and adapted a widespread accusation in metropolitan France 
that, if French women gained suffrage, they would vote entirely according to the directives of their parish 
priests, and thus against the Republic. There is perhaps a connection here between the feminization and 
demonization of religion in France and the feminization, or de-masculinization, of the non-French 
community in Algeria. For feminization of religion in France see, among many works, Carline Ford, 
Divided Houses: Religion and Gender in Modern France (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005). 
31 AN F19/5922. Transcript of the inquiry conducted by Vicar General Lafumat, 3 October 1895.  
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conduct an inquiry, during which he collected 44 depositions from among the town’s 
inhabitants. The prelate concluded that the charges had little foundation and came only 
from the mayor and a local notable, the village doctor. In one of the depositions, an 
inhabitant reported that “if you were to put in Bou Sfer a priest who did not speak 
Spanish the complaints would not cease to rain down on the prefect and the bishop. This 
priest would find it impossible to work, and he would remain no more than 15 days.”32 As 
a result of this inquiry, the bishop went against the wishes of the French mayor and chose 
to keep the Spanish priest in the village. The prefect accepted this decision to appease the 
Spanish inhabitants of Bou Sfer. 
 By June 1896, however, the problem had not gone away. The mayor again wrote 
to the prefect and accused Pomarès of chanting in the public square, “Long live Spain, 
down with France!”33 The prefect suggested to the governor general that they conduct 
another inquiry, this time led by a secular official, rather than a member of the bishop’s 
council. The prefect wrote that “whatever the explanations given for the attitude of 
Monsieur Pomarès, one cannot deny that as a freshly naturalized Frenchman he remains 
Spanish at heart.”34 The prefect feared that when surrounded by so many of his 
compatriots the priest felt himself freer to express his “anti-French ideas and vengeance 
against the mayor.”35 The letter from the prefect sufficiently worried the governor general 
so that it caused him to pen an anxious letter to the minister of interior in Paris. On 15 
September 1896 the governor warned the minister that “Pomarès occupies himself with 
                                                
32 Ibid. 




questions incompatible with his ministry, notably during the elections.”36 He added the 
now familiar refrain that the priest “remains a Spaniard at heart, despite his French 
naturalization, and will inspire in his compatriots a hatred for our authority.”37  
 The equation of Spanish priests with anti-French sentiments in Algeria resulted in 
part from the vastly different trajectories in church-state relations underway in 
metropolitan France and Spain. Just as the French Third Republic had defeated its 
royalist enemies and begun to consolidate its secular institutions, republicans in Spain 
found themselves on the defensive. In 1874, a Bourbon restoration overthrew Spain’s 
republican government and scrapped its secular-minded constitution of 1873. The new 
conservative constitution of 1876 restored Roman Catholicism as the official religion of 
Spain. As a result of these diametrically opposed religious paths, French civilian leaders 
in Algeria saw Spanish priests and Spanish settlers as a direct threat to the republican 
government.38 At the same time, Spanish priests looked admiringly in the direction of 
Spain as its conservative leadership set about constructing its own religious modernity 
(one that would culminate in the ascension to power of Francisco Franco in 1939).39  
 The situation remained threatening in the department of Oran in particular, where 
as late as 1897 the ethnically French population still constituted a minority of the overall 
European population in 43 of the 100 communes that comprised the department.40 On 2 
September 1898 a local notable in the town of Mers-el-Kebir wrote to the minister of 
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38 For the birth, rise, and defeat of radical anticlericalism in nineteenth-century Spain see Patrick Foley, 
“But What About the Faith? Catholicism and Liberalism in Nineteenth-Century Spain,” Faith and Reason 
(Winter 1990). 
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cults to inform him that the 373 electors in the village of Mers-el-Kebir included only 74 
French voters, compared to 216 Neapolitans and 83 Spaniards. He warned the minister 
that “the Crémieux decree [which granted French nationality to Algeria’s Jewish 
population] is a great danger, but the law of ‘89 is also a source of serious peril.”41 Not 
only did the law of 1889 allow “foreigners” to exert their political will over Frenchmen, 
but these foreigners were “almost all fanatics who do not recognize any authority except 
for clerical authority [and] they will only consult with the priest for their electoral 
votes.”42 If “comparison is always both a strategic and a political act,” the village notable 
in this instance used the method of comparison to highlight the dangerous consequences 
that neo-French colonists posed to French colonial rule.43 
 The issue had geopolitical implications as well. The city notable reminded the 
minister that Italy had never desired to recognize the naturalization of its subjects abroad. 
“In the case that we go to war with Italy,” he wrote, “these children of foreign origin will 
not respond to their call [to serve the French army].”44 He noted that Mers-el-Kebir would 
very likely serve as a port of war in the near future, and yet one “administered by the 
faithful subjects of Umberto who only obey orders emanating from a priest.”45 Less than 
a month later, the mayor of Mers-el-Kebir wrote to the prefect to warn that the local 
priest continued “to use his pulpit and confessional to make political accusations against 
                                                
41 AN F19/5922. Letter from Pierre Ruffie, “propriétaire,” to the minister of cults, 2 September 1898. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Stoler, Along the Archival Grain, 170. 
44 AN F19/5922. Letter from Pierre Ruffie to the minister of cults, 2 September 1898. In 1873, the minister 
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45 AN F19/5922. Letter from Pierre Ruffie to the minister of cults, 2 September 1898. 
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the government and he is supported in this sad labor by the anti-French population.”46 He 
further alerted the prefect that if the administration did not intervene “the French element 
will disappear entirely from this commune” – the prefect underlined this phrase when he 
forwarded the letter to the governor general.47 Nearly a decade after the law of 
naturalization, two years before the turn of the century, and slightly more than a decade 
until the outbreak of World War I, the fear of foreign priests and their influence over 
foreign settlers had grown to the point that officials perceived them as threatening to 
undermine French rule entirely. 
 
The Salésiens de Don Bosco in Oran (1891-1904) 
These anxieties coalesced around the Catholic missionary congregation known as the 
Salésiens de Don Bosco, which arrived in Oran in 1891. The rigorous persecution and 
intense surveillance directed towards the Salésiens reveals that, despite the famous claim 
by Léon Gambetta to the contrary, metropolitan anticlerical laws could very much 
constitute items for export.48 The reality of the situation better matches that described by 
historian Claude Prudhomme, who observed that “the metropolitan vision of an imperial 
France as an object of a uniform policy in matters of religion does not correspond to the 
extraordinary diversity of the colonial world.”49 Even within a single colonial territory, 
not all congregations received equal attention, surveillance, and persecution. The 
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obsession over the Salésiens stemmed directly from their Italian background and their use 
of both Spanish and Italian priests.  
 The government’s surveillance over the Salésiens and their followers reveals a 
colonial state that both possessed an insatiable will to knowledge and continued to fail in 
its quest to obtain such knowledge, which remained fragmented, disordered, and 
insecure. In reality, as Stoler has reminded us, “colonial regimes were neither monolithic 
nor omnipotent.”50 Throughout this time period, the state could never ascertain exactly 
how many Salésiens were foreign, French, or neo-French; the same failure held true for 
the identity of the Salésiens’ followers as well. Indeed, after the law of 1889, officials 
remained dogged by confusion over what it even meant to be French or foreign. The 
government’s very obsession over its own instability, however, only increased its desire 
to classify and control the Salésiens and their supposedly foreign followers. 
 French Catholic congregations in Algeria, meanwhile, actually saw their fortunes 
stabilize in the 1880s and 90s. The Filles de la Charité, Soeurs Trinitaires, and Frères des 
Ecoles Chrétiennes all continued to work relatively undisturbed in this period.51 The 
differing fortunes of the French congregations and the Salésiens are best revealed in the 
                                                
50 Frederick Cooper and Ann Stoler, “Introduction,” in Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a 
Bourgeois World, edited by Stoler and Cooper (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997). For more 
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respective public responses to their use of orphan labor. In 1885, the sisters of the Filles 
de la Charité rented a new four-story building in Algiers where they directed six classes 
and a nursery for 500 to 600 children. They also oversaw a workshop (ouvroir) for 60 
students in Algiers that provided “a source of great profit for the house.”52 In the village 
of Boghat as well the sisters used money earned from the products of their orphan-
workshops to fund their own private school. These establishments won the support, or at 
least the tacit consent, of colonial authorities and the press. The workshops of the 
Salésiens, meanwhile, only provoked accusations that they employed orphans for their 
own profit and undercut the sales of the skilled laborers of Oran.53 
 Founded in Turin, Italy, in 1873, the Salésiens came to Algeria in 1891 after the 
bishop of Oran invited them to open a primary and secondary school as well as an 
orphanage in the city of Oran. The congregation’s superior, Don Rua, admitted that “no 
land would be better suited by its standing, the ease of its relations with Europe, its 
climate, its customs, its language, to become a sort of garden of acclimation [to Africa], a 
practical novitiate for future missionaries.”54 On 1 January 1891, seven Salésien priests 
led by their French visiting superior Charles Bellamy arrived in the city of Oran. Unlike 
previous missionary societies, the Salésiens from the outset planned to focus primarily on 
the European population of Oran. In the words of Bellamy: 
 We have not come here as explorers – the time has passed – nor as tourists – the 
 time has not yet come – but as converters! Because this Algerian people, a mix of 
 so many peoples, these French of all nations – ultra civilized in the natural sense 
                                                
52 FC 27/22. Sister Salzani’s notes on her visit to the central house of Algiers, 8 September 1896. 
53 To be sure, the sisters likely encountered less opposition because female orphans who learned sewing and 
needlework did not provide competition to male skilled laborers. Rebecca Rogers has recounted how a 
secular teacher in the 1850s taught indigenous girls the skill of weaving and sold their textiles throughout 
Europe for a great profit. See Rogers, A Frenchwoman’s Imperial Story: Madame Luce in Nineteenth-
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54 CAOM 1U/106. Charles Bellamy, “Les Oeuvres salésiennes d’Oran,” 12 November 1895. 
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 of the word – has the greatest need to be converted to a true Christian life. Our 
 mission here is not to evangelize the savage peoples of the earth, but to…save 
 from damnation these civilized people who risk being submerged in a cloak of 
 false religions and superstitions.55 
 
The Salésiens thus arrived with their own civilizing mission and felt that their multi-
national character, and especially their Italian origins, rendered them particularly suitable 
to ministering to the diverse European settlers of Algeria.  
 Notably, however, although the Salésiens’ mission to civilize still envisioned a 
society in which civilization entailed Christianity, the stated object of their proselytism 
was not the lapsed Catholic or the anticlerical, but rather the practicing Catholic whose 
knowledge of Catholic orthodoxy remained tenuous and whose religious practices had 
begun to merge with those of France’s colonized subjects. This fear that living in close 
proximity to native Algerians would create a form of syncretic religious practice only 
echoes the Italian priest’s accusation, described above, that his Italian parishioners had 
begun to consult native sorcerers and healers. As such, the blurring of religious 
boundaries in Algeria perhaps constitutes a more widespread phenomenon of the 
“decivilizing mission” described by historian Owen White in colonial Timbuktu.56 White 
recounts the story of a Père Blanc missionary, Auguste Dupuis, who adopted the dress 
and customs of members of the Muslim Songhay society and who eventually changed his 
name to Dupuis-Yakouba, indicating his dual identity as at once French and African. 
Although the Catholic colonists described here likely did not challenge the racial and 
religious hierarchy to such an extreme extent, the fact that they threatened to constitute a 
mass movement only heightened the anxieties of colonial officials and likely helped 
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convince these officials to allow the Salésiens an initial foothold in Algeria – an act they 
would come to regret.  
 Successive bishops of Oran as well proved valuable patrons for the Salésiens. In 
1891, Bishop Géraud Soubrier secured for them the use of the old civil court building in 
the center of town on the Rue Ménerville. The government had previously slated the 
structure for demolition and upon arrival Bellamy found it “in a state of disrepair.” Still, 
he noted that the space received plenty of light and fresh air and he and his fellow 
missionaries immediately kneeled in the courtyard to pray for the criminals condemned 
during the building’s previous incarnation. Within a few months the congregation 
officially opened the Oratoire de Saint-Louis, the first Christian secondary school for 
boys in the city of Oran since the expulsion of the Jesuits in 1880. In its first year, 
enrollment reached 50 students.57 By 1899 the school taught 150 elementary-level 
students, 22 secondary-level students in Latin studies (en route to ecclesiastical training), 
and an additional 130 students who came from the lay schools to attend the Salésiens’ 
youth club (patronage des écoliers).58 The establishment also had its own chapel that 
provided religious services for adults, including catechism classes in French, Spanish, 
and Italian. Finally, the Salésiens opened an outreach program for soldiers (foyer du 
soldat) that provided access to a library and mailroom. 
 In January 1893 the Salésiens opened a second school, the Oratoire de Jésus-
Adolescent, in the neighboring town of Eckmühl, situated on the vast plateau that 
overlooks Oran and the Mediterranean. A local widow donated the plot of land, which 
included groves of olive trees that allowed the missionaries to supplement their meager 
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58 CAOM 1U/106. Report by the chief of police of the first arrondisement of Oran, 20 October 1899. 
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income.59 Within a few years, the Salésiens also opened a boarding school (pensionnat) 
and an orphanage that provided orphans with training in skilled labor, especially 
carpentry. The school counted 41 children at the elementary level, 14 at the secondary 
level, and 76 not yet of school age.60 The boarding school admitted free of tuition 
students in “poverty or abandoned [but who had] an undoubted morality,” while 
wealthier families paid what they could afford. According to Father Bellamy most 
students paid nothing and very few paid the maximum tuition.  
 The congregation raised a portion of its funds from donations, but the majority 
came from selling products made by the students and orphans in the apprentice 
workshops (ouvroirs).61 The boarding school at Eckmühl aimed specifically to impart a 
trade to orphans and poor children who, “left to idleness, become a danger to the 
colony.”62 To this end, local artisans or skilled Salésiens helped train apprentices 
primarily in carpentry, but also in blacksmithing, tailoring, cobbling, and locksmithing. 
The Salésiens granted children weekly awards in equipment, clothes, linens or even cash 
for the completion of finished products. They also directed the students to set any cash 
awards aside as savings to use only after graduation. In order to graduate with a worker’s 
diploma (diplôme d’ouvrier), students presented a masterwork to a jury composed of 
skilled artisans from Oran.63 
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 By 1893 the number of Salésiens in Oran had risen to 28, and as their number 
increased so did their public notoriety. Despite their success, the Salésiens began to court 
controversy among certain politicians, organs of the press, and even secular clergy. Such 
conflict occurred for four primary reasons. First, many settlers accused the Salésiens of 
harboring “foreigners” and of imparting a non-French education to their students and 
orphans. Two-thirds of the Salésiens’ students in 1892 came from either Spanish or 
Italian families, and although the law of 1889 rendered these children French citizens 
upon their age of majority, the republican press continued to identify these children as 
foreigners.64 Second, most of the French children who attended the Salésiens’ schools – 
and who constituted one-third of the student body – came from French military families. 
The alliance between the military and missionaries continued even after the switch to 
civilian rule, and civilian politicians viewed this alliance with suspicion, which only 
intensified around the time of the Dreyfus affair. Third, many politicians denounced the 
Salésiens for using their workshops to exploit orphans for their own profit and for 
undercutting the labor of Oran’s skilled workers by selling their products at below market 
value. Finally, by opening their own chapel the missionaries incited the jealousy of 
Oran’s secular clergy as the chapel especially attracted a number of “foreign” families 
who had previously attended mass and received sacraments at the larger cathedral of 
Oran. 
 Suspicions over the Salésiens’ alleged foreignness began almost immediately 
upon their arrival. In 1892, an article in the Echo d’Oran contended that “these Salésiens, 
who have for a founder an Italian…are foreign immigrants in Algeria, and they want to 
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impose their will on our fair city of Oran.”65 Similarly, in 1893 an op-ed in the newspaper 
Le Républicain Oranais complained that the congregation includes “a certain number of 
non-naturalized Italian priests.”66 The author encouraged the prefect of Oran to authorize 
intense surveillance over the houses in Oran and Eckmühl, as “these Crispinien priests 
would not hesitate to…send to their compatriots information dangerous to our national 
defense.”67 The writer even went so far as to accuse the prefect of complicity with the 
Salésiens and – in a thinly veiled threat of violence – warned that if the prefect could not 
fulfill his duty then the republican citizens of Oran would expel the Salésiens on their 
own. This accusation that the Salésiens represented a foreign, and thus dangerous, 
element in the Algerian colony only gained momentum as the decade progressed. 
 Further, much like other missionary congregations, the Salésiens too encountered 
opposition from the secular clergy of Oran. On 26 October 1895 the prefect of Oran 
wrote to Bellamy to inform him to “absolutely prohibit access to your chapel to any 
person from outside your congregation.” As the journal l’Union Africaine noted, “the 
[secular] clergy had itself solicited the prefect to shut the chapel” because the chapel had 
begun to take parishioners away from the existing cathedral.68 This attraction stemmed in 
part from the Salésiens’ ability to preach in Spanish to the thousands of Spanish-speaking 
inhabitants who resided in Oran. Moreover, the very next month the local military 
                                                
65 Quoted in: Father Cyprien Bessière, 50 Ans d’Apostolat Salésien en Afrique du Nord: 1891-1941 
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67 Ibid. 
68 Quoted in letter from Charles Bellamy to l’Union Africaine, 12 November 1895. In 50 Ans d’Apostolat 
Salésien en Afrique du Nord: 1891-1941, Deuxième Partie, 7. 
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chaplain convinced the bishop to shut down the Salésiens’ recreational room for local 
soldiers.69 The military chaplain had in the parish his own recreational room that 
welcomed junior officers and soldiers and he saw the Salésiens’ establishment as “a 
serious encroachment on his domain.”70 What is striking here is that the increasingly 
beleaguered Catholic clergy did not close ranks in mutual defense, but rather continued to 
compete with each other as they had done since the conquest of Algeria in 1830. Even as 
late as 1900, missionaries and secular clergy alike saw Algeria as a space in which they 
could pursue professional and personal advancement that remained closed off in the 
metropole. 
To be sure, throughout the 1880s and 90s a wave of anticlericalism overtook 
metropolitan France as well. As we have seen, however, the persecution of Catholics in 
Algeria took different forms. There was little mention in Algeria of Catholicism serving 
as a bastion of monarchism or of the Catholic clergy putting allegiance to the pope over 
the republic. Rather, anticlericalism in Algeria during this period stemmed directly from 
the supposed ties between Catholic clergy and “foreign” settlers and, after 1889, the 
political overtones this allegiance held in towns where the ethnically French population 
constituted a distinct minority. It was this crucial difference that Bellamy failed to grasp 
when he wrote to the prefect of Oran in October 1895 to bemoan that “our society…has 
everywhere in France met with the benevolence of the civil administration [but] we are 
the object of such scorn here in Algeria.”71 Only in Algeria did their alleged foreignness 
connote a danger to French rule, which already rested on the flimsiest of foundations. 
Although numerous Spanish and Italian immigrants worked and lived in France as well, 
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71 CAOM 1U/29. Letter from Charles Bellamy to the prefect of Oran, 30 October 1895. 
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nowhere did they constitute anything like a majority that threatened French political 
power.72 
Bellamy and the Salésiens employed three contradictory arguments to counter the 
accusations against them. At times they contended that their works spread French 
language and culture and thus facilitated the policy of assimilation. At other times, they 
argued that they pursued a policy of association by using foreign priests to cater to the 
particular religious needs of the foreign population and thus ensure that population’s 
loyalty for France.73 Finally, when both these arguments failed, they claimed that 
religious works by nature transcended ethnic and national boundaries. On 30 October 
1895 Bellamy wrote in a letter to the prefect that as “true French missionaries we teach 
all our children the language, history, and love of France.”74 In the same letter, however, 
Bellamy backtracked and admitted:  
 If, in favor of the numerous foreigners who live in our Algerian colony, we 
 welcome into our congregation some priests of their nationality, there is nothing 
 illegal in this. It is rather a means to make foreigners esteem the taste of 
 hospitality that is so liberally practiced in France, and it shows that France knows 
 how to grant to those who come to it seeking aid the liberty to freely and easily 
 practice their religion.75 
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After employing arguments that appealed both to strategies of assimilation and 
association, Bellamy then changed gears entirely. On 16 November 1895, he published a 
letter in Le Petit Africain in which he asserted that like virtue or truth, religious 
congregations “have no fatherland.” He appealed to larger geopolitical sensibilities and 
asked what the minister of the interior would say if foreign governments elsewhere, 
inspired by the comments made in this newspaper, took reprisals and expelled French 
congregations from their territories.76  
 Finally, Bellamy resurrected a strategy used by missionaries before him and 
invoked the danger that persecution of Catholics posed to the larger colonial order of 
things. He wrote to the prefect of the profound “humiliation” he felt when he had to close 
his chapel while at the same time the government actively protected numerous mosques 
in Algeria. He further noted that the governor general had just pledged funds for the 
construction of a grand synagogue in Oran, while the metropolitan government had even 
proposed to construct a grand mosque in Paris itself. Casting himself in the role of 
beleaguered Frenchman, Bellamy demanded to know “why our national pride should 
suffer thus.”77 In a colonial society supposedly based on the monopolization of privilege 
by Europeans, Bellamy hoped to convince the prefect that by extending religious 
freedoms to the indigenous population and offering moral support to their religious 
sensibilities alone the government threatened to turn the colonized/colonizer relationship 
on its head.78 
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 These arguments made little headway, and local authorities and organs of the 
press continued to denounce the Salésiens. After placing restrictions on the 
congregation’s chapel and closing its recreational room for soldiers, the authorities then 
moved to close the Salésiens’ school in Oran. In November the academic inspector 
accused the school of having a “clandestine character and illegal existence,” as many of 
the Salésiens taught without the required license (brevet de capacité).79 By the end of 
1895, the inspector ordered Bellamy to restrict education to orphans alone. A letter from 
the inspector noted that in order to avoid such restrictions Bellamy claimed to no longer 
direct an educational establishment, but that he rather “has become the boss of an 
industrial establishment” and that he continued to lodge all his apprentices near his 
workshops. The inspector did admit that this state of affairs was “perhaps legal.”80 
 Ultimately, the shift from academic education to the teaching of skilled labor 
engendered accusations of a new nature. After four years overseeing carpentry 
workshops, the Salésiens began to appear more as private entrepreneurs than as 
missionary priests. In 1899, Oran’s representative in the Chamber of Deputies, Marcel 
Saint-Germain, alleged that the missionaries capitalized on cheap orphan labor to sell 
their products at a low price, thus undercutting the business of the city’s skilled workers 
and then pocketing the profits for themselves.81 Saint-Germain told the general council of 
Oran, “we must close these workshops, which attract a large clientele and create 
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disastrous competition for skilled workers and middling shop owners.”82 A police report 
from 1899 further noted that “the larger business owners in the city say that the Salésiens 
sell their goods for prices below those considered as official in the world of workers.”83 
Although the Salésiens ran similar workshops throughout France, both the missionaries 
and their opponents readily admitted that only in Oran did such establishments court 
controversy.84  
 The claim that orphan labor threatened the livelihoods of skilled workers resulted 
from class and racial politics peculiar to Algerian society or, as Ann Stoler has argued, 
from the (always unsuccessful) desire to prevent the emergence of an indigent European 
underclass in the colonial world.85 In the city of Oran, however, the imperial hierarchy 
that concerned the French did not – or not so much – involve maintaining the social 
marginalization of the indigenous population; rather it entailed allowing a class of skilled 
French laborers to remain economically superior to their lesser skilled Spanish and Italian 
neighbors. In Oran, these foreign migrants worked almost entirely as fishermen or 
“itinerant day laborers” in the industries of sanitation, construction, land clearance, or 
transportation. As one historian has written, Spanish migrants often arrived with nothing 
but the possessions on their back “so that the French typically referred to them as snails 
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(escargots).”86 The French elite put in considerable effort to maintain such ethnic and 
class distinctions. 
 The law of 1889 only increased French anxiety over the instability of this 
hierarchy and led the colonial administration to establish quotas in fields such as cork 
production that restricted the number of foreigners who could legally work in the 
industry.87 Further, in 1898 the Ligue Algérienne des Travailleurs Français addressed a 
petition to the national assembly in which it called for a special tax on foreign skilled 
laborers and the abrogation of the law of 1889.88 French skilled laborers saw the 
Salésiens’ workshops as yet another manifestation of the “foreign peril” that had allowed 
neo-French settlers in Algeria to encroach on their political and economic supremacy. It 
seems that economic policy towards the foreign population mirrored “the paradoxical 
tendency of colonial policymakers to find order in [the] economic insecurity” of the 
conquered Muslim population, as described by Benjamin Brower – a policy which he 
adds “was profoundly flawed [as it] unleashed a host of social tensions and crises that 
created conditions for conflict.”89 The orphan workshops posed the double threat of both 
lowering the standard of living for French skilled labors and of allowing foreign or neo-
French children to climb the social hierarchy and bridge or even erase the ethnic and 
class divide. At the same time, shuttering the orphanage only antagonized the Salésiens 
and their foreign followers. 
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 For their part, the Salésiens too played on fears of a European, if not French, 
underclass by arguing that their workshops helped the colony by training abandoned 
orphans to work as useful artisans. As Bellamy wrote to the editor of L’Echo d’Oran, the 
workshops inculcated in young workers a respect for labor, property, and religion and 
thus helped orphans “to escape the seductions of vagabondage and all its 
consequences…all too common here in Algeria.”90 Somewhat dubiously, Bellamy also 
claimed the workshops served a patriotic purpose by helping France regain its “former 
supremacy in hand labor that has recently been taken from us by the disastrous 
competition of Germany, England, and Belgium.”91 More realistically, he asked how a 
mere five workshops with 51 apprentices could undercut the labor of a city of 80,000 
people. Rather than competing with the working class, Bellamy wrote, the Salésiens 
actually aided the working class, as the orphans themselves came from lower class 
families. He concluded that the Salésiens desired only “to raise Christian citizens useful 
to France, to Algeria!”92 
 Unsurprisingly, these arguments continued to founder due to the anticlericalism 
and national chauvinism of Oran’s colonial elite. More surprisingly, even self-identified 
French Catholics began to question the loyalty of the Salésiens and other foreign priests 
in Oran. This suspicion soon spread to the Salésiens’ patron, Bishop Géraud Soubrier, 
who had first invited the Salésiens to come to Oran in 1891. This bishop owed his 
appointment entirely to the late archbishop, Cardinal Lavigerie. Since Lavigerie’s death 
in 1892 many commentators had begun to see Soubrier as, unlike Lavigerie, dominated 
                                                





by foreign priests. In August 1898, an article appeared in the journal L’éclair that accused 
the bishop of allowing foreign priests to undermine his authority. The author wrote: 
 These Spanish priests have surrounded [the bishop], suffocated him, suppressed 
 his authority, and when this old man took the route back to the country of his 
 birthplace, he very much resembled a maroon in his own country, chewed up, 
 emptied of all substance so that only his skin remained. 
  
In another example of the “creole medievalism” described by Michelle Warren, the 
author wrote that “the pious convert Clovis” would no longer recognize his realm if he 
returned today to find so many foreigners.93 Though Catholic himself, the author did not 
turn his pen against the anticlerical republic, but rather against anti-French elements 
within the church. He warned his readers that “Spanish monks have disembarked here as 
though in a conquered land and they are impossible to control.”94 He also linked the 
danger specifically to the law of 1889, writing that “many Spanish in Algeria are priests 
or abbés, but they have had to gain naturalization. We must hope that these brave sons of 
El Cid have not considered their entry into the French nation as a simple formality.”95 
Again, rather than assimilating foreigners to French culture, the law of 1889 threatened to 
allow foreigners to exert their own will on ethnically French citizens. 
 The incoming bishop, Monseigneur Cantel, proved equally solicitous toward 
foreign priests. In October 1899 the prefect of Oran asked the bishop to gather the name, 
date and place of birth, and naturalization status for all the priests in his diocese in order 
to ascertain “what measures the government must take to remedy the very preponderant 
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situation of all the foreign priests in the department.”96 The bishop responded, “I have 
given you exact information on this topic and you can see from it that the ‘scandalous 
situation’ in fact does not exist.”97 He counted in Oran eleven priests of Spanish origin, 
six of whom were born in Spain, the others in Oran, all naturalized Frenchmen, to which 
he added one priest born in Naples, one in Syria, two in Metz, and two in Strasbourg 
(though we should take these figures with a grain of salt). “Should we even count these 
last four as foreigners?” the bishop asked, adding that “obviously, it is above all the 
Spanish that you had in mind.”98 Spanish priests in particular incited the anxieties of 
colonial officials as the settlers of Spanish descent continued to outnumber those of 
French descent in the city of Oran.99 
 The bishop defended the use of foreign priests for their ability to spread 
civilization to “savage” foreign colonists. “If some [foreigners] have been named vicars 
in large cities, it is because their services are necessary there, precisely because of their 
knowledge of the Spanish language,” he noted. He assured the prefect that everywhere 
priests gave mass first in French and only afterwards in Spanish, adding:  
 A great number of people, children above all, do not understand this language; so 
 we must use Spanish if we don’t want them to languish in the most complete 
 religious ignorance. Do you not know that in the Midi of France priests preach 
 often in patois? To an even greater extent this practice is necessary among us, 
 where the foreigners are so numerous.100 
 
The bishop’s argument, of course, failed to invoke much sympathy, as at that very 
moment metropolitan policy aimed to root out local patois and replace it with 
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standardized Parisian French.101 Like officials in the metropole, the bishop in Oran hoped 
to lift the Spanish out of ignorance by imparting French culture; unlike them, however, he 
hoped to impart this culture by using a policy of association, rather than assimilation, and 
thus to employ the particular language of the Spanish colonists. 
 
A Tenuous Separation: Applying the Laws of Laïcisation to Algeria 
 
 For all missionary congregations in Algeria, as in France, persecution to varying 
extents was enshrined into law with the so-called lois Combes of 1901 to 1904.102 In 
France, this legislation began with Prime Minister Pierre Waldeck-Rousseau’s law of 1 
July 1901, which required all “associations” to apply to the government for official 
authorization (section III dealt specifically with religious congregations).103 Three years 
later, on 7 July 1904 new Prime Minister Emile Combes drafted a second law more 
explicitly designed “for the suppression of congregationist teaching.”104 The law 
prohibited all members of religious congregations from teaching in France and forcibly 
shut down congregations exclusively devoted to teaching.105 This law dealt with all forms 
of education: primary, secondary, artistic, agricultural, professional, and industrial. 
Nevertheless, if the congregation worked in both teaching and nursing or devoted itself 
strictly to the education of orphans, the law provided enough room for interpretation to 
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allow some of these establishments to stay open.106 On 9 December 1905 a final law 
officially separated Church and State, definitively ending government funding for any 
religious activity.107 
 Claude Prudhomme has written that the laws of 1900-05 did not fundamentally 
alter the status of missionaries in the empire but that they did accelerate a long-standing 
trend of missionaries leaving France to go abroad.108 In Algeria, however, all religious 
congregations eventually felt the force of these laws, with different congregations 
suffering to different extents. Many congregations – including the Soeurs Trinitaires, the 
Filles de la Charité, and the Frères des Ecoles Chrétiennes – would continue to operate in 
some type of legally recognized capacity, often even in the field of education, up to the 
First World War and beyond. Others, however, were not so lucky. Out of all the 
congregations in Algeria to apply for authorization under the law of 1901, only the 
Salésiens failed at this first hurdle and did not obtain initial legal recognition. Their 
failure stemmed directly from their perceived status as foreigners, even if, as we have 
seen, nearly all the Salésiens had obtained naturalization as French citizens (while their 
visiting superiors in Algeria were all ethnically French).  
 Oissila Saaïdia and Pierre Soumille have recently written that “with the current 
state of our research we cannot say when the law of 1901 was actually applied [in 
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Algeria].”109 Drawing from documents in the French overseas archives and various 
missionary archives, however, I have found that early on the government sought to apply 
the law of 1901 to Algeria. Four months after the law’s application in France, the 
governor general requested all congregations in Algeria to apply for authorization as 
well. A chart drafted by the governor general on 8 October 1901 listed all the 
congregations that needed to apply and included notes on whether or not to grant 
authorization.110 The archives of the Soeurs Trinitaires reveal that in 1901 the sisters 
applied for authorization and the minister of interior informed their superior in Oran that 
he would “leave us to continue peacefully in our work.”111 Indeed, the government also 
agreed to grant authorization to allow the Frères des Ecoles Chrétiennes, the Filles de la 
Charité, and the Lazarists all to continue working in Algeria for the time being.  
 Despite their continued difficulties with the colonial government, the Salésiens 
too set about applying for authorization to comply with the law. On 10 December 1901, a 
special report written jointly by the governor general and the Special Commissioner on 
the Safety of Railroads and Bridges urged the government to reject the Salésiens’ 
application. Although it noted that these missionaries had a “secret role of 
[disseminating] religious propaganda” in both their workshops and youth clubs, it 
focused more on matters of national origin than religion.112 The authors warned that a 
foreign congregation with a large number of foreign personnel 
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 constitutes a danger because of the spirit in which they instruct children…a large 
 number of whom are of Spanish origin, but destined to become French 
 subjects…and yet these children are under the authority of non-French teachers 
 and are perhaps poorly prepared to receive the benefits of the law of 
 naturalization.113  
 
Finally, the report noted that “the entire city of Oran does not fail to complain” about the 
competition of the Salésiens’ workshops. Again, only the Salésiens, of all the 
congregations in France and abroad, encountered such accusations of providing 
competition to lay skilled laborers.114 To be sure, the workshops run by the Filles de la 
Charité probably failed to encounter opposition because they taught the trades of sewing 
and needlework to orphaned and poor girls, and thus did not present competition to male 
skilled laborers, as the Salesiens’ woodworking shops did. 
 The Salésiens initially found an unlikely ally in the form of the municipal council 
of Oran. As part of the 1901 law, the government invited local municipal councils to give 
their opinion on whether to grant authorization to congregations that worked within the 
councils’ jurisdiction. On 20 January 1902, the municipal council of Oran opened its 
meeting to discuss authorization of the Salésiens. Surprisingly, the once-anticlerical 
council expressed qualified support for the Salésiens. Various councilmen noted that the 
Salésiens offered a useful service by imparting trades to orphans, and one councilman 
stated that, “leaving the religious question to the side,” he supported granting 
authorization to such a “humanitarian” association. Another councilman added that 
seeing as “the government which voted on the law of 1901 did not consult the municipal 
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councils then, [I] do not see why it is consulting them today.”115 In the end, the council 
opted to waive its right and not to express any opinion whatsoever. 
As later documents and debates make clear, the municipality’s support for the 
congregation stemmed from widespread anti-Semitism amongst the newly elected 
councilors. Historians have documented the violent wave of anti-Semitism that swept 
Algeria in the period between 1896 and 1903. This outbreak stemmed in part from the 
economic depression that hit Algeria in the 1890s and it combined with calls to revoke 
the Crémieux decree of 1870 – which many Europeans saw as unfairly favoring Jewish-
owned businesses to the detriment of their own – culminating at the time of the Dreyfus 
Affair in France.116 In the 1890s, a number of anti-Jewish leagues appeared in the 
territory and many called for full-scale independence from the metropole.117 In 1898, 
Algerian voters elected the leader of the anti-Jewish league of Algiers, Max Régis, as 
mayor, while in the same year the notorious anti-Semite Edouard Drumont won election 
to the Chamber of Deputies for the department of Algiers.118 In the city of Algiers alone, 
1898 saw two Jewish citizens murdered, 87 Jewish-owned businesses ransacked, and the 
town’s synagogue entirely destroyed.119 Although the anti-Semitic campaign was led by 
the French elite, they often appealed to, as one historian has noted, the “more pronounced 
                                                
115 CAOM 1U/29. Minutes of the meeting of the municipal council of Oran, 20 January 1902. 
116 For the Dreyfus Affair in France see Martin Johnson, The Dreyfus Affair: Honor and Politics in the 
Belle Epoque (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999). 
117 This call for seccession actually created its own short-lived political party, referred to as the Parti 
Cubain, in reference to the creole-led Cuban independence movement of 1898. See Marc-Olivier Gavois, 
“La perception du pouvoir métropolitain par les Européens d’Algérie,” Cahiers d’histoire. Revue d’histoire 
critique 85 (2001): 87. 
118 See Thénault, “1881-1918: l’apogée de l’Algérie française et les débuts de l’Algérie algérienne,” in 
Histoire de l’Algérie à la Période Coloniale, 163-4. 
119 Didier Guignard, “Les crises en trompe l’oeil de l’Algérie française des années 1890,” in Histoire de 
l’Algérie à la Période Coloniale, 223. 
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religious anti-Semitism of the Spanish and Italians” to gain support for their cause [my 
italics].120 
In Oran this campaign sparked a brief and incongruous alliance of anticlerical and 
anti-Semitic French “republicans” with Catholic and anti-Semitic Spanish clergy and 
colonists.121 Guignard recounts that republican politicians simply used anti-Semitism as a 
political tactic and that they quickly abandoned it after it had served its purpose.122 This 
temporary alliance helps explains the municipal council’s lack of hostility toward the 
Salésiens and their religious works. In 1902, the prefect of Oran contended that the 
bishop, all his clergy, the seminary, and the Salésien missionaries voted in the municipal 
elections for a mayor who nonetheless passed himself off as at times an anticlerical 
republican.123 The prefect later alleged that the councilors who rose to power on an anti-
Semitic platform had received loans from the bishop of Oran as well as many members of 
the local Catholic clergy, including the Salésiens. The municipal council actually hoped 
to remove the prefect of Oran and enlisted the Salésiens to tell their parishioners not to 
vote for his reelection. As a countermeasure, the prefect enlisted other inhabitants of 
Oran to agitate against the Salésiens and to push the council to reject their authorization. 
In the end, the council spited the prefect and (half-heartedly) repaid the support of the 
                                                
120 Guignard, “Les crises en trompe l’oeil de l’Algérie française des années 1890,” 220. 
121 Historian Jean-Jacques Jordi has written that, between July 1901 and May 1904, “the naturalized 
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122 Guignard, 221. 
123 AN F19/2551. Letter from prefect of Oran to the minister of interior, 17 May 1902. 
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Salésiens by refusing to vote on their authorization whatsoever, knowing that, regardless 
of its vote, the application would be rejected in the French Senate.124 
Numerous police memoranda and letters from the prefect further reveal that a 
number of Catholic clergymen supported anti-Semitic candidates and attempted to rally 
their “foreign” parishioners behind their electoral cause. On 11 May 1902 a confidential 
police report recounted that a Spanish priest used his pulpit to encourage his Spanish 
parishioners to vote for the church’s candidates in the coming elections. On the same day, 
a police spy reported overhearing the same priest tell a friend: “Down with the Jews.”125 
One month later a second police report noted that many local clergy had encouraged their 
parishioners to vote against the freemasons and for the “anti-Jewish” candidates of the 
church. The report claimed that these voters were nearly all neo-French, or naturalized 
citizens of foreign origin.126 Similarly, on 17 May 1902, the prefect of Oran wrote that the 
new bishop, “although chosen by a republican government from among the priests of 
Paris, has given very strong support for the religious congregations.”127 He stated that the 
bishop used the religiosity of the Spanish to further his own political ends by encouraging 
his clergy and their followers “to take part in all the elections, even the municipal ones, 
and give overt support to the anti-Jewish candidates, with whom they have very quickly 
formed an alliance.”128 
On 3-4 July 1903, the French Senate held its official hearing to decide whether or 
not to grant the Salésiens authorization. The debate’s significance lies in the particular 
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125 CAOM 1U/107. Secret police report of 11 May 1902. 
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imperial dangers of allowing foreign missionaries in a French territory. Although the 
hearing covered the Salésiens’ houses in France and Algeria, commentators on both sides 
readily admitted the issue primarily concerned the establishments in Oran alone. Not only 
was the Senate’s argument to reject authorization led by now-senator of Oran Marcel 
Saint-Germain, but the Salésiens’ spokesman, M. Bérenger, also began by noting that 
while seven Salésiens who worked in France did not possess French citizenship, “in 
reality this [concern] is really about the house in Oran.”129 Bérenger further noted that 
while the Salésiens ran a number of orphan workshops in France, “it is only the house in 
Oran that is complained about. Hardly anything is mentioned of the houses in Paris, or 
Dinan. But in Oran the dossier of this commission is full of a number of allegations…that 
this school presents the most serious competition to commerce.”130 The handful of 
Salésiens of foreign origin in metropolitan France did not figure at all in the debate to 
grant them authorization. 
The Salésiens had support in the form of conservative senator Gustave de 
Lamarzelle, who expressed surprise that deputies from Algeria in particular refused to 
accept the French identity of Salésien priests naturalized through the law of 1889. “The 
number of these neo-French is considerable,” he asserted, asking if “it is not very 
dangerous to tell them that the naturalization they have acquired…does not give them a 
quality of Frenchness equal to our own?” If this denial showed a lack of prudence in 
France, he added, “is it not even more imprudent in Algeria?” Lamarzelle argued that by 
denying the Frenchness of the naturalized Salésiens, their opponents also denied the 
Frenchness of all the naturalized foreigners in Algeria, and thus only contributed to 
                                                




sowing these foreigners’ disloyalty for the French government. He contended that as 
naturalized foreigners who spoke French, Italian, and Spanish, the Salésiens more than 
anyone else could help integrate neo-French settlers into the French community.131 
Lamarzelle thus argued for the Salésiens’ utility by appealing to the increasingly bygone 
policy of colonial association for the foreign population. 
It thus comes as little surprise that on 5 July 1903 the Senate ruled by a vote of 
158 to 100 not to grant authorization to the Salésiens’ establishments in Oran. This ruling 
stemmed in part from the Salésiens’ continued refusal to accept and further the policy of 
assimilation that the colonial government had worked so hard to enact. On 1 September 
1903 the colonial authorities ordered the Salésiens to evacuate their establishments at 
Eckmühl and at the Rue Ménerville. When the missionaries refused to leave their schools 
the police arrived on 16 October to arrest them. A number of people attended the ensuing 
trial and, as one of the missionaries later recalled, “protests in favor of the Salésiens 
became so vehement that the judge threatened to force the audience to leave the room.” 
When the judge ultimately upheld the ruling and fined each of the priests 25 francs, the 
crowd began to chant, “long live the Salésiens, down with the three points [i.e. the 
freemasons].”132 After the appeals court of Algiers upheld the ruling on 7 June 1904, the 
government seized the Salésiens’ property and put it up for sale on public auction.  
 
Conclusion: After the Dispersion 
Unlike the Salésiens, the other congregations examined here all won initial 
authorization to continue working in Algeria. To be sure, this authorization would prove 
only a temporary respite before the application of the 1904 law began the long process of 
                                                
131 Ibid. 
132 Quoted In 50 Ans d’Apostolat Salésien en Afrique du Nord: 1891-1941, Deuxième Partie, 21-2. 
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closing missionary schools throughout Algeria. Nevertheless, many of these 
congregations would continue to work with the government’s consent with orphans, in 
hospitals, or even in rare cases as congregationist teachers. The law stipulated that all 
teaching congregations must evacuate their schools within a ten-year period; in a handful 
of instances missionary schools in Algeria continued to operate until 1914, when a decree 
from the minister of interior revoked the law of 1904 in order to allow secular teachers to 
report to the warfront. In Philippeville, this decree arrived the day before the Frères des 
Ecoles Chrétiennes had planned to leave their school and open another in Casablanca. 
Not only did the city reinstate them, but for the first time since 1881 it provided them 
with salaries from the municipal budget.133 Elsewhere, the Filles de la Charité continued 
to direct three schools in the department of Algiers – at Miséricorde, Cité Bugeaud and 
Bab-el-Oued – until on the eve of expulsion in 1914 they too “were saved by the Great 
War.”134 The Soeurs Trinitaires also directed a handful of private schools up to the First 
World War and beyond.135 In sum, the secular laws of the metropole proved slightly less 
onerous for congregations in Algeria than for congregations in France.136 
Unauthorized to even exist in Algeria, the Salésiens more than any other 
congregation continued to attract the close attention of colonial officials, who employed 
police spies to gather information on the congregation and report back to the government. 
At the same time, the Salésiens continued to enjoy the support of a large number of 
                                                
133 Archives of the Frères des Ecoles Chrétiennes NL 473(1). Reported in a letter from the FEC director of 
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Oranais youth, most of whom belonged to so-called foreign families. After they failed to 
gain government authorization, all but three Salésiens opted to return to Europe or move 
elsewhere abroad. The law prohibited two or more unauthorized congregationists to 
inhabit the same dwelling, but it could not prohibit two literal brothers, Léon and Cyprien 
Bessière, from doing so. In 1904, the two “ex-Salésiens” and four lay supporters moved 
to a building on 18 Rue de l’Arsenal in Oran and opened a youth club (patronage) 
consisting of 150 of their former students. The club met every Sunday to stage plays that 
reenacted scenes from the Bible or from the lives of saints. These plays were by 
invitation only and gained upwards of 200 attendees, including many members of the 
military as well as a number of city notables.137 
Despite the persecution, the ex-Salésiens continued to see Algeria as a place to 
enact their own version of a religious present, but one that consisted largely of reviving 
an increasingly distant religious past. On 25 January 1906, a local priest purchased the 
Salésiens’ old building on Rue Ménerville and invited the two brothers, plus a third ex-
Salésien who remained in Oran, to work as teachers in his new private school. While not 
explicitly Catholic, the school gave secular education in the daytime and religious 
education in the evening and quickly reached enrollment of 200 students. The priests also 
continued to run the musical Society of Joyous Harmony in Oran. In another example of 
the phenomenon of “creole medievalism,” Cyprien Bessière later recounted that these 
works allowed the ex-Salésiens to “rejoin their ancestors from the Middle Ages” and to 
“practice their faith like Christians of earlier centuries.”138 
                                                
137 CAOM 1U/106. Report by the chief of police regarding the ex-Salésiens, 12 February 1904. 
138 Quoted In 50 Ans d’Apostolat Salésien en Afrique du Nord: 1891-1941, Troisième Partie, 8, 10. 
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The ex-Salésiens continued to rely on the non- or neo-French population in their 
attempt to remake a medieval France in modern Algeria. After the closure of the 
orphanage at Eckmühl, Léon Bessière rented a neighboring villa from the mayor of St 
Denis du Sig, where he opened an auditorium, a gym, a woodworking shop, and a chapel. 
In 1907, a police report noted that the house continued to stage plays, sporting events, 
and musical concerts that attracted as many as 300 people, again by invitation only. The 
workshop employed seven apprentices to build furniture for both religious and private 
establishments and provided crucial income for the cash-strapped ex-Salésiens. The 
report observed that the children in these establishments primarily comprised “young 
men of Spanish or Neapolitan origin.”139 As late as 1909, the chief of police commented 
that Bessière focused his work “above all on people of Spanish and Italian nationality” 
and that the brothers “have thus maintained an incontestable influence…on their old 
students and on the families of those students.”140 
This influence continued to serve as a source of division for the settler population 
and confusion for colonial officials until the eve of the First World War. A police report 
from 1910 stated that the Bessière brothers used their youth club on Rue de l’Arsenal to 
encourage their children, “almost all Spanish or Neapolitan in origin,” to burn school 
textbooks condemned by the clergy. The same report noted: 
The population of many neighborhoods of Oran is in large part of foreign Spanish 
 origin. This group, clerical by tradition, submits without questioning to the 
 influence of the clergy, all the more because the clergy of Oran is in part 
 composed of Spanish priests [the strikethrough is in the original].141 
 
                                                
139 CAOM 1U/29. Police report of 19 February 1907. 
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Algeria, 5 April 1909. 
141 1U/107. Report from the Sûreté Générale to the governor general, 30 November 1909. 
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The language of the report reveals the continuing limits of imperial knowledge, control, 
and classification and the “ambiguous nomenclature” that “cleaves into the conceit that 
more knowledge secures a more durable empire.”142 Despite legislation to the contrary 
and constant surveillance thereafter, the ex-Salésiens continued to ply their trade and the 
reporting officer no longer even knew how to classify their followers. Indeed, as a direct 
and unintended result of the law of 1889 the police struggled to identify exactly who 
constituted the political danger in the territory of Algeria (demonstrated by the 
strikethrough of the word “foreign”).143 Despite nearly a half-century of government 
policy of assimilation and efforts to shape religious sensibilities, the Oranais population 
of Spanish descent continued to practice their religion in their own language. 
 The influence of the Salésiens remained considerable and only increased 
throughout the first half of the twentieth century thanks to the continued support they 
received from the settlers of foreign origin. Léon and Cyprien Bessière would remain in 
Oran until at least 1941, when the latter decided to chronicle his experiences in a 
memoir.144 In this document Cyprien fondly referred to the period between 1901 and 
1914 as “the golden age of our dear society in Oran.”145 It was only after their legal 
dispersion that the remaining Salésiens really began to expand their influence among the 
youth of Oran, an influence that only grew in the interwar years. In his memoir, while 
lamenting the laws of laïcisation, Cyprien included the following passage:  
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 At the very moment I write these lines, I hear that Marshall Pétain, who 
 presides over the reconstruction of France, has…proclaimed the abrogation of the 
 laws of 7 July 1904 and 1 July 1901…Finally, Providence has returned our past to 
 us, or even improved on our past, and justice has smiled upon us…Henceforth the 
 religious congregations will resume their task, in the words of our Head of State, 
 of ‘diffusing and applying these great Christian truths which serve as the base of 
 our civilization.’”146 
 
In 1940, with the fall of the French Third Republic, it appeared that the policies of the 
Vichy regime would finally allow these missionaries to fully implement their own 
version of creole medievalism, and everything that it entailed.147
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The Paradox of Settler Colonialism 
 
 
“Europe’s ambivalent conquests – oscillating between attempts to project outward its 
own ways of understanding the world and efforts to demarcate colonizer from colonized, 
civilized from primitive, core from periphery – made the space of empire into a terrain 
where concepts were not only imposed but also engaged and contested.”1 
-Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question. 
 
 This dissertation has described in detail the lives of Catholic missionaries in 
Algeria between 1830 and 1914. In doing so, it has taken seriously Frederick Cooper’s 
call that scholars focus on the specificity of empire. Cooper urges us to analyze the 
colonies not just as abstract and uniform receptacles for the application of metropolitan 
ideologies. Rather, he calls for a more nuanced study of colonial particularities, where 
power is not just unilaterally applied from above and outside, but rather negotiated, 
contested, and subverted from below and within. At the same time, Cooper at times 
perpetuates the very dichotomies he seeks to break down by viewing such struggles for 
power as occurring between colonial rulers and colonized subjects alone. By applying 
Cooper’s methodology to missionaries, their allies, and their opponents, we can go even 
further in his effort to “reveal the limits of colonial power and define alternative modes of 
living and working in the crevices of authority.”2 These crevices emerged not only in the 
extension of authority over the indigenous population, but also in the equally important 
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attempt to mold the settler population in order to differentiate it from the indigenous 
population. It was within these very crevices that missionaries learned to thrive. They did 
so by posing as potential mechanisms that could transmit relations of power into the tight 
and narrow confines – confines of colonial sentimentalities and subjectivities – that 
colonial authorities had not yet figured out how to penetrate. Because of their very 
existence outside of authority, however, these crevices remained hotly contested and 
missionaries constantly struggled to portray themselves as transmitters rather than 
destabilizers of power. 
 In addition to reconceptualizing the thrust of colonial authority and the sites of 
tension that threatened to destabilize colonial rule, this study has sought to tease out the 
broader implications that an analysis of missionaries holds for the larger history of 
French Algeria on political, social, and cultural levels. Politically, a study of missionaries 
provides a new periodization for the ever-changing legal relationship between civil and 
military authorities in the territory and between France and Algeria as a whole. Socially, 
this analysis reveals much about the wider settler community – about the ambitions that 
led them to migrate to Algeria, the opportunistic nature of their multifaceted relationships 
once there, and the unexpected successes and failures that these relationships engendered 
on the ground. Culturally, a study of missionary work uncovers a colonial society not 
only shaped by racial difference, but one also and equally shaped by religious, ethnic, and 
national differences. Despite the immense effort and resources that went into monitoring 
missionaries and settlers throughout this period, the discourses surrounding all of their 
complicated relationships remained remarkably confused right up to the eve of World 
War I. 
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 The historical trajectory of French Algeria corresponded less to major political 
upheavals in the metropole and legal impositions in the territory than to the particular 
necessities of imperial rule. Similarly, changing political structures in Algeria owed less 
to an evolving relationship between the state and native Algerians and more to the 
continuing need to police a nebulous and always potentially dangerous settler 
community. In the first two decades of the conquest, the appointment of the first two 
bishops of Algiers in 1838 and 1846, respectively, served as the two events that most 
altered and disrupted missionaries’ lives on a daily basis. By keeping our focus on these 
missionaries, religion, and religious education, we see that the Revolution of 1848 did not 
bring missionaries or other settlers under the metropolitan and civilian rule of law. Rather 
missionaries and settlers continued to rely on personal patronage of bishops or military 
generals, and this reliance held implications for every European child, parent, or civilian 
official in the colony. In fact, the political decision that had the most impact on European 
families in Algeria in this period was the decision not to apply the Falloux educational 
laws of 1850 to the European community of Algeria. We can even say that this failure did 
not result from an actual decision, but rather from the inability of metropolitan and 
colonial officials to even agree on how to frame the question. This inability stemmed 
from officials’ continued uncertainty over how to govern the settler population, and it 
further reveals the ad hoc and entirely spontaneous nature of imperial governance. 
 The next significant change for missionaries in Algeria arrived not with the fall of 
the Second Empire in 1870, but with the arrival of Archbishop Lavigerie and the circular 
of Governor General MacMahon in 1867. By centralizing religious authority around 
himself and his congregation Lavigerie disrupted the extralegal networks of patronage 
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that missionaries had relied on for success during the preceding forty years. The rise of 
the Third Republic did little to change this relationship. On a purely secular level, it was 
MacMahon’s desire to create mixed schools for native Algerians and Europeans that 
allowed civilian authorities to begin their attempt to secularize the public schools of 
Algeria. Significantly, although MacMahon intended the circular to alter the relationship 
between colonial settlers and native Algerians, the decision of the municipal council of 
Algiers to purposefully misinterpret the circular and apply it only to Catholic 
missionaries and schools again reveals that a preoccupation with creating a utopian settler 
community repeatedly trumped the ideal of assimilating conquered Algerians to French 
civilization. Indeed, colonial rule rested entirely on the requirement that this latter 
assimilation not occur. As Cooper has written, “the extent to which difference across 
space is institutionalized is important to constituting empire…for if incorporation ceased 
to entail differentiation, it could result in a relatively homogenous polity that becomes 
more nation-like and less empire-like.”3 To complicate even this nuanced appraisal, we 
can assert that civilian officials failed even in their attempt to mold a homogenous polity 
of Europeans – one that would have constituted a nation within a more heterogeneous 
polity that they hoped would continue to exist as an empire. 
 The proclamation of the Third Republic on 4 September 1870 and the nominal 
institution of full civilian rule in Algeria did not mark a decisive shift for missionaries in 
Algeria. Rather, it accelerated two previously existing trends without allowing either to 
come to full fruition. First, in a brief period between 1870 and 1872 civilian municipal 
councils sought to build on previous efforts of the council of Algiers and continue the 
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trend of secularizing the public schools. Second, and as part of this first trend, these 
councils aimed to consolidate civilian authority over Algeria and bring the territory fully 
in line with the metropolitan rule of law. In neither case did they succeed. They failed 
because the advent of the Third Republic did little to clarify the position of (religious) 
foreigners in French Algeria – foreigners who, much like native Algerians, continued to 
“build lives in the crevices of colonial power, deflecting, appropriating, or reinterpreting 
the teachings and preachings thrust upon them.”4 The continued impotence of colonial 
authority led even staunchly republican officials in the metropole to continue to empower 
a military governor general to ensure he continued to meet the religious needs of these 
colonists. As such, the governor general cited the failure to fully transition to civilian rule 
– that is to enfranchise all the Europeans of Algeria – to justify his continued, always 
contested, position of authority and to unilaterally reinstall the missionary teachers. 
 The real legal transition from military to civilian rule in the European communes 
of Algeria came in 1883 and 1889; but this transition failed to have the desired effect of 
uniting the settler community. In 1883, the government rendered public education free, 
obligatory, and secular for all Europeans of Algeria and in 1889 it granted citizenship to 
all Europeans born on French territory, including Algeria. The 1883 law had a profound 
effect on missionaries, as it forced them to open private schools; and without a willing 
bishop to serve as their patron they drastically curtailed their activity. At the same time, 
missionaries continued to work due to the ongoing religiosity of the non-French 
population. As a result, the law of 1889 only proved a boon for missionary work and a 
source of further division for the settler community. It empowered the previously 
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disenfranchised religious element of the territory to use their new political rights to 
provide support for Catholic missionaries. Further, the law even had the totally 
unexpected effect of allowing a congregation of foreign missionaries to arrive in Algeria 
and further divide the foreign and neo-French settlers from the ethnically French settlers. 
Finally, although the official legal assimilation of Algeria to France was finalized with 
the application of the Combes laws of secularization in 1904, the creation of a united 
settler community remained elusive up until the First World War.  
 As this re-periodization shows, these changes and continuities enveloped many 
more colonial actors than just missionaries alone. In many ways the history of 
missionaries in Algeria is the history of the settler population on a more general level, a 
history that, Jennifer Sessions has written, “remains the least known aspect of the decades 
of the conquest,” or indeed beyond.5 Like missionaries, settlers saw Algeria as a land of 
opportunity in which they could achieve levels of autonomy and professional 
advancement unattainable in the more constraining legal confines of the metropole. Both 
secular and religious settlers exhibited traits of ambition and opportunism, and held 
grandiose visions of success.6 At the same time, missionaries and civilians alike often 
found a rude awakening upon their arrival as they encountered unexpected obstacles in a 
territory where competition served as the rule, and collaboration the exception. 
 Historian Pierre Nora has argued that “the history of Algeria cannot be written 
according to its laws: its history is the manner in which the French of Algeria have gotten 
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around them.”7 The most successful European migrants to the southern shores of the 
Mediterranean understood quickly that professional and personal advancement did not 
entail working within the rule of law. Rather, it resulted from the ability to cultivate 
relationships with powerful authorities. At the same time, these relationships were 
constantly shifting, and settlers and missionaries had to remain cognizant of the fact that 
the personal preferences of one holder of authority did not necessarily extend to his 
successor, or even to his own allies. Settlers thus had to constantly recalibrate their 
strategies based on the very specific historical moment they inhabited and the individual 
personalities of their chosen patrons. As such, more than in the metropole, alliances and 
rifts among European settlers did not divide neatly between a secular and clerical camp. 
These allegiances cut across the entire settler population, and often one’s staunchest 
source of opposition came from one’s closest acquaintance, who also provided the most 
direct source of professional and personal competition. As such, missionaries frequently 
courted secular, typically military, officials to eliminate their closest competitors. As the 
Catholic clergy as a whole became more embattled, this competition in no way abated. 
 Finally, for missionaries and lay settlers alike, the opportunity for extralegal 
advancement diminished as the nineteenth century progressed and the metropolitan rule 
of law slowly, fitfully, and haphazardly came to apply to Algeria. At the same time, the 
discourses surrounding missionaries, their supporters, and faith in general only exhibited 
increasing confusion. Indeed, throughout the nineteenth century these discourses proved 
especially dense and, as a result, especially variegated. Their incoherence resulted in part 
from their seemingly incongruous strategic invocations of a population that often seems 
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absent in this analysis just as it often seemed absent in the words of contemporaries 
themselves: the overwhelming majority of the marginalized Muslim subjects of French 
Algeria. If explicit mention of native Algerians rarely figured in the colonial discourses 
examined here, it is because the colonists wanted them not to figure in the larger social 
and political landscape of Algeria. If this study demonstrates anything about the native 
population of Algeria it is that, despite any rhetoric of assimilation or association, they 
remained throughout the period up to the First World War utterly and completely Other.8 
 At the same time, they stubbornly continued to exist. As Oissilia Saaïdia has 
written, “whether invisible or visible, [Algeria’s Muslims] were always present.”9 When 
we do catch glimpses of native Algerians in colonial discourses about or by missionaries 
they primarily served as inanimate and eternal objects of strategic invocation, conjured 
up to justify a particular argument for or against a certain ideal of settler society. 
Missionaries claimed that Algerians would never respect a colonial state that did not 
respect its own national religion, while civilian officials countered that French Algeria 
must remain entirely secular so that Catholics did not offend Muslims with their religious 
ceremonies and sensibilities. In neither case did such discourses reflect the real concerns 
of their authors. In practice, neither civilian officials nor missionaries exhibited respect 
for the Muslims of Algeria or the Islamic faith. Missionaries wanted only to convert 
them, while civilian officials wanted only that they remain invisible. As such, an analysis 
of these discourses draws upon historian Mary Lewis’ methodological framework already 
                                                
8 Alice Conklin has argued that in French West Africa this was not the case. French officials took their 
civilizing mission seriously and it was their very desire to elevate West Africans to French civilization that 
impelled the French to adopt punitive institutions of forced labor and separate legal codes. Conklin, A 
Mission to Civilize. The primary difference between the two territories, it seems, stemmed from the sheer 
size and reactionary nature of the settler population in Algeria. 
9 Oissilia Saaïdia, “Algérie et Tunisie: le repli en terre d'islam?,” in Le grand exil des congrégations 
religieuses françaises, 1901–1914, edited by Patrick Cabanel and Jean-Dominique Durand (Paris: Le Cerf, 
2005), 333. 
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described in the introduction to this dissertation. Lewis calls for an approach that looks 
for power differentials within colonial society while still recognizing unequal relations of 
collective power between colonizer and colonized.10 For in the end, despite the divisions 
between and among secular and religious settlers, they continued as a collectivity to 
wield a degree of authority largely unattainable for native Algerians. 
 Finally, as the dissonance between these discourses and practices reveals, official 
policies of assimilation and association towards the Algerian population remained 
stillborn in the realm of metropolitan ideologies. The same was not the case, however, 
when applied to the European settler community. Although rarely articulated as such, 
military, civilian, and ecclesiastical officials understood the urgency in the need to 
somehow spread civilization to this horde of often poor and ignorant Europeans. As the 
earlier remark by Frederick Cooper demonstrates, assimilating or associating indigènes to 
French society would completely obviate the very raison d’être of the entire imperial 
enterprise by creating a homogenous polity that was more “nation-like” than “empire-
like.” At the same time, Cooper leaves unarticulated the other side of this equation: that 
the application of such policies to the European community would help perpetuate the 
very ideological justification of imperialism. Only once the European settlers possessed 
the civilized habits of the universal French citizen could they then justify their alleged 
desire to spread this civilization to conquered colonial subjects. Without this civilization, 
settlers themselves threatened to assume the uncivilized traits of the supposedly inferior 
Algerians. 
                                                
10 Mary Lewis, Divided Rule: Sovereignty and Empire in French Tunisia, 1881-1938 (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 2014), 6. 
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 Ultimately, settlers and missionaries could not agree on a common definition of 
civilization or even in which direction to look to locate its ideal manifestation. David 
Prochaska has written that “perhaps the single most characteristic feature of the colonial 
city is its plural nature, the fact that it is comprised of a mixture of ethnic and racial 
groups.”11 Although the arguments put forth in this dissertation support this contention of 
Prochaska’s, they contest his corollary argument that “we should not lose sight of the 
primary fact…[that] the Europeans were never so isolated [from each other] as to 
preclude assimilation and acculturation.”12 In making this argument, Prochaska applied 
Eugen Weber’s analysis of the assimilating influence of French public schools in the 
metropole onto colonial Algeria.13 Prochaska wrote specifically that “this amalgamation 
[of the European population of Algeria] was itself effected by the school, by the street, by 
the barracks.”14 Even if we accept Weber’s analysis as unproblematic, an in-depth 
examination of alternative sites that held the potential to effect assimilation and 
acculturation reveals that another, nearly equally pervasive set of institutions in Algeria – 
as in France – continued to hinder such efforts of assimilation.  
 If we take as the objects of our analysis the Catholic school, the parish church, 
and the religious orphanage, we can identify a powerful counter current that, rather than 
assimilate and acculturate, sought to associate and to impart a particular religious 
subjectivity that deviated from the universalism of French republicans. Moreover, more 
than in France, this particular subjectivity provided a political danger to colonial rule 
because of the very numerical inferiority of ethnically French citizens and the numerical 
                                                
11 Prochaska, Making Algeria French, 18. 
12 Prochaska, Making Algeria French, 165. 
13 Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen. 
14 Prochaska, Making Algeria French, 208. 
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preponderance of their foreign or neo-French European neighbors. In Algeria, the 
universal ideal of French citizenship was in fact embodied in a very small proportion of 
the population. Paradoxically, this group’s very standing as a minority only radicalized its 
universalist discourses and sentiments, just as it in turn radicalized the religious 
sentiments of Algeria’s Catholics. The French elite feared that their authority rested on 
ultimately tenuous foundations and that, especially as geopolitical tensions rose around 
the turn of the century, the Catholic foreigners represented a fifth column waiting to ally 
with the government of their homeland and undermine imperial rule from within. 
 The question of whether or not this fear was well founded is less important than 
what it reveals about the anxieties, uncertainties, and confusion that beset imperial rule in 
any context. These ambivalences get to the heart of the fundamental paradox of settler 
colonialism. Colonial states desired ardently that settlers serve as their representatives on 
the ground – that in their superior economic status, their superior rationality, and their 
superior culture they could demonstrate the incontestability and inevitability of European 
dominance. As this analysis has shown, this dominance was never incontestable or 
inevitable. We can see its fictive nature in the reams of government documents that 
questioned whether to subject this settler population to the rule of law, or whether to 
maintain a more authoritarian regime in order to force the settlers to adopt and exhibit 
their superior sentiments and their superior rationality. We can see it in the stubborn 
refusal of Algeria’s Catholics to shed their own “fanaticism,” to accept French secular 
culture, and to differentiate themselves from Algeria’s colonized subjects. Far from 
diminishing over time, the anxieties caused by the very fictitiousness of European 
supremacy only grew throughout the nineteenth century as European inadequacies came 
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clearly and incontestably into view. Nowhere were these anxieties more apparent than in 
officials’ repeated attempts to channel and control the faith of missionaries and their 
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